I. The Big Story: China-India Brief
Wang Yang, a Politburo Standing Committee member and the Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (also the number 4 in the Party), visited Tibet this week. He was leading a delegation to Lhasa on August 18-19. This is after President Xi Jinping visited the region in July 2021. A series of high profile visits continue as this year marks the 70th anniversary of Tibet’s “peaceful liberation.” The PLA’s presence in the region started in 1951 after an agreement was signed between the central government and the administration in Lhasa. The current local government of Tibet, known as the Tibetan Autonomous Region, was founded in 1965.
“Only by following the [Chinese Communist Party] leadership and pursuing the path of socialism can Tibet achieve development and prosperity,” said Wang. This comment is very similar to the statement he made in 2018 when he visited the region. He also said, “No one outside China has the right to point fingers at us when it comes to Tibetan affairs. Any attempt … to separate Tibet from China is doomed to fail.” He made this comment in a ceremony outside the Potala Palace, Lhasa.
During the trip, he laid down Beijing’s priorities in the region, including political stability, economic development, ecology and border security. He said that all officials and members of ethnic groups were to be mobilised “to forge an ironclad defence against separatist activities”. Wang is also responsible for the CCP’s ethnic affairs.
You Quan, Padma Choling and Zhang Qingli accompanied him during the visit. They represent the CCP Central Committee, United Front Work Department, Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. His delegation also visited Nagqu for the opening of an expressway linking Nagqu and Yangbajain.
Meanwhile, the Hindustan Times reports that Tibet’s permanent resident population increased by 21.52 per cent or 6, 45,900 in the last decade. It’s around the 3.64 million mark now. More interestingly, around a 10.5 per cent population increase is in the disputed parts along the China-India and China-Bhutan borders, said Wu Yingche, TAR’s CCP chief. He also added that the 21 border counties are directly under central government aid and supervision. This jump, especially in the border areas, is certainly related to China’s “well-off villages in border areas” (边境地区小康村建设规划). Earlier this week, a People’s Daily report outlined that China is building around 604 border villages on the borders with India, Bhutan and Nepal. The deadline for this project was 2020, however, it looks like it will be completed before the 20th Party Congress in 2022.
Staying with Tibet, a recent PLA Daily report hints that China has "informatised" a combined armed brigade under China's Tibet Military District. This is perhaps the first CAB to be "informatised" under the TMD (某合成旅是首支被西藏军区评为 "信息化建设先进单位" 的部队).
You could read this interesting piece by Amb Shyam Saran for the Print, where he argues that the salience of the Tibet issue in India-China relations has become more direct and explicit. It will further complicate the quest for a new equilibrium in India-China relations. He also makes an important observation: Note the singular importance given to Tibet in ensuring border security (in Xi’s speech). No other border, nor borders in general, have been mentioned. This is why one must realise the significantly enhanced threat to India’s security in Arunachal Pradesh.
Gogra Disengagement
Two weeks back, China and India disengaged from Gogra’s PP17 in eastern Ladakh. The Hindu had an interesting edit on it. It claims that the buffer zone model, where both sides temporarily cease patrolling in disputed areas, has appeared to work so far in keeping the peace. It is, however, only a temporary measure, and one that India should not accept as permanent as it would prevent India from enforcing its territorial claims and favour the PLA, which can deploy faster in larger numbers owing to the more favourable terrain and better logistics. You could read the Indian Express’ explained piece on buffer zones, how China and India used them in the past, and how they are using them for disengagement in the ongoing border stand-off in the present.
Meanwhile, the latest satellite imagery by @detresfa_ highlights that China is upgrading, widening and reconstructing the Chinese controlled Tianwendian highway that leads up to the Depsang Plains.
It has also commissioned the new high-speed 928C and 928D patrolling boats for Pangong Tso’s surveillance. These boats are faster, armed with better armour and firepower and can carry 60 persons per vessel.
