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Amid rising concerns of curtailed academic freedoms, U.S. universities are increasingly closing down Confucius Institutes, which are Chinese government-funded centers offering Mandarin-language and cultural courses that at one point numbered over 100 in North America alone. Samuel Brazys and Alexander Dukalskis, authors of a new AidData working paper on the topic, write in the Washington Post that the institutes have had limited success in improving China’s image abroad as part of a broader soft power campaign. A year ago, a group of UMass Boston students, alumni, and professors asked to meet with the chancellor to discuss concerns that the campus’ Confucius Institute was promoting censorship and curtailing academic freedom. Today, interim chancellor Katherine Newman cited nationwide concerns when announcing the university would be ending its 12 year relationship with the Institute. Instead, the university will pursue a partnership with Renmin University. This closely follows closures at North Carolina State University and the University of Michigan. At Commonwealth Magazine, Colman M. Herman reports:

The Chinese government says it promotes the Confucius Institutes throughout the US as tools for cultural exchange. The institute at UMass offered non-credit classes in Chinese language and culture, programs for UMass students to study in China, professional development programs for Chinese language teachers, and Chinese proficiency testing. UMass Boston paid the director’s $100,000 salary and provided office space, while China provided $250,000 and paid the salaries of four or five teachers.

[…] Others have expressed concern that the Confucius institutes are used by the Chinese government as outposts for espionage.  The FBI has said that it monitors the activities of the institutes.

US Rep. Seth Moulton has also raised concerns publicly about the institutes and in a private discussion with Newman. On his Facebook page, Moulton said the intent of the Confucius Institutes is to “distort academic discourse on China, threaten and silence defenders of human rights, and create a climate intolerant of dissent or open discussion.”

Twelve other academic institutions, including the University of Chicago, Pennsylvania State University, the University of Michigan, the University of Rhode Island, and Texas A&M, have severed ties with Confucius Institutes. Tufts University in Medford has said it will soon decide on whether to renew the school’s agreement with its Confucius Institute. [Source]

Cornell suspended exchange and research programs with Renmin University after it blacklisted and monitored over a dozen Renmin student labor activists.

The University of South Florida closed its 10-year old Confucius Institute on New Year’s Eve, citing declining enrollment in Chinese studies rather than national security concerns. At The Tampa Bay Times, Howard Altman and Megan Reeves report:

USF said only 65 students total were enrolled in its four Chinese courses this fall, compared to 191 in spring 2014.

[…] However, university officials did concede that the national security concerns of U.S. government officials played a role in the decision — specifically when it comes to federal funding. In August, President Donald Trump signed the $717 billion 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. Inside is a provision that limits federal funding to colleges and universities with Chinese ties, and the provost said USF was unwilling to pass on those funds.

[…] USF World vice president Roger Brindley, whose division manages the university’s global partnerships, led the inquiry. It was started soon after U.S. Sen. Marco Rubio wrote letters to USF and four other Florida schools with Confucius Institutes in February, urging leaders to end their relationships with the Chinese government.

[…] The institutes are “cogs in a larger wheel” of effort by China to increase its global influence through the acquisition of science and technology, Giordano said. Having such a physical presence on campuses provides the Chinese government with the potential to gather data and intelligence “that can be leveraged for other agendas, whether economic and market or … national security.”

[…] “But there is no direct history of that,” Giordano said, adding that calls to close the institutes is more of a preventative measure than a response to any specific threat. [Source]

At Inside Higher Ed, Elizabeth Redden details the changing reasons as to why American universities are increasingly closing down the institutes:

[University of Chicago professor] Marshall Sahlins […] said he thinks the main reason for the closures is “pressure from the American right, including the National Association of Scholars [which issued a critical report of CIs in 2017], as well as lawmakers, and from security agencies of the U.S., notably the FBI: a coalition of political forces responding distantly to the developing Cold War with China — raising even older terrors such as Communism and the Yellow Peril — and proximately to drumbeat rumors that CIs are centers of espionage. Those that give other, face-saving reasons are probably protecting their academic cum financial relations to China, such their intake of tuition-paying mainland students.”

“Apparently the tide is beginning to turn, though for the wrong reasons,” Sahlins said. “As I said in my Inside Higher Ed op-ed last year, we are now in a pick-your-poison, lose-lose situation: either keep the CIs or allow the U.S. government to interfere in the curriculum — mimicking the Chinese [Communist] Party-State.”

[…] Other institutions that have announced closures of Confucius Institutes within the last 12 months include the Universities of Iowa, Michigan at Ann Arbor and Minnesota at Twin Cities and North Carolina State University. In addition to these institutions, Tufts University has charged a committee with reviewing its CI, and a decision on whether to renew the CI agreement when it expires in June has not been made yet pending receipt of the committee’s recommendations.

