I. The Big Story: China-India Brief
The latest round of disengagement between China and India happened in the first week of August 2021, when both forces returned to their permanent bases from PP17 Gogra. However, the two countries are still engaged in stand-offs in at least three areas – PP15 Hot Springs, Demchock - where the PLA has transgressed in relatively smaller numbers and the Depsang Plains.
But since the latest round of disengagement, there have been some activities on both sides. Let’s first start with China’s activities in Tibet.
China’s Tibet Military District (TMD) conducted two days and one night combined armed forces, blue versus red army military exercises in Tibet last week. The TMD reportedly deployed more than ten combat units for these military exercises. These units were divided into two teams, the blue and red armies. The red army was the PLA, while the blue army most likely resembled India. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reports that the units included an elite regiment from the military district, alpine troops, forces with tanks and military vehicles, artillery personnel, missile forces, drones, intelligence personnel, army aviation teams, and airborne troops. Over two days, the PLA trained for shell raids using an artillery force, electromagnetic attack, observation and espionage, and accurate attack intelligence-gathering, highlights the SCMP report. “Coordinate data relating to the blue army outpost was sent to the command centre in real-time, allowing precision strikes by the artillery and howitzer forces at the front line. The drill also saw the anti-aircraft artillery troop shoot down drone aircraft, aided by an intelligence reconnaissance brigade, which also sent electromagnetic interference to confuse and mislead the enemy,” underlines the report.
Meanwhile, the recent Western Theatre Command Air Force’s June 2021 air exercises in Tibet reportedly indicated that there are still major gaps in integrating newer equipment with the forces. This is a PLA WTC Air Force specific update but could help understand the broader trend post the military reforms and force modernisation in China.
Returning to Tibet, a recent report highlights that China has conducted over 100 military exercises and drills close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Tibet in the first six months of 2021. Broadly, as our upcoming research on Tibet will highlight, there is an upward trend in military exercises in Tibet since 2017 and a huge spike since mid-2019. You could read my recent piece for the Times of India on the PLA’s military exercises in Tibet. You could also read Dr Rajeshwari Rajagopalan and Pulkit Mohan’s Occasional Paper on the PLA’s military exercises in Tibet.
Staying with Tibet, there were a few unconfirmed reports about Tibetan recruits shooting PLA officers at the Ngari Gunsa airbase. But THERE IS NO WAY TO CROSSCHECK THE REPORT. Also, no major Indian or Western news outlet has carried this report indicating that it could have been a rumour.
However, Chinese authorities last week arrested 60 Tibetans from Dza Wonpo Township in Kham Kardze on the charges of keeping pictures of the Dalai Lama. Additionally, 53 more Tibetans have also been detained.
Meanwhile, President Xi Jinping attended the Central Ethnic Work Conference on August 28. He spoke about promoting exchanges and the integration of all ethnic groups. “It is necessary to improve the development and opening-up policy system along the border, and further promote the action of solidifying the border and rejuvenating the border and enriching the people,” said Xi. Tibet is a key area for the ethnic work policy along China’s borders.
On the Indian side, too, there have been plenty of activities in the past few weeks. The Indian Army’s XIV Corps, which looks after the deployment along the China-India border in Leh alongside Kargil and the Siachen Glacier, conducted operation preparedness “Snow Leopard Brigade” integrated manoeuvre live-fire exercises in Ladakh.
Furthermore, India is also participating in the 25th edition of the Malabar Naval Exercises involving the Quad countries off the coast of Guam in the Pacific Ocean. This is after India and Vietnam held bilateral joint drills in the South China Sea as part of maritime cooperation between the two countries. As Prof Harsh Pant has argued in his recent commentary, “China’s presence continues to grow in the Indian Ocean region, much to India’s discomfiture, New Delhi is waking up to the challenge by trying to increase its presence and influence in China’s backyard — the western Pacific. This will annoy Beijing, but rattling China is necessary if India is to suitably protect its interests from the Himalayas to the maritime domain.”
Noticeably, six naval task groups from five countries are currently deployed in the Western Pacific. This includes the US’ Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group and Japan-based American Expeditionary Strike Group, the U.K. Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Group 21, Australian Defense Force’s Indo-Pacific Endeavour 21 task group, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Indo-Pacific Deployment 2021 force and the Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet task group. Besides this, Indian and Japanese Air Forces will also conduct joint air exercises in the upcoming weeks. Interestingly, India has dispatched six Su-30s for these exercises. There have been suggestions that this is after the Japanese aircraft encountered SU-30s over the East China Sea.
Meanwhile, here is a list of recent defence acquisitions and deployments on the Indian side in the past few weeks:
-Russia to deliver the first of the two stealth frigates to India by 2023.
-India set to deploy long-range missile tracking ships in the Indian Ocean.
-India-US inks a pact to develop air-launched unmanned aerial vehicles.
-Indian Army orders over 100 Indo-Israel Kamikaze drones.
Also, check Prof M Taylor Fravel’s recent podcast on the impact of COVID-19 on the Chinese armed forces. The major takeaway from this podcast is that China’s activities, for example, military exercises, have not increased since the pandemic. But it has also not decreased. (Although there is very limited information on whether the PLA has reduced the personnel or scope of these exercises). Prof Fravel adds that during COVID-19, the PLA didn’t become more assertive but it also didn’t become less assertive. The level of assertiveness that we saw prior to the pandemic has continued; in some cases like Taiwan and India, it has increased. However, the increase is not directly related to the pandemic but a combination of factors that also includes the ongoing pandemic. Do listen to the podcast to understand the combination of factors for PLA’s assertiveness with Taiwan and India. He also adds that there has been no slowdown in the PLA modernisation during the ongoing pandemic.
Finally, also read Pravin Sawhney’s piece for the Wire on how China not only walked through India’s conventional military capabilities but also threw its purported nuclear deterrence out of the reckoning.
Read More
- China’s rail-road link to the Indian Ocean.
- Why does China beat India on soft power?
- Outgoing ITBP chief on China
- US Indo-Pacific Command head shares concerns over China military build-up, intent
- NPT RevCon rescheduled to 2022: Use the time to build bridges: Dr Manpreet Sethi
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II Developing Stories
China’s Missile Silos
Multiple analysts have interpreted the implications of the recent discovery of three missile silo fields on China’s nuclear policy, posture and the future of arms control. Dr Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, who identified the Hami silo field, highlight a few reasons for China’s silos construction. They are:
Reducing the vulnerability of China’s ICBMs to a first strike, overcoming potential effects of missile defences, transitioning from liquid-fuel to solid-fuel silo missiles, increasing the readiness of the ICBM force, balancing the ICBM force, increasing China’s nuclear strike capabilities, increasing the number and types of strike options and increasing national prestige.
They also argue that China now appears to be moving from a “minimum deterrent” to a “medium deterrent”- a position between the smaller nuclear states (France, Britain, Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea) & the two big ones (Russia and the US). They highlight that the Chinese government is unlikely to officially declare that it is abandoning its minimum deterrence strategy, and its threshold for what constitutes a “minimum” deterrent will likely continue to shift as China expands its nuclear arsenal. In fairness, all nuclear-armed states claim they only have the minimum number of nuclear weapons they need, no matter how many nuclear weapons they have.
They also question the shell game hypothesis. They claim that the shell game is certainly a possibility, however, if China wants to do a shell game, wouldn’t one large silo field be sufficient? Why build more than one? Read the full brief here.
Meanwhile, I also tried to contribute my two cents to the ongoing debate on China’s missile silo fields. Here’s the link to my Explained Piece for the Indian Express.
Read More
-How finding China’s nuclear sites upsets pro