While China has carried out construction on the land, India is raising the stakes at sea. It recently conducted joint naval exercises with Vietnam in the South China Sea as a part of the ongoing deployment of Indian warships in the region. The sea phase of the exercise witnessed the guided-missile destroyer INS Ranvijay and corvette INS Kora undertaking surface warfare exercises, weapon firing drills and helicopter operations with Vietnamese Frigate Ly Thai To. The Indian task force is now scheduled to participate in the multilateral Malabar exercises with the Quad countries off the Guam coast. This will be followed by bilateral exercises with the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia.
Furthermore, this week, the Indian and Australian Navies also signed ‘joint guidance for the navy to navy relationship’ document to further bilateral cooperation and interoperability in the multilateral domain. More interestingly, India revived the Colombo Security Conclave, a maritime security conclave that includes India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. It was revived in November 2020, and the second meeting was hosted the last week. India plans to bring Bangladesh, Seychelles and Mauritius into the fold. The group was formed in 2011, and the last meeting before 2020 was held in 2015 when the former Foreign Minister Ms Sushma Swaraj was exploring the possibility of an expansion of the conclave.
I also hope that this would encourage India to pay more attention to the existing but almost moribund forums like IONS and IORA in the future.
Finally, I am sharing an interesting image that I found on Twitter this week. It’s Maj Gen YK Joshi and Maj Gen Wang Haijiang at the opening ceremony of the China-India 2016 Hand in Hand military exercises. Today, Lt Gen YK Joshi is the head of India’s Northern Command, and Lt Gen Wang Haijiang is the Commander of China’s Xinjiang Military District, which commands the western sector of the dispute on the China-India border.
More Readings
-20 ITBP personnel were awarded a medal for fighting the PLA in Ladakh
-Modi government’s politics with China is evolving: Lt Gen HS Panag
-Decoding 12th Corps Commander Meeting: Antara Ghosal Singh
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II. Developing Stories
China’s Missile Silos
Rodrick Lee, Director of research at the Air University’s China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), highlighted that China is constructing its third missile silo field at Hanggin Banner, Ordos City, Inner Mongolia. He highlights that these constructions are very similar to China’s missile silo fields discovered at Jilantai, Yumen and Hami earlier this year. But he also highlights that the Hanggin field has no PLA RF unit in the vicinity, unlike the Yumen silo field. The Hanggin Banner field has around 30 missile silos, much less than Yumen and Hami fields, with around 110-120 silos each.
With this discovery, China will now have around 250-270 new missile silos, ten times more than what it had maintained in the past.
Due to these recent discoveries, I decided to re-read the US Strategic Command Chief, Cdr. Adm. Charles Richard’s April 2021 Senate testimony. Highlight some interesting points on China from the testimony:
1) China is capable of executing any plausible nuclear employment strategy within their region and will soon be able to do so at the intercontinental ranges.
2) They are no longer a “lesser included case” of the pacing nuclear threat than Russia.
3) China’s recent capabilities building questions its NFU and minimum deterrent strategy.
4) It’s rapidly improving its strategic nuclear capacity and capabilities, with rapid growth in road-mobile production, doubling the number of launchers in some ICBM brigades, constructing ICBM silos on a potentially large scale, adding an air-leg, and is well ahead of the pace necessary to double its nuclear warheads by the end of the decade.
5) It has already moved a portion of its nuclear force to a Launch-on-Warning posture and is adopting a limited “high alert duty” strategy.
6) On conventional capabilities, he says that China is deploying a range of ballistic missile defence technologies in support of its A2/AD and has tested a mid-course interceptor in February 2021.
