United States
U.S. v. Mohamud
Decision Date: December 5, 2016
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a lower court ruling that the incidental collection of a U.S. citizen's activities online under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) did not violate the Appellant's Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure. The Appeals Court also held that the District Court properly rejected the Appellant's entrapment defense. The monitoring of a foreign national's email account from inside the U.S. revealed emails between the foreign national and the Appellant, Mohamed Osman Mohamud which led the government to obtain a FISA warrant to monitor the defendant's account. The FBI subsequently carried out an undercover operation in which they arranged for Mohamud to believe he was to detonate a bomb at the Portland Christmas tree lighting ceremony. The Court reasoned that because the collection of Mohamud's communications occurred incidentally during lawful surveillance of a foreign national outside the U.S. under Section 702, there was no violation of Mohamud's Fourth Amendment rights either on the incidental collection of emails or on their use to obtain a FISA warrant to surveil Mohamud and his activities.
Doe v. Coleman
Decision Date: September 22, 2016
The Supreme Court of Kentucky refused to allow the disclosure of the identity of anonymous users of a website who allegedly defamed a public figure, Hickman, because he failed to provide sufficient evidence proving the falsity of the statements. The Court reasoned that because Hickman brought the case, he bore the burden of proof, but his bare denials failed to reach a sufficient standard to convince the court to pierce the anonymous protection that the John Does were afforded. Baring evidence for a prima facie showing, the Court was unable to move to the next step of balancing the First Amendment right to anonymous speech with the right of those harmed to seek redress. The Court also reiterated the importance of free speech especially when it is political in nature and aimed at public officials but, also, that this freedom is subject to limitations.
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