The recently announced closures follow on closures of the CIs at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, in 2017; Pennsylvania State University, in 2014; and the University of Chicago, where more than 100 faculty members had signed a petition calling for the closure in 2014. North of the border, in Ontario, McMaster University closed its CI in 2013 after a visiting instructor from China claimed the university was “giving legitimization to discrimination” because her contract with Hanban — the Chinese government entity that sponsors the institutes — prohibited her participation in the religious organization Falun Gong. [Source]

Concerns over China’s curtailing of academic freedoms have also been prevalent within China. In December, British academic publisher Taylor and Francis acquiesced to Chinese government requests and dropped over 80 journals from its China offerings due to “inappropriate” content. This followed the August 2017 saga of Cambridge University Press reversing its decision to hide from Chinese users 315 journal articles and 1,000 e-books covering the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, policies toward Tibetans and Uyghurs, Taiwan, and the Cultural Revolution. This also coincided with the Association of Asian Studies receiving—and refusing to honor—similar censorship requests for articles also largely focused on Tibet and the Cultural Revolution.

Meanwhile in Africa, whose Confucius Institutes have been questioned for their ability to adequately train China-bound African scholars, Kenya will start teaching Mandarin to elementary school students in 2020, with the primary goal of increasing job competitiveness and deepening trade ties with China. Additionally, the Chinese government is providing Uganda with textbooks and tutors for its new compulsory Mandarin courses, which are currently mandatory for the first two years of secondary school at 35 schools. This follows South Africa’s decision to offer Mandarin in early 2016—despite strong resistance from teachers’ unions.

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Post tags: academic censorship, academic freedom, Africa, confucius institute, Cultural Revolution, espionage, foreign universities, mandarin, self-censorship, soft power
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A recent exposé by Kenyan newspaper the Daily Nation details a host of risks to Kenyan sovereignty and national resources inherent in a loan agreement highly favorable to China signed with the state-owned Export-Import (Exim) Bank of China in May 2011. Such risks had last month been cited in media reports as an example of growing controversy over Xi Jinping’s ambitious infrastructure inestment plan, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Included among the risks alleged to come with the Standard Gauge Railroad (SGR) loan are Beijing’s possible seizure of critical resources such as ports and airports should Kenya default; Chinese law governing the pact; all relevant arbitration being handled by Beijing; and a confidentiality clause barring Nairobi from detailing citizens about the deal without direct written permission from China. Following the January 13 release of his original exposé, the Daily Nation’s Edwin Okoth summarizes the major points in a report that Kenyan officials are struggling to save face in the wake of the revelations:

The loan contract Nairobi entered into with Beijing has several clauses that heavily favour China and compel Kenya to make many compromises, with the most controversial one being the waiver of sovereignty on assets.

Sovereign lending deals do not usually include the offering of collateral by the borrower, which explains why China’s angling for Kenyan national assets has puzzled many within and outside government.

[…] Because of the collateral clauses, Kenya’s cash-rich parastatals and firms risk Chinese takeover in case of a default.

Among them is the Mombasa-headquartered Kenya Ports Authority, whose exposure risk was recently the subject of an audit query by the Auditor-General. […] [Source]

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, who has been friendly with Beijing since taking office, last month dismissed criticism of the deal’s risk as “pure propaganda,” and according to reports has similarly dismissed the recent exposé. China’s Foreign Ministry has also waved off earlier questions about the deal being a debt trap.

A report from Voice of America contextualizes the “debt-trap diplomacy” on display in the SGR loan with other active Chinese international infrastructure loans under the BRI:

The Nation didn’t reveal how it acquired the contract, nor how it determined its authenticity.

But language in the document closely matches contracts VOA uncovered for projects tied to the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s trillion-dollar global infrastructure plan, in Serbia, Kyrgyzstan and Guyana, suggesting the terms of the Kenya loan, from asset seizure and confidentiality clauses to stipulations about using Chinese vendors, may reflect Bejing’s lending practices across Africa, and beyond. [Source]

More on how the collateral clause has recalled unease about the BRI from the South China Morning Post’s Kristin Huang, who cites a relevant example:

The prospect that China might at some point be able to seize Kenya’s prized port of Mombasa has caused public confusion and alarm and again raised questions about the risks of participating in China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”.

[…] The country’s current debt to China is understood to be about US$9.8 billion, which has funded large chunks of national infrastructure, including a number of highways and the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) which provides a high-speed connection between Mombasa and Nairobi, the country’s capital, to facilitate the import and export of goods.

[…D]espite Chinese President Xi Jinping saying the initiative was “an open and inclusive process, and not about creating exclusive circles or a China club”, the belt and road project has been criticised by many as a tool used by Beijing to encourage dependence on China.

