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The Takshashila PLA Insight
Issue No 106.
July 24, 2021
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Today's Issue: 

- China-India Brief:  Xi's Tibet Visit, Jaishankar and Wang Meet, Global Times' Screw up, India's Rebalance and Infrastructure Boost
- Research Papers: China's Defence Acquisition, Russia-China Military Exercises, Type 003
- The South China Sea
- Taiwan and China
- Henan Floods and the PLA 
I review Amb Vijay Gokhale's (@VGokhale59)  book Tiananmen Square: The Making of a Protest for The Hindustan Times
I. The Big Story: China-India Brief

Xi’s Tibet Visit

General Secretary Xi Jinping
visited Tibet this week. This is his first visit to Tibet since he started heading the party, state and military. Previously, Xi visited Tibet in 2011 when he was the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) Vice Chairman and the People Republic of China’s Vice President. During his 2011 visit, he famously said, “[We] should thoroughly fight against separatist activities by the Dalai clique by firmly relying on all ethnic groups... and completely smash any plot to destroy stability in Tibet and jeopardise national unity.” During his recent visit, he said the CCP’s approach to Tibet was correct. “It has been proven that without the CCP, there would have been neither China nor new Tibet,” said Xi.

The State media reported that Xi visited sites in the capital, Lhasa,
including the Drepung monastery, Barkhor Street and the public square at the base of the Potala Palace that was home to the Dalai Lamas. He also visited Nyingchi, a prefecture-level city in the Southeast of Tibet. It’s very close to the China-India border near Arunachal Pradesh.

In Nyingchi, he visited the Nyang river bridge to inspect the Yarlung Zangbo or the Brahmaputra River. He also inspected the Lhasa-Nyingchi section of the Sichuan-Tibet railway line. The Sichuan-Tibet railway line is China’s poster project under the 14th Five-year Plan. It’s divided into three sections: The first section from Chengdu to Yaan was finished in December 2018. The Yaan-Nyingchi section would be completed by 2030. The 435 km Lhasa-Nyingchi section, which Xi inspected in his recent visit, became operational in June 2021. Here’s my op-ed from the 
Hindustan Times on how this railway could impact India, do check it out.  
 

His visit implies the enormous importance given to the strategic railway line and the mega-dam structure under the current five-year plan - both projects have geopolitical implications for India. He also visited the Tibet Military District and asked the PLA soldiers to “comprehensively strengthen training and preparation work.” His visit aimed at celebrating the 70th anniversary of a “peaceful liberation” of Tibet – referring to the May 1951 Seventeen Point Agreement that gave China control over the region. Also, his visit marks the first by any President in the last 30 years.   

Jaishankar and Wang Meet

India’s Minister for External Affairs, Dr S Jaishankar, met China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi last week at Dusanbe at the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting. Highlighting the lack of movement in the disengagement process, Dr Jaishankar said that India hopes China would follow through to resolve the LAC issue. India’s Ministry of External Affair’s 
statement read: “It was expected that the Chinese side would work with us towards this objective (complete disengagement). EAM noted, however, that the situation in remaining areas is still unresolved.”

The Chinese MFA’s 
statement read: “The frontier troops of both countries disengaged in the Galwan Valley and the Pangong Lake areas, and the overall situation in the border area was de-escalated. Meanwhile, China-India relations still stay at a low level, which is not in the interest of either side.”

The two statements indicate the difference of approach – suiting their interests- with which China and India look at the ongoing military stand-off. The Chinese statement also indicates that the PLA is likely to stay for long, and the ongoing tensions are the new normal in the China-India relations.
 
Meanwhile, China and India will soon hold the 12th round of 
Military Commanders’ talk, mostly at Chushul. The talks were supposed to happen on July 26, but India asked for another date since it's Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil Victory Day). It’s been three months since the 11th round of Military Commanders’ talk that focused on disengagement in friction points like Gogra and Hotsprings. 

The Business Standard 
reported quoting government sources that the Chinese troops had crossed the LAC again at several places, and there was at least one clash between the two sides near Galwan in 2021. “During winter 2020-2021, the PLA had thinned out or withdrawn from many of the positions it had occupied on the Indian side of the LAC in the summer of 2020. But the freeze of winter gave way to renewed confrontation in the first week of April 2021, when Chinese drones began entering Indian airspace in large numbers, say Ministry of Defence (MoD) sources. In May-June, Indian patrols in Demchok and Chumar, in Southern Ladakh, reported an increased presence of PLA men in civilian clothes. In mid-May, without Indian provocation, the PLA began re-occupying many of the positions that had been vacated, boosting tensions and triggering counter deployments by the Indian Army.” The article hints that the clash/incident took place somewhere around this time when the summer deployment started. Two things are to be noted here: First, the Indian Army has categorically denied that any such incident has happened, calling the Business Standard story false and baseless. Second, no Indian mainstream newspaper has followed up on this story. 

