China's Nuclear Forces; China-India Brief; Taiwan; The South China Sea; Change in China's Military Strategy; PLA RF night exercises

I. The Big Story: China’s Nuclear Forces

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission conducted a hearing on China’s nuclear forces on June 10, 2021. China’s force expansion and modernisation, upgrading delivery and support systems, and implications for the US, allies, partners and the Indo-Pacific region were major discussion points during this hearing. I have highlighted some important issues from the testimonies.

I) Chinese Nuclear Hardware, Delivery Systems and Supporting Infrastructure

Force Modernisation and Increase in Warheads

I found Dr Hans Kristensen’s testimony extremely interesting and insightful. Broadly, he outlined four phases of China's nuclear modernisation, addressed the ongoing modernisation drive, discussed various estimates of the Chinese nuclear warhead stockpile size, and outlined projections for its potential future development.

Developments in the Four phases:
- Phase 1 (1960s and 1970s): Introduction of bombers, liquid fuel MRBMs like the DF-1 and DF-2.

- Phase 2 (1980s and 1990s): Silo-based ICBMs that could reach India, Russia and nearly all of the US. Also, the introduction of the first solid-fueled road-mobile MRBM (the DF-21) and experimental SSBM Type 092.

- Phase 3 (first and half-decade of the 2000s): Introduction of the DF-31, an upgrade on the DF-5 (MIRVs), a small SSBN fleet, and fielding the DF21 C/D.

- Phase 4: The fourth modernisation phase is currently underway. China is fielding a broad set of nuclear weapons systems that appear intended to upgrade older systems, add new types, and eventually, develop a triad of long-range strategic forces complemented by medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The PLARF force structure currently includes at least 40 missile brigade bases, of which up to half might have nuclear capability.

On the nuclear stockpile, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) published that China’s nuclear warhead stockpile is currently estimated to be in the low-200 range. Dr Kristensen interprets the low 200 number as warheads only assigned to the operational launchers with an active nuclear mission. “Warheads produced for new launchers that had not become operational - such as the DF-41 and the two additional Type 094 submarines, or a small number of bombs potentially held in deep storage for a secondary contingency mission for a small number of H-6 bombers - might not be included in the count...We put our Chinese stockpile estimate at around 320 warheads,” highlights Dr Kristensen.

He has also made an excellent table on changes in Chinese force structure if the stockpile doubles/triples/quadruples. I am attaching it here, do check the testimony for details.

China’s NC3 Systems

Dr Phillip Saunders’ testimony focuses on China’s Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3) systems and how these systems could adapt to new naval and air force nuclear capabilities.

Dr Saunders argues that the PLAN operates China’s SSBNs and presumably receives alert and launch orders from the CMC and conveys those orders to SSBNs on patrol. Communications with SSBNs on patrol are a significant operational challenge, especially if submarines are deployed into the deep ocean. He claims that the PLA has built a super-low frequency (SLF) transmitter capable of communicating with submarines at 30–300 hertz frequencies. The PLA is also researching the extremely low frequency and satellite communications, facilitating communications with SSBNs submerged to 100-meter depths or below. The effectiveness of these naval NC3 systems in an operational environment is unknown. Some analysts assess that the potential unreliability of these communications systems in a crisis or conflict might lead China to pre-delegate launch authority to SSBN commanders and political commissars, although such a decision would be inconsistent with the CCP’s emphasis on negative control and insistence on controlling key military decisions.

For the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), he claims that China has designated the air-refuellable H-6N as a nuclear-capable bomber that will likely carry air-launched ballistic missiles derived from the DF-21. China is also reportedly developing a new long-range strategic stealth nuclear-capable bomber. The PLAAF headquarters will likely maintain operational control of these nuclear assets, as they do with other strategic assets such as conventional bombers, some special mission aircraft, transports, and the Airborne Corps.

Mark Hibbs also has a testimony in the same section, which focuses on China’s Military Civil Integration and dual-use technologies.

II) Why is China Expanding and Modernising its Nuclear Forces?

Drivers for China’s Shifting Nuclear Posture

Dr Christopher Twomey discusses the key elements behind China’s strategic nuclear posture and the drivers behind a gradual shift

External Drivers:

1) US’s development and deployment of advanced missile defence systems: (Ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California, joint deployment of the SM-3 Block IIA systems with Japan and exploration of multi-object kill vehicles. Also, deployment of low-yield W76-2).

2) Concerns in the regional strategic arena: The US worries about the growth of China’s arsenal to 5 per cent, perhaps 10 per cent, of its today’s arsenal. How should China view India, which already has 75 per cent of China’s arsenal?

3) Furthermore, China has three other nuclear powers on its borders: Russia, North Korea and Pakistan.

