|
I. The Big Story: China’s 100 New DF-41 Silos
China has begun construction of more than 100 new silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in a desert near the northwest city of Yumen. Commercial satellite images obtained by researchers at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif., show work underway at scores of sites across a grid covering hundreds of square miles of arid terrain in China’s Gansu province. The 119 nearly identical construction sites contain features that mirror those seen at existing launch facilities for China’s arsenal of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles.
These new silos are most likely for China’s latest DF-41 ICBMs. Previously, at least 16 similar silos were traced in the training area, located east of the city of Jilantai in the Inner Mongolian province. This facility is used by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLA RF) to train personnel and fine-tune procedures for operating road-mobile missile launchers and their support vehicles.
China’s 100 new silos are surprising because it only has 100 ICBMs.
Silos are supported by underground bunkers, which may act as launch centres. The satellite imagery shows that there is also a small military base in the area. In case you want to know more about the silos, warheads and China’s storage facilities, I recommend Mark Stoke’s 2010 publication for Project 2049 Institute. It’s titled China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System.
So how should this latest development be interpreted? Does this mean a change of posture? Or it means more warheads? Or it’s just a decoy trick?
Chinese scholar Dr Wu Riqiang tweeted, “I’m more concerned with the 119 silos than DF-26. The silos could be a precursor of launch on warning. The dual-use DF-26 is just for cost-saving, its implication is significantly overestimated.”
It could also mean an increase in warheads since a DF-41 could possibly carry between six to 10 warheads. However, the DF-41 is only tested twice with a couple of warheads since 2016. Of course, it's possible that the DF-41 has been tested with more warheads, and China has not publicised this information. Irrespective of the number of warheads that DF-41 could carry, there've been serious studies warning of a doubling of Chinese warheads in the next five-ten years.
So the most likely explanation for the increase in the number of silos could be related to China's decoy strategy, also called a shell game in this case. Put simply, build more silos than missiles, thus forcing an aggressor to target them all. This would imply wasting aggressor's more warheads on fewer or no missiles. For instance, 100 silos could very well be ten missiles or even less than that. Watch this two minutes video to understand the shell game.
Dr Jeffrey Lewis writes that this is what the United States planned to do with the MX missile in the 1970s—to build 23 silos for every one MX missile, shuttling the missiles among them to force the Soviets to target them all. The plan later changed to horizontal storage, but silos were considered. This scheme was called the “shell game.” Even China considered adopting a similar plan of its own for its first silo-based missiles in the 1980s before choosing to build a small number of decoy silos, he adds.
Similarly, Dr Tong Zhao tweeted that this means China’s idea to keep the enemies guessing. “It would force its enemies to take all new silos seriously and bolster China’s image as a much stronger nuclear power than before. Whether China will actually fill each silo with an ICBM is a different matter…China appears still very worried about US missile defence, nuclear/conventional counterforce capabilities, etc., but these are likely to be technical justifications of a nuclear growth that may be increasingly influenced by threat perceptions at the geopolitical level…If China’s goal is indeed to project an image of a stronger nuclear power (and to keep its enemies guessing about specifics), then it would not bode well for confidence-building measures like transparency, a precondition for traditional arms control talks.”
However, Chinese military analysts have dismissed these developments as unfounded. Former PLA instructor Song Zhongping claimed that the silo technology had long been obsolete. “China has already used mobile launchers and discarded these fixed silos, which are time-consuming, labour-intensive, costly and vulnerable to be attacked and destroyed,” said Song. "Having said that, I firmly support the expansion of China’s nuclear power, but the expansion of nuclear power should be prioritised on sea-based nuclear power and land-based nuclear power. And space-based nuclear power also needs to be further strengthened,” he said.
Of course, Hu Xijin, the Global Times’ editor in chief, had to spitfire. “In reality, DF-41 is a solid-fueled road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, and one of its biggest advantages is its mobility and vitality. There is no point to put it inside a silo. Lewis (Dr Jeffrey Lewis) may not understand the basic features of DF-41 before shooting off his mouth at the media…. I believe Washington Post produced the report in cooperation with the US think tank with the aim to put pressure on China. It wanted to force China to issue a statement regarding its nuclear plan and squeeze the room for China’s nuclear development through public opinion pressure. I suggest the Chinese side ignore this report and other similar reports in Western media. China should neither confirm nor deny such “revelation” and let the Western media imagine it. This is what nuclear deterrent means,” writes Hu.
Anyway, Ned Price, the US State Department spokesperson, responded to this development as concerning. “It raises questions about the PRC’s intent,” said Price. “These reports and other developments suggest that the PRC’s nuclear arsenal will grow more quickly and to a higher level than perhaps previously anticipated…We encourage Beijing to engage with us on practical measures to reduce the risks of destabilising arms races - potentially destabilising tensions,” he said.