Meanwhile, China has been developing a new military base (airbase) near Shackche near Ladakh. This base is being built between Hotan and Kashgar in the South Xinjiang Military District.
 
Furthermore, The Times of India 
reports that China is recruiting young Tibetans in the PLA and local militia to act as guides along the border. The latest Indian security establishment intelligence report claims that each Tibetan family must send at least one male member for recruitment in the PLA in the border areas like Ngari Prefecture. 

Global Times’ Screw Up

The Print carried a 
story headlined China revises the Galwan Valley clash toll to 5. It was based on the Global Times’ misreporting in its English version: “The 33-yeard-old Chen Hongjun sacrificed his life in the frontline confrontation with India in the Galwan Valley in June 2020, along with four others of his comrades-in-arms.” It has now issued a correction: “The 33-yeard-old Chen Hongjun sacrificed his life in the frontline confrontation with India in the Galwan Valley in June 2020, along with three of his comrades-in-arms,” not “along with other four of his comrades-in-arms” as stated in the article published on July 19, 2021.

So what happened? The People’s Daily carried a 
long piece on the Galwan Valley clash and Chen Hongjun (one of the four PLA soldiers killed) on July 19. The article reads, “The head of a border regiment, Qi Fa Bao, in the spirit of negotiating and solving problems in good faith, went out to negotiate with only a few officers and soldiers, wading through waist-deep river water. During the negotiation process, the other side ignored our sincerity, premeditatedly hiding and mobilising a large number of troops, trying to force us to give up by virtue of a large number of people. Chen Hongjun, who rushed to the confrontation point for reinforcements, learned that Qi Fabao was besieged, led people into the crowd to rescue, braving the enemy’s stones and sticks, successfully rescued Qi Fabao, but he himself never returned.” Ananth Krishnan, in his newsletter, writes that this was a peril of reading what is put out in different languages: This official piece on Chen Hongjun wasn’t put out in English, but picked by Global Times’ English website, which carried a report on it (but not a full word-for-word translation). He also claims that this is not the first such mistake that Global Times made. Later, many Indian newspapers/websites picked it up from the Global Times and published that five PLA soldiers were killed in Galwan. Another lesson for India’s China watchers in the importance of the language! 
 

Meanwhile, the PLA Army and Air Force conducted military drills near the Karakoram mountain range to check its newly inducted weaponry. A brigade attached to the Xinjiang Military District conducted drills. Earlier in May, these weapons were deployed with the Xinjiang Military District. Similarly, the Global Times reports that the WTC air force also practised emergency airlift and deployment using its Y-20 strategic airlift aircraft.
  
What’s happening on the Indian side?

Indian media reports that the Indian Army was on alert in the central sector after around 40 PLA soldiers were seen patrolling in the area along the LAC near Barahoti in Uttarakhand’s Chamoli District. “They came on horses four-five days ago and left some belongings as evidence of their visit,” a government official was 
quoted in the Times of India.    
 

Meanwhile, the specialised elements of India’s Strike Corps, which have been dual-tasked with focusing on Pakistan and China as India’s rebalance strategy, have reached Ladakh. The Print reports that currently, they are undergoing familiarisation and re-orientation training. “This is part of the re-orientation training. This is not a permanent deployment as they will come back to their stations after some time. They will be replaced by the rest of the elements from the particular Corps. The Strike Corps will come into play when there is a need,” reports The Print.
 
India has also planned to boost Ladakh’s connectivity by building four new dual-capable airports and 37 helipads. The Government is also said to be planning on an alternative airfield for the town of Leh and a direct link to the Zanskar valley and an airport near Changtang that links to Pangong Tso lake. All 37 helipads will be across Ladakh. These are spread across remote and inaccessible parts of the UT. Once completed, these will be capable of even handling the heavy Chinook CH 47 helicopters. Also, many of these are likely to be operationalised this year itself.
 
For oceans, too, India finally 
issued a tender to construct six new-generation conventional stealth submarines with foreign collaboration. The foreign ship-builders are Naval Group-DCNS (France), Rosoboron export (Russia) and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (Germany). Furthermore, India has also planned to appoint a National Maritime Security Coordinator (Kargil Group of Ministers’ recommendation) to establish synergy between the Navy, coastguard and State maritime boards. Finally, the Indian Navy participated in a two-day bilateral PASSEX exercise with the Royal Navy Carrier Strike Group in the Bay of Bengal. 
 

Do check this Guardian report which quotes the residents of Chushul claiming that the de-escalation doesn’t reflect on the ground (even near Galwan and Pangong), and Chinese are dismissive of any talk of de-escalation. 
 