Internal Drivers:

1) Organisational politics in the PLA RF: Given that the officers move back and forth across the force, it is likely this leads to some desire to think about how China’s nuclear forces might be used in less traditional ways.

2) Budgetary priorities: We know very little about how budgetary preferences are assessed, and how relative prioritisation is conducted. Given the steady elevation of what is now called the PLA-Rocket Force in institutional heft, it is likely that it has also given it a greater voice in internal debates over priorities. That likely will lead to some added budgets but also more of a voice in shaping doctrine.

Continuity and Change in China’s Nuclear Doctrine, the way China Might use the weapons

David Logan’s testimony examines aspects of continuity and change in China’s nuclear doctrine, the features and drivers of nuclear strategy, and how China might use its nuclear weapons.

He claims that China’s nuclear doctrine, structures and operations are consistent with both a continued nuclear strategy of assured retaliation and with the adoption of a shift to a new and more expansive nuclear strategy. But regardless of the limited strategic aims for which China might design its nuclear doctrine, forces, and operations, Chinese capabilities today can increasingly support more than merely an assured retaliation posture. China’s nuclear stockpile is increasing, the number of missile brigades has increased from 29 to 40 in just three years, and there is an attempt to expand credible sea and airlegs. He claims that the ongoing trends within China’s nuclear forces will likely increase pressures for raising their alert status. The growing entanglement of conventional and nuclear forces may lead nuclear units to adopt practices and policies previously isolated to the conventional forces, leading to increased readiness among nuclear units.

Finally, he also emphasises the point that there is no clear distinction between China’s theatre and strategic nuclear forces. They are distinguished by basing, locations, range and lesser extent by yields. The primary strategic systems are consistent with the silo-based and some road-mobile intercontinental-range system garrisoned at the heart of the country. In comparison, theatre-based systems are largely road-mobile and are garrisoned near China’s borders. The available evidence, however, doesn’t distinguish between the roles assigned to the strategic and theatre nuclear forces. Much more in the testimony.

Similarly, Dr Caitlin Talmadge's testimony highlights US-China engagement's changing nature, which risks raising nuclear use. She focuses on China's improving mobility of the nuclear forces, investments in sea-based nuclear deterrents and ambiguous modernisation (the DF-21 and DF-26), and the impact these developments would have on the changing dynamic of the US-China engagement.

Two plausible pathways to Chinese nuclear use: Asymmetric nuclear escalation and escalation in response to conventional counterforce.

III) Implications for the US and Region

Dr Abraham Denmark has discussed how the US’s partners and allies view China’s nuclear modernisation in general and engaged in country-wise analysis on how each state is reacting to it. On India, he argues that New Delhi views China’s nuclear modernisation as a direct challenge. Although the India-China relationship has grown to be antagonistic, its nuclear relationship is stable. New Delhi’s strategy towards China looks like “counter value assured retaliation.” Indian strategists are worried about China’s technological advances, which may drive Beijing to adjust its NFU. Indian strategists also worry about a collusive nuclear threat between China and Pakistan, arguing that it makes the Indian arsenal insufficient. There is more in this testimony on Japan, Australia and Taiwan. Do read the full testimony.

Also, there are two more testimonies by Valarie Lincy on China’s role in the proliferation of missile and nuclear technologies and Dr Brad Roberts’ testimony on China in US deterrence strategy. Do take a look, I am not covering it since I couldn’t find time to read them.

II. Developing Stories

China-India Brief

This month marks the first anniversary of the Galwan Valley clash between China and India, which resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian and at least four PLA soldiers. It also marks the first fatalities on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in over 45 years resulting from China’s attempts to change the status quo forcefully in Ladakh. The initial Chinese incursion was located at four points — Pangong Tso, the approach roads to the Depsang Plain, Gogra and Hotspring areas and Galwan Valley — which both China and India consider to be on their side of the LAC but were previously controlled by New Delhi.

The Galwan Valley clash on the night of 15 June 2020 shattered three decades of trust and confidence established by five pacts signed between 1993 and 2012. Today, after thirteen months of friction, eleven rounds of Corps Commander-level meetings, seven Work Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) meetings and at least two known interactions between India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the two sides have only disengaged at Galwan and Pangong Tso.

Dinakar Peri reports for the Hindu this week that the PLA has built additional accommodation in the depth areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and is preparing for a long haul. “The PLA has built additional accommodations, both permanent and temporary, in Rudok, Kangxiwar, Gyantse and Golmud areas. Construction of field hospitals and procurement of additional snow mobility vehicles by the PLA also indicate that they are preparing for the long haul and permanent winter occupation of these posts,” claims the report. The report also claims that the Chinese troops near the Pangong Lake have been rotated. China’s 4th and 6th divisions were withdrawn from Pangong Lake's banks to Rutog County for repairs in February and returned to Xinjiang for repairs in the past three weeks. They were replaced by the 8th and 11th Divisions. Each division has two mobile infantry regiments, an armoured regiment, an artillery regiment and an air defence regiment, claims the Hindu report.