China has not yet and would most likely not respond to the story.
You could listen to the Arms control wonk podcast on the same subject. It’s interesting.
Just as a sider, I agree and would like to re-emphasise Prof Caitlin Talmagade’s recent tweet. “I personally still think the DF-26 is a more concerning signal about China’s long term nuclear intentions than these silos. The DF-26 range, precision, & hot swap strongly suggest theatre nuclear warfighting. Silos went up fast & there’s a lot of them, but China has had silos forever.”
|
|
|
II. India China Brief
Bloomberg reports that India has directed 50 000 additional troops to its borders with China. Over the past few months, India has moved troops and fighter jets squadrons to three distinct areas along the border. All in all, roughly 200,000 soldiers are deployed on the India-China border, a 40 per cent increase from last year, reports Bloomberg's Sudhi Ranjan Sen.
India's troops' deployment is in response to Chinese additional deployment and activities on the border. For instance, the PLA recently moved additional forces from Tibet to the Xinjiang Military Command's South Xinjiang Military District - responsible for patrolling the ongoing stand-off areas. Similarly, China is adding fresh runways, building bomb-proof bunkers to house fighter jets and creating new airfields along the disputed border in Tibet. More importantly, it has also added long-range artillery, tanks and rocket regiments to the South Xinjiang Military Command in the last few months. Furthermore, China has also set up 20 permanent and temporary camps at Rudok to house 15,000 to 18,000 troops. Previously, the camp's capacity was limited to about 5,000.
When asked about the recent deployments, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that the situation on the border is stable and controllable and that the two countries were preparing for another round of military talks to help ease the tensions. “China believes that any arms race and infrastructure construction aimed at military control are not conducive to the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border areas,” an MFA spokesman said.
Meanwhile, both China and India have agreed to the dates for the next Corps Commander-level meeting. However, the Corps Commander’s meeting’s 12th round would be limited to Gogra-Hot spring regions. The two sides will not discuss the Depsang Plains, as the local commanders would deal with it. The decision to discuss Hot Springs (patrolling point 14) and Gogra (patrolling point 17A) was taken at the virtual meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India China border affairs on June 25. The PLA transgressed the two friction points near the Kugrang and Chang Chemmo rivers on May 17-18, 2020 (apart from the north banks of Pangong Tso).
What’s happening on the Indian Side?
India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh visited border areas to review operational preparedness in the region. “We have always worked for world peace. We never attack anyone. Our objective has never been to achieve victory against anyone. India has neither attacked any country nor occupied an inch. Our intention is very clear... but our army has the capability to give a befitting reply to every challenge,” said the Defence Minister, while addressing soldiers in a forward location on the second day of his visit to eastern Ladakh. He also inaugurated 63 infrastructure projects this week constructed by the Border Roads Organisation in Ladakh.
Elsewhere, the Indian Army Chief M.M. Naravane said that Artificial Intelligence is becoming a critical part of modern warfare, adding that compared to conventional systems, military systems equipped with AI are capable of handling far larger volumes of data more efficiently. “Artificial intelligence is today the modern, holy grail of technology, with far-reaching implications on the nature of geopolitics and geo-strategics. By way of impact and influence, it will exceed the Industrial Revolution by several orders of magnitude,” he said. He also added that AI applications have the potential to revolutionise training and education in the Indian Army. But he cautioned that all this would require simplified procedures that facilitate the transition.
Meanwhile, India also tested a new nuclear-capable Agni Prime, next-generation nuclear-capable ballistic missile that ranged 1000-2000 km. While it is popularly believed that the new missile will replace the Prithvi, Agni 1 and Agni 2 series of ballistic nuclear missiles, the Print explains, “It is not a replacement for any of the existing missiles. Agni P is part of the Agni series of missiles with new modern features that make it very manoeuvrable and increase accuracy.” The report adds that the missile was made using the same technology used in the longer-range Agni 4 and Agni 5 missiles.
What’s happening on the Chinese side?
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) celebrated its centenary this week. President Xi Jinping gave an hour-long speech at Tiananmen Square. While addressing more than 70,000 people gathered at Tiananmen Square, Xi said, “No one should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” This statement elicited the loudest cheers from the crowd. Here’s the full speech.
China also awarded a PLA soldier who lost life at the Galwan Valley clash. Chen Hongjun, one of the four PLA soldiers earlier given posthumous military honours having died in the Galwan Valley clash, is among the 29 people awarded by Xi with the July 1 medal.