Meanwhile, Ma Xiu and Peter W. Singer have an interesting analysis of the recently found silos. They claim that although the major analytical focus is on the new number of silos, other aspects of China’s significantly expanded and modernised ballistic missile force are less visible but equally important. They claim that these silo fields might affect the PLA RF’s force structure and order of battle. “The PLARF exploded in size between 2017 and 2019, growing more than 33 per cent in only three years. Ten new brigades were added, with the six Bases growing to accommodate them. However, the construction of two entirely new missile silo fields could make that existing structure inadequate. Assuming roughly six to 12 silos for a typical ICBM brigade, each field could easily require multiple brigades, even if only a fraction of silos were filled. Currently, all PLARF Bases oversee between six and seven brigades and seem unlikely to grow much further. This means that each of these sites would likely be too large to fit within the existing force structure and could easily become a Base in its own right. This would make them the PLA’s first new ballistic missile Bases in over 50 years on.”
They also claim that the PLA RF undertook reforms in 2017 to streamline its support structure. Although this looks mundane, it would be necessary to accommodate a large number of missiles that would likely be on these silo sites.
You could also read:
- Prof Harsh Pant and Kartik Bommakanti’s commentary on China’s expanding nuclear stack for the Hindu.
- Prof Mathew Kroenig’s commentary on China’s silos and arms control fantasy for the Wall Street Journal.
- Dr James Cameron’s piece on Silos: New intelligence, old problems for WOTR
Taiwan and China
Last week, the Biden administration approved its first arms sale to Taiwan. The potential US$750 million deal includes 40 new M109 self-propelled howitzers and almost 1,700 kits to convert projectiles into more precise GPS-guided munitions. The proposal, brought forth under the State Department’s Foreign Military Sales programme, will require the approval of Congress, which has united around the need for US support of Taiwan on a largely bipartisan basis. This week, the two countries agreed to hold regular talks on cooperation between their coastguards, which include joint drills near the island.
Meanwhile, the White House has announced that it will bring together leaders of diverse democracies for a virtual summit on December 9-10 and an in-person summit in a year’s time. It’s been reported that Taiwan aims to attend this summit. Regine Chen, deputy director-general of the ministry’s Department of North American Affairs, Taiwan, claimed that the Taiwan government would continue negotiating with the Biden administration to participate in the summit, scheduled in December. Furthermore, in an interview with ABC News, US President Joe Biden said, “We have made-- kept every commitment. We made a sacred commitment to Article Five that if, in fact, anyone were to invade or take action against our NATO allies, we would respond. Same with Japan, same with South Korea, same with-- Taiwan.” This suggests that the US would defend the island if attacked, a deviation from the long-held US position of “strategic ambiguity.” Later, the State Department tried to clarify that the US policy with respect to Taiwan has not changed. “The US defence relationship with Taiwan is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), as it has been for the past 40 years, and is based on an assessment of Taiwan’s defence needs and the threat posed by the PRC,” said the official, referring to legislation that codifies relations between Washington and Taipei.
But all these recent instances and especially President Biden’s comments have resulted in an angrier response from the PRC. China sent 11 aircraft to Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, including fighters, bombers, and surveillance aircraft. This was just before the Taiwanese navy’s joint flight level drills with the Taiwanese air force in the same area. China also conducted assault drills near Taiwan’s southwestern and southeastern waters. Furthermore, Beijing is preparing to build an airport on the reclaimed land between Dasha and Xiaoshan, off the east coast of Pingtan County. The airport would serve as a major aviation and logistics hub with access to Taiwan
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Do read this excellent discussion in Foreign Affairs on Beijing’s Threat to Taiwan. In this, Dr Rachel Esplin Odell, Prof Eric Heginbotham, Dr Bonny Lin and David Sacks and Dr Kharis Templeman react to Dr Oriana Skylar Mastro’s article, where she argues that Beijing might use force for reunification. Furthermore, Dr Mastro also replies to her critics. Don’t miss this discussion.