This development is indicative of the fact that the PLA plans to stay for a longer duration. There was one commentary in the Global Times’ Chinese edition arguing on similar lines (Prof M Taylor Fravel mentioned this in the Centre for Policy Research panel discussion on the road ahead for Sino-Indian relations). The commentary roughly argues that India’s economy is weaker than China and it’s taken a hit due to the ongoing pandemic. China is relatively more comfortable in such deployments along the border than India. It’s a war of attrition and it would be difficult for the Indian economy to sustain such deployment in the longer term.

Meanwhile, @detresfa_, @Simtack and @theintellab joined forces to uncover China’s massive air architecture expansion in Tibet in the last few years. Using satellite imagery, they have reviewed eight airfields in Tibet to uncover the massive expansion China is undertaking.

For instance,

Hotan Base: Second runway, new support and maintenance area, several hangars for UAVs and underground tunnels. Hotan is situated very close to the ongoing stand-off sites.

Ngari Gunsa base: 12 hardened air shelters, new maintenance and support area and surface to air missile deployment within the airbase. Authors claim that new hardened air shelters were due to the arrival of Rafales at the Ambala Air Force station located just across the border from Ngari Gunsa.

Lhasa airbase: 24 hardened shelters under construction, new helicopter staging area under construction with heliports and ongoing construction of several underground facilities near the PLA AF base. This was the primary airbase serving Chinese air power during the Doklam stand-off.

Kashgar airbase: Extension apron, which is home to the H-6 bombers, and HQ-9 surface to air missiles. The base witnessed H-6 bombers arrival during the ongoing 2020 China-India stand-off.

Changdu Bangda airport: New underground facilities and two long operational runways.

New Airbases under construction: Tingri, Tashkorgan and Damxung.

Moving on, The Economist reports that China will soon inaugurate a 435 km stretch on the Tibet-Sichuan railway line. The railway line has tremendous strategic utility for China as it increases connectivity for the 77 Group Army’s multiple infantry, motorised, armoured and special operations brigades based around Chengdu and Chongqing. It also passes extremely close to the border at Nyingchi. The full railway line would be operational by 2030.

It’s not that only China is upgrading its facilities. India is also responding to the Chinese aggression and infrastructure development. India’s Border Roads Organisation has recently launched two tactically important bridges towards Doka La and Yangtse. “Launch of Indigenously-developed (by GRSE) 140’ double lane Class-70 modular bridge in Sikkim (to Dokala) is complete, and forward location of Yangtse in Arunachal Pradesh is now connected with road,” claims the report. The Indian Army also got the delivery of specialised boats for deployment in Pangong Tso. The Army had inked two contracts for specialised boats after the stand-off started. First, a set of 12 fast patrol boats with advanced surveillance gears. Second, 17 troops carrying, flat bottom fibre-glassed boats.

Furthermore, the Indian Army’s top brass also reviewed the situation along both China and Pakistan borders in a two-day conference chaired by the army chief himself. Do check this Snehesh Alex Philip’s piece on the role of the Indian Air Force alongside the Army at the border.

Meanwhile, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) interviewed the Chinese commander wounded in the Galwan Valley last year. Qi Fabao, the regiment commander who sustained a head injury, was given a hero award in February 2021, along with battalion commander Chen Hongjun, who was honoured posthumously. The Central Military Commission also posthumously gave Chen Xiangrong, Xiao Siyuan and Wang Zhuoran first-class merit awards.

In the meantime, Chinese netizens and the Xinjiang Military Command commemorated the four PLA soldiers who lost their lives in the Galwan Valley clash last year.

Do read this piece by Ananth Krishnan on how China has revealed selective details about the Galwan Valley clash conveying the carefully crafted message to the domestic audience. He also writes that the PLA has begun a domestic campaign ahead of the CCP’s July 1 centenary. It highlights last year’s actions, especially along the Pangong Lake, as part of a broader push to underline the military’s firm support to President Xi Jinping. “As part of the campaign, the soldiers are presenting China’s national flag “once raised on Pangong Lake”, a key site of tensions in 2020, at various military units and educational institutions as they tour the country.”

This week, China’s ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, remarked that China and India should help each other succeed instead of undercutting each other. “It is normal for countries to have differences. The boundary question is left over from history and should be put at a proper place in the overall bilateral relations. The Chinese side’s position is clear. We are committed to settling the boundary question through dialogue and consultation. At the same time, we are resolved to safeguard our sovereignty, security and development interests. The two sides should respect each other, treat each other as equals, conduct dialogue and consultation and properly address differences to find a mutually acceptable solution,” he said.