Meanwhile, check Dr Arzan Tarapore’s recent paper for ASPI titled Mitigating the Risk of a China-India Conflict. Dr Tarapore argues that the risk of China–India conflict is significant because, even if its likelihood is low, its consequences may be considerable. “A limited conventional war would be likely to impose significant costs on India, but, depending on the reactions of its partners, it may also reinforce latent Indian suspicions over the utility and reliability of its strategic partnerships. In that way, even a localised limited war on the LAC may have far-reaching implications if it incidentally drives a wedge between India and its partners in the Quad.” I found this argument intriguing.
He argues that the repercussions of a costly India-China war may spill over to damage the recently developed strategic partnership between the Quad countries. That’s because the relationship is built on counterbalancing China. “A war could be a catalyst for either strengthening or enervating the Quad. There’s a chance that a border conflict would result in a redoubled Indian commitment to the Quad. Much as it did with the Ladakh crisis itself, India may calculate that it has no option but to seek more external assistance to manage its competition with China. Conversely, there’s also a chance that such a conflict would result in Indian disaffection with the Quad. India deepened Quad cooperation during the Ladakh crisis as a deterrent signal to China, partly because the Quad is still full of untested promises. However, after a conflict—that is, in a contingency where China hasn’t been deterred and has probably imposed significant costs on India—the Quad’s utility would have been tested, and probably not ameliorated India’s wartime disadvantage.”
For mitigating these consequences, he gives a three-node framework of risk mitigation.
- First, Quad’s operational support to India: Help the Indian military to war game its concept operations, also identify and war game locating and neutralising PLA’s vulnerability or centres of gravity in the Himalayas.
- Second, support in other theatres and domains: Cyber
- Third, political and diplomatic support.
He writes that preparing policy options in these three tiers should send a deterrent signal to Beijing—ideally, to forestall any prospect of war. Failing that, the Quad partners should at least signal to both Beijing and New Delhi—assuming India is the victim of Chinese aggression—that they are reliable and effective strategic partners…Quad members aren’t well postured to lend significant operational support to India (and nor would that be politically welcomed by Delhi), but they’re better prepared to act in other domains and, even more, to ensure that any Chinese adventurism is politically too costly. Do read the full paper, it’s extremely interesting.
More Readings
- Pakistan Midget Submarine site for joint project with China
- Tanzania to revive $10bn Indian Ocean port project with China
- It’s time to sound an alarm over Chinese intrigues in the Himalayas
- India-China border built up
|
|
|
III. News Update
- A Chinese magazine named Naval and Merchant Ships published a detailed outline of the PRC's three-stage surprise attack on Taiwan. According to the magazine, round one will consist of mainly ballistic missiles aimed at destroying information gathering and decision making assets, including airports, radars, anti-air missile bases, command centres etc. China could use the DF-16 along with H-6 bombers and J-16 fighters at this stage. The second round will consist of intensive cruise missile attacks, such as the YJ-91 and CJ-10, launched from land, ships and submarines targeting military bases, ammunition depots, communications infrastructure and key road junctions. The article suggests that the PLA surface ships could then use drones to assess the damage. Finally, the article said artillery strikes from surface ships and land-based rocket forces would remove any remaining obstacles for the PLA’s Marine Corps and amphibious landing troops. This was the second time the publication has outlined a scenario for an attack on Taiwan. Last year it released a video detailing how an assault on the island’s defence systems could occur to coincide with the start President Tsai Ing-wen’s second term.
- The CCP’s centenary celebrations featured the largest display yet of its most advanced active stealth fighter, the J-20. Fifteen of the jets featured in Thursday’s performance above Tiananmen Square in Beijing, compared with the five that took part in the National Day parade in October 2019. The aerial show also featured Z-8 and Z-19 transport and reconnaissance helicopters forming the number “100” in the sky, while the PLA’s August 1 aerobatic team formed the numbers “7” and “1” – a reference to the party’s official foundation date of July 1 – with its J-10 fighters. But the centenary only featured 71 aircraft, over 100 less compared to the National Day parade in 2019.
- China's Ministry of Veterans Affairs (MVA) and Ministry of Finance issued a notice this week to raise the pension and subsistence allowance standards for some veterans and other recipients of special care and preferential treatment. The disability pension for disabled personnel (including disabled military and police members, officials in state organs, militias and migrant labourers), regular pension for three kinds of families (namely family members of martyrs, military members who died on duty or of illness), and the subsistence allowance to the Red Army Veterans will increase by 10% This is the 17th consecutive year that the country has raised the pension and subsistence standards for special-care recipients.
- Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative has updated its map of Chinese power projection capabilities in the South China Sea to account for new deployments in 2020. These include the KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, new radar and communication arrays, airstrip and hangars to accommodate combat aircraft, the mobile surface to air and anti-ship cruise missiles, etc. Read in detail.
|
|
|
| This newsletter is written by Suyash Desai, a research associate, China Studies Programme, at the Takshashila Institution. He has previously completed his M Phil from CIPOD, JNU. |
|
|
|
|
|