You could also read:
- How China’s civilian shipping enable a Taiwan invasion: WOTR
- Taiwan’s Han Kuang exercises in September
- Japan missile on Ishigaki Island to boost Taiwan’s defence
Russia-China Military Exercises
This week, Russia and China were involved in joint military exercises (ZAPAD/INTERACTION 2021) at PLA’s Qingtongxia joint tactical training base in China’s northwest Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. Li Zuocheng, Central Military Commission (CMC) member and chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department, served as the general director of the exercises. More than 10,000 troops were deployed for the five days military exercises. More interestingly, China’s newer weapons featured in these drills. This includes the J-20 fighter jets, KJ-500 airborne early-warning and control aircraft, Y-20 transport aircraft and J-16 fighters.
Lt. Gen. Liu Xiaowu, deputy commander of the People's Liberation Army Western Theatre Command, led the Chinese side. The deputy commander of the Russian Eastern Military District commanded the Russian side.
After this training, the PLA will participate in the International Army Games in Russia starting tomorrow, August 22. The PLA AF has dispatched 11 military aircraft, including H-6K bombers, J-10B and J-16 fighter jets, a Y-20 large transport aircraft and a Y-9 tactical transport aircraft, as well as a team of airborne troops to Russia to participate in these games. The J-10B and J-16 fighter jets, and the Y-20 large transport aircraft will be making their debuts in the competition on August 23.
Do read this commentary by Prof Zhao Huasheng, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University. He argues that China and Russia should form the concept of maritime strategic partnership, which is needed for practical cooperation and long-term development of bilateral relations. The marine strategic partnership is not the same as marine strategic cooperation. Strategic cooperation points to specific cooperative behaviour, while strategic partnership refers to the status of mutual recognition as strategic partners. The concept of maritime strategic partnership will form an overall cooperation framework, integrating continental and oceanic cooperation together and opening up more space for strategic collaboration between the two countries.
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III. Research Papers
China’s Doctrine and Force Structure for Border Defence
While studying Tibet, I came across Prof M Taylor Fravel’s 2007 paper from the Journal of Strategic Studies on China’s frontier defence. Prof Fravel argues that China’s current doctrine reflects a defensive approach to securing its land borders. A key source for this is the persistent threat of ethnic unrest with the vast frontier regions, which can become a locus of conflict with neighbours.
He argues that frontier defence remains a core mission for China’s armed forces as a large per cent of China’s military assets, in addition to paramilitary border guards, participate in the defence of the borders. He highlights that China’s military doctrine describes a defensive approach for securing and defending territorial integrity. Among the campaigns that form the core of China’s current joint operations doctrine, the ‘border area counterattack campaign’ outlines how China plans to defend its borders from external threats. ‘The goal is to destroy and expel invading enemies and restore the territorial sovereignty in border areas. The campaign occurs in two phases. The first phase involves defensive operations to create favourable conditions for a counterattack. The second phase includes counterattacks, which is a decisive operation of the campaign for destroying and expelling the enemy forces. The counterattack begins after the main force units have arrived in the theatre of operations from the interior, regardless of progress achieved in the defensive operations.
He argues that such campaigns and force structure are consistent with a defensive doctrine for securing its borders, as light infantry units are stationed on the border itself while most manoeuvre units capable of offensive operations are based hundreds of kilometres away in the interior.
But he also claims that there are five challenges to the successful execution of such campaigns:
1) The border is difficult to defend initially due to weak border defence units.
2) Rapid reaction is required for counterattacks, which requires quick combat units and transport infrastructure (Note: Both are a part of Xi’s ongoing reforms).
3) Mobile operations are critical for counterattacks but could be challenged by varied geography.
4) Command and control among various units (PLA, paramilitary and militia) are required for integrated joint operations.
5) Rear stability (internal stability) cannot be taken for granted.
There is much more in the report, read the complete journal article for details. I found it to be extremely useful.
Trilateral Arms Control
David C. Logan published an issue brief with the Stimson Centre on Trilateral Arms Control and Chinese participation in it. He argues that the trilateral arms control between the US, Russia, and China is unlikely due to strategic, organisational and political challenges and China’s consent to it. Instead, he argues, a more fruitful approach would be to engage in separate bilateral efforts to engage in risk reduction and prioritise crisis management. He argues that in the short term, rather than pursuing traditional arms control, the US should focus on reducing risks of nuclear escalation in a crisis or conflict and do it in parallel bilateral settings.