Finally, check Manoj Joshi’s latest Occasional Paper for ORF, where he claims that the incidents on the border—the stand-offs in Depsang and Chumar in 2013 and 2014, and the various incidents and clashes in Pangong Tso and Demchok—were all linked to Chinese proposals in the BDCA and on the Code of Conduct on border affairs. These were for the Indians to freeze construction in the border areas. But far from freezing, the Indian construction process, which had slowly gathered speed since the mid-2000s, began to move expeditiously after 2010.

While reading his paper, I realised a pattern of a gradual buildup of activities on the border by China since 2011-12. It’s simultaneous to China’s entering into the Indian Ocean in 2008 and Xi’s taking office in 2012. Perhaps, this topic merits a more serious and rigorous study in the future.

Read More
- Lt Gen SL Narasimhan’s piece titled restore status-quo ante to resolve impasse
- Lt Gen Rakesh Sharma’s piece titled the year of calamity on the border
- Senior Col Zhou Bo’s piece on the border impasse
- PLA recruiting Tibetans on the border
- My latest submission to the 9Dashline on what has changed since the Galwan Valley incident

Taiwan and China

The PLA AF sent 28 aircraft into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ) on Tuesday. This was the largest show of force since such activities started in August last year. Taiwan’s Defence Ministry claims that the warplanes included fighters, bombers, an anti-submarine aircraft and an electronic warplane aircraft. This was followed by seven aircraft involving two newer J-16 and four J-7 fighters and one Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft on Thursday. According to the Defence Ministry, it was the sixth time PLA planes had entered Taiwan’s ADIZ this month. This was in response to the US’ Ronald Reagan carrying out military exercises in the South China Sea on Monday.

In the meantime, Daniel Kritenbrink, the nominee to be the top US diplomat for East Asia, said the US should develop a robust relationship with Taiwan in every sector.

More interestingly, Japan would most likely mention the importance of the stability of Taiwan to Japan in its 2021 defence white paper, which will be presented to the Tokyo Cabinet in July. A section of the white paper was leaked to the media, which revealed that the balance of cross-strait military power tended to be in mainland China’s favour and that this gap was widening.

Meanwhile, Taiwan finalised two missile system deals with the US that includes M142 high mobility artillery rocket systems and Harpoon coastal defence systems. It also unveiled the Thunderbolt-2000 rocket’s new variant, which has a range of 100 km.

Elsewhere, The CMSI held a conference on Large Scale Amphibious Warfare in Chinese Military Strategy. Here are the select key findings:

- China keeps strengthening the relevant capabilities (Surface to air, advanced fighter aircraft, mine delivery, UAVs, etc.).

- China retains many weaknesses (PLA Jointness, Marine Corps is not optimised for an amphibious operation, helicopter forces suffer limitation, natural geography).

- Areas of Consensus: China is pursuing comprehensive capabilities by incorporating all possible forces, militia and civilian logistics. However, it lacks the required strategic airlift capabilities. Thus, a major invasion would require heavy reliance on civilian assets).

- Areas of Debate: Whether PLA might first threaten strikes on the offshore islands, potential large-scale beach landings or seizure of the Taiwanese ports).

Also, read this WOTR commentary on the Ambiguity of Strategic Clarity.

The South China Sea

Xinhua reports that more than 500 plant species were recorded on China’s Xisha Island (Paracel Islands). A ruling by the South China Sea Tribunal {The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China)} demanded human habitation for an islet to qualify as an island. Since then, China has undertaken plantations projects on multiple islets in Paracels and Spratlys.

Meanwhile, the Ronald Reagan strike group entered the South China Sea for routine military exercises. The scope of activities included flight operations with fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, maritime strike exercises, and coordinated tactical training between surface and air units. The PLAN also sailed its new Type 052 destroyers conducting four-day real combat training exercises in the South China Sea as a response to the US activities in the region.

In the middle of the rising tensions in the region, The Philippines has again suspended a decision to scrap a crucial agreement governing the US troop presence in the country, its foreign minister said this week. The Pentagon has welcomed this announcement. It’s the third suspension of decision, however, both countries have also not renewed the pact.

Finally, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said that developments in the South China Sea had attracted attention in the region and beyond, and India supports the freedom of navigation, over-flight, and unimpeded commerce in these international waterways.

Also, read NATO’s statement, which calls China a systemic challenge, and the G7 statement calling for fresh COVID-19 origins investigations and criticising Beijing for Xinjiang.

Read More
- What’s driving China’s race to build a space station? By ChinaPower (Must read)
- China launches 3 astronauts towards the new space station