Read More

-
Research Paper: Emerging Paradigms of National Security: Threats & Responses by Lt Gen Prakash Menon

-The end of delusion and persistence of
stalemate: Prof Harsh Pant

-Research
Report: Deterrence by Detection

-The Dalai Lama’s inner circle listed in the 
Pegasus project

-India is
welcome to join China-South Asia Grouping

-India-China
trade grows

II. Research Papers

Defence Acquisition in Russia and China

RAND Corporation published a report on China’s defence acquisition (please read about Russia in the paper). The report attempts to answer four questions: 1) How China approaches its defence acquisition in theory? 2) How China approaches its defence acquisition in practice? 3) What limits China’s ability to acquire newer systems? 4) How China excels in developing newer systems? 
 

The paper highlights that the civilian controlled State administration for Science, technology and Industry for National Defence, the Equipment Development Department under CMC and the PLA service branches have a say in China's defence acquisition and production. The civilian administration is responsible for drafting regulations, standards, and long-term plans. EDD manages weapon systems’ life cycles and services and is responsible for training, manning, and equipping the force (The situation pre-2015 military reforms was different).

- The paper claims that the research and development process for developed or stolen projects in China is extremely long. For instance, the J-20 took over nine years of preliminary research, while the Y-20 took over 17 years to be ready.

- The paper highlights bureaucratic corruption as a major hurdle in China’s military-industrial complex.

- The paper also claims that China’s MCF has to be credited for the recent military-technological advantages that the PLA has achieved. The MCF strategy includes China’s retaining of top-tier engineering and managerial talents from abroad, especially the US.

-But the paper also claims that the PLA is still struggling to spur domestic innovation and close the gap on a few glaring technical deficiencies, such as high-end chips, silent submarines, and aircraft engines – this would be a challenge for China’s military-industrial complex in the future. (There is much more in the report and each of these pointers is a section, so please read the whole report in detail 
using this link).


Russia-China Military Exercises

Richard Weitz published a report on the Russia-China military exercises for the CSIS. The paper reviews the evolving Chinese-Russian military exercises, assesses their purposes and results, forecasts their future evolution, and evaluates the policy implications for US military planners. Please check the Appendix in the paper for all Russia-China exercises since 2005. The paper claims that these regular exercises have become a foundational tool for institutionalising bilateral defence ties without a formal military alliance. They also enhance interoperability despite the fact that the PLA’s acquisition of more advanced domestic manufactured weapons is moving the two militaries away from their common roots. In terms of diplomacy, these drills enable to signal reciprocal support. And in terms of functional capabilities, it looks like the two countries are venturing into newer domains of cooperation like cyber and space. 


Type 003: Progress Report

The latest satellite imagery captured by Maxer technologies reveals that China has made considerable progress in the construction of its third aircraft carrier, the Type 003. The imagery of Jiangnan Shipyard shows the construction of the carrier’s flight deck, the basic superstructure and sponsons as nearly complete. 


 The CSIS confirms

-China’s newest carrier will feature a flat-top flight deck; three channels for the operation of Type 003’s catapult-assisted launch system, each measuring approximately 105 meters, are clearly visible on the vessel’s deck.

-The Type 003’s two aircraft elevators appear to be several meters wider than those of its predecessor, the Shandong.

-The island of Type 003—which houses the command centre for flight deck operations along with radar and communication equipment—has been reconfigured to have a smaller footprint compared to China’s other carriers.

 
I found this 
resource while reading on China’s defence budgets. It is the Chinese State Council Budget Tracker by CSET. It tracks approximate budgets for China’s 21 ministries and three national commissions for 2019. A very useful resource.

III. Developing Stories

South China Sea

This month marks the fifth anniversary of the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal ruling. In a nutshell, the tribunal formed to hear a case brought by the Philippines ruled that any claim to historic rights in the South China Sea was invalid. Beijing rejected the tribunal and declared that China has historic rights over the region.

On the fifth anniversary of this ruling, the US State Department issued a 
press release reaffirming the ruling (which it also did last year in July 2020). Furthermore, it also claimed that an attack on the Philippines armed force, aircraft or public vessel in the region would invoke the US mutual defence commitments. 
 

China’s MFA spokesperson criticised this statement claiming that the US disregards historical merits and objective facts in the region. He claimed that no country had objected to this position until the 1970s, and the arbitration had major fallacies in fact-findings and application of international law. 
 
Meanwhile, the US 7th fleet 
conducted the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the region on July 12. On the same day, China warned the US destroyer USS Benfold to leave the Paracel waters when it “trespassed” in the region, claimed the Southern Theatre Command’s spokesperson. The PLA also responded by launching military exercises in all three seas surrounding China. In the South China Sea, the PLA organised a confrontational exercise featuring multiple warplanes, warships, submarines, and land-based missiles, the PLA STC announced.