He argues that for the long term, as Dr Zhao Tong has proposed, a comprehensive treaty limiting the combined number of all delivery systems with ranges greater to or equal to those covered by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty could possibly work out. Although Russia and the US have superiority in nuclear delivery systems, China possesses superiority in conventional delivery systems, and the three countries enjoy relative parity across total systems. Other things include dialogues, confidence-building measures and crisis management mechanisms.
Logan concedes that achieving this would be difficult and requires some groundwork. First, the US can consider how its own strategic capabilities policies might influence Chinese and Russian attitudes toward arms control. There are many drivers of China’s and Russia’s approaches to nuclear weapons, including domestic political and organisational ones, which have little to do with US policy. Second, the US can help build capacity for negotiating and implementing arms control agreements. On the US side, this could mean removing obstacles to cooperation on sensitive issues.
He writes that the work will be slow-going and challenging, but the stakes are too high not to try.
Chinese and US Engagement with African Security Chiefs
CSIS’s Judd Devermont, Marielle Harris and Alison Albelda published an issue brief on Chinese and US military engagement with African security chiefs. Following are the broad observations from the brief:
1) The US engages far more with African security chiefs than China.
2) The majority of Chinese engagements are ceremonial activities.
3) The US largely interacts with the Chief of Defence Staff and Naval chiefs; China's interactions are more evenly distributed across services.
4) The US activities largely focus on West Africa; China’s activities are more in Southern Africa.
5) Less than half (approximately 40 per cent) of Chinese engagement with African security chiefs is high impact, a rate comparable to that of the US.
China’s Autonomous Undersea Vehicles (AUVs)
Ryan Fedasiuk’s article for CIMSEC highlights China’s growing fleet of AUVs. The author profiles three major AUV research institutes and identifies potential applications of China’s growing fleet of AUVs and continued barriers to development.
Shenyang Institute of Automation, China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation and Harbin Engineering University are three major design centres for AUVs. But the author also highlights that there are currently 159 undersea vehicle research projects under development at more than 40 Chinese universities – a significant increase over 15 major universities that had constructed undersea vehicle research teams just four years prior. Additionally, CCP’s CMF strategy is also facilitating a boom for China’s private sector AUV industry. He argues that the central missions with the PLA using AUVs would be marine surveying and reconnaissance, mine warfare and countermeasures, undersea cable inspection and seabed operations and anti-submarine warfare. He also argues that battery life could be a challenge for Chinese AUV ambitions on the technical side. Additionally, bureaucratic inertia could also constrain these developments.
Also, read Krista Langeland and Derek Grossman’s research report for the RAND Cooperation on Tailoring Deterrence for China in Space.
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IV. News Update
- After Afghanistan withdrawal, the US is looking to tighten its focus on China. Last week, over 25,000 US Marines and other US Naval personnel held exercises to stimulate the capture and control of islands in the Western Pacific Ocean. This was one of the largest military drills since the Cold War—involving dozens of ships and submarines, and was held with Japanese, British and Australian forces. Meanwhile, the US has also appointed Carlos Del Toro as the 78th Secretary of the Navy this month. In his inaugural speech, he highlighted four challenges: China, Covid, culture and climate.
- The PLA successfully carried out two new missile tests that can take out military commands and communications systems, SCMP reports. The report claims that the two new missiles can overcome complex electromagnetic interference to destroy facilities in a fast reaction operation, adds the report.
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V. More Readings
- Prof Srikant Kondapalli: A Transformative Decade: Xi Jinping's Rise and China's Political Landscape
- CRS report: US-China Competition in South and East China Seas, updated August 4
- Qiushi August edition
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| This newsletter is written by Suyash Desai, a research associate, China Studies Programme, at the Takshashila Institution. He has previously completed his M Phil from CIPOD, JNU. |
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