[…] In July, 2017 Sri Lanka agreed to lease the Hambantota Port to China Merchant Port Holdings for 99 years for US$1.4 billion to settle unpaid debts to China.

The port, which was built with Chinese money borrowed by Sri Lanka, is now in Chinese hands. [Source]

Close Kenya ally, neighbor to Sri Lanka, and longtime BRI critic India is reportedly watching the situation in Kenya closely. Earlier this month, a report showed that China had in 2016 offered its political leverage be applied to quash international probes into a local scandal in Malaysia in exchange for BRI-related contracts, another episode attracting further critique to Xi’s massive initiative.

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Post tags: Belt and Road Initiative, debt, infrastructure, kenya, uhuru kenyatta
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The following censorship instructions, issued to the media by government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online.

Everyone: although this vaccine incident occurred in Jinhu [county], it is extremely likely to spread throughout the city. I hope everyone will get an idea of the overall situation across the city, and that we can pull through this crisis together.

Related requirements are as follows:

1. Strictly control calls to action or inflammatory information related to the Jinhu vaccine situation on self-media and other platforms.
2. If you discover calls to action, inflammatory information, or attacks on the Party committee or government on forums outside the city, report promptly with links and screenshots. (January 12, 2019) [Chinese]

This directive was issued by a propaganda official in Huai’an city, Jiangsu province. New York Times’ Sui-Lee Wee and Elsie Chen reported protests in Jinhu following news that 145 children had received expired polio vaccines.

Hundreds of angry parents gathered on Friday outside the county government office, some of them scuffling with police officers, according to the police in Jinhu and videos that went viral on WeChat, a popular social media tool.

Dozens of protesters surrounded the party secretary of Jinhu, chanting: “Beat him, beat him.”

“None of us wanted to beat the party secretary, but perhaps several people were quite emotional,” said a mother surnamed Sun who had tried unsuccessfully to check official websites for information about three vaccine doses given to her 1-year-old son. “All we wanted was an explanation from him.”

Ms. Sun said the local police had warned her not to accept interview requests on the subject, “especially from the foreign media.” “I don’t dare to trust China’s vaccines anymore,” Ms. Sun said.

[…] In a statement on Saturday, the police in Jinhu said they had detained three men for “inciting trouble.” They said that parents of children who had not received the expired vaccines “took the opportunity to create trouble, spread rumors, incite people to gather, block government gates and traffic, and disrupt public order.” [Source]

Macquarie University’s Kevin Carrico commented on the Jiangsu case, linking it to earlier scandals involving vaccines, milk powder contamination and alleged child abuse:

Milk powder, vaccines, the kindergarten scandals… how many crimes have been committed against the young and defenseless, then concealed for “stability,” meaning that the problem remains unresolved and the cycle starts over?

— Kevin Carrico (@kevincarrico) January 13, 2019

For more on stability maintenance in the wake of “sudden incidents,” see CDT’s 2017 interview with SFU historian Jeremy Brown.

13 local health officials have reportedly been dismissed in Jiangsu, while others remain under investigation. Expired doses are usually simply ineffective, but there have been reports of fevers, rashes, coughing, and vomiting, and widespread anxiety surrounds vaccine safety following earlier scandals. CDT published directives on coverage of earlier cases last summer and in March 2016. Last month, Sixth Tone’s Ni Dandan wrote about the lasting effects of earlier scandals, reportedly including deaths, disabilities, and chronic illnesses, and about reservations with the government’s legislative response:

Following this summer’s scandal, China in November released its first draft law on vaccine management for public inspection. The draft law would impose stricter penalties for any illegal practices in the industry; establish a system to track the production, distribution, and administration of vaccines; and set up a formalized compensation system for victims of substandard vaccinations. It would also impose stricter penalties for any illegal practices in the industry, including hefty fines for fake vaccines or fraudulent inspection records.

But Beijing Fahuan Law Firm lawyer Wang Peng — no relation to Wang Shixia — says that the law’s vague wording still leaves the vaccine system open to abuse. “At present, medical associations decide whether there is any connection between a vaccine and a patient’s reaction to it,” he says. “But the members of [medical association] appraisal boards include hospital doctors. These people might be receiving certain benefits under the table.”

[…] Lu, the Guangzhou-based professor, agrees with Wang’s analysis, telling Sixth Tone that such a third party would have to include people from all walks of life, not just doctors and medical professionals. “This would benefit information transparency and make the results more convincing,” he says, adding that grassroots medical practitioners at community-level hospitals should receive more training to diagnose abnormal reactions to vaccinations, so that victims can receive timely care. [Source]

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth

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Post tags: censorship, children, children's health, Directives from the Ministry of Truth, health care, Internet censorship, Internet control, Jiangsu, media control, online censorship, vaccines
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