Furthermore, recent reports indicate that China had 
deployed electronic warning and surveillance aircraft and helicopters on two disputed islands in the South China Sea. These were KJ-500 aircraft. Moreover, the recent South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) report also claims that the US is monitoring the Chinese submarine activities in the region. “In the first half of 2021, the South China Sea saw a surge in US maritime reconnaissance activities, with all five ocean surveillance ships owned by the US Navy - four Victorious-class ships and an Impeccable-class ship - having conducted missions in the region,” claims the report.

US FONOPs in the region since 2015

Source: @CollinSLKoh

Meanwhile, the Philippines defence minister ordered the military to investigate a report by the US-based tech firm that hundreds of Chinese vessels were 
dumping sewage into contested areas of the South China Sea. "While we are confirming and verifying these wastes being dumped ... we consider such irresponsible acts, if true, to be gravely detrimental to the marine ecology in the area. Despite conflicting claims and interests by states in the South China Sea, all nations must be responsible stewards of our natural resources and environment," Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said in a statement.

The Chinese embassy in Manila claimed the report to be fake based on fabricated news. "It's a typical 'whole industry chain' aiming at creating hatred and Sinophobia in the Philippines. Will people with common sense see through the trick?" 
responded the embassy to the report. 

Read More

- After 25 years, there is still no South China Sea Code of Conduct:
Foreign Policy
- Overwhelmed by Chinese fleets, Filipino fishermen ‘protest and adapt’: New York Times


Taiwan and China

Another US aircraft (military cargo plane) landed in Taipei this week to deliver a package to the new American Institute in Taiwan director, Sandra Oudkrik. The aircraft departed from Kadena Air Force base in Okinawa, Japan, early Thursday morning and landed at Taipei’s Songshan Airport at 9:32 a.m. Beijing has reacted angrily to this. “Taiwan is a sacred and inalienable part of Chinese territory. Any foreign military aircraft must get permission from the government of the People’s Republic of China to land on our territory. The US is now playing with fire and must stop any risky and provocative actions immediately,” the mainland defence ministry said in a statement.

The PLA Army and Navy also
held amphibious landing drills in waters off east China’s Fujian province a day after military aircraft landed in Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Taiwan Army plans to hold the annual Condor Exercise in late August this year.  

Also, check this submission by Michael Mazza on three
scenarios for China’s evolving nuclear strategy and its implications in Taiwan. Scenario 1: China’s sticks to the strict interpretation of the NFU, Scenario 2: China maintains a “squishy” interpretation of NFU and Scenario 3: The death of NFU. The main point: Analyses of the likelihood of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and of the course such a conflict might take, too often overlook the role nuclear weapons are likely to play. The content and fate of China’s “no first use” policy is just one factor that will significantly shape outcomes in the Taiwan Strait (Details in the article, do check it out).


Japan Defence Review

Japan published its 2021 defence review (annual whitepaper) this week. It raises an alarm over the subject of Taiwan security for the very first time. “Stabilising the situation surrounding Taiwan is important for Japan’s security and the stability of the international community. Therefore, it is necessary that we pay close attention to the situation with a sense of crisis more than ever before,” claims the review. 
 
Besides this, I found the following table from the review extremely useful:


IV. News Update

-Henan Floods and the PLA: At least 25 people are reportedly killed, and tens of thousands relocated after record flooding in central China’s Henan province caused extensive damage. The PLA’s Central Theatre Command has sent more than 5700 soldiers and militiamen (not sent by CTC) for rescue and relief measures.  This was after Xi Jinping instructed the authorities to deploy the PLA to rescue those stuck in inundated subways, hotels and public places. The CTC has also said that it has used military aircraft and satellite imagery to monitor the flood sites.

-China is building a new type of 
research vessel that will carry drones and be equipped to conduct air, surface and underwater monitoring remotely. “The ship will use sensors, satellite communication, the internet and other technological means to navigate in open water autonomously, and it will dock and leave the dock with assistance,” the report said. “It could be a game-changer for marine survey work.”
 

-China will start its military recruitment for the second half of this year in mid-August, the MND’s circular states. It stressed recruitment among university graduates and certified technicians graduating from relevant training schools and colleges. China’s military has extended its conscription from once a year to twice a year, starting from 2021. 

V. More Readings

-Xi’s Tibet Visit: Prof Srikant Kondapalli

-2021: China
Transparency Report: Do check Collin Koh’s and Fredrik Bartels’ submissions from this report

-China: The Forgotten Nuclear
Power No More

-Light Tanks: A Missing Priority for the
Indian Army: Kartik Bommakanti

This newsletter is written by Suyash Desai, a research associate, China Studies Programme, at the Takshashila Institution. He has previously completed his M Phil from CIPOD, JNU. 
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Suyash Desai · 2nd floor, 46/1, Cobalt Building, Church St, Haridevpur · Shanthala Nagar, Ashok Nagar, Bengaluru · Bangalore, 560001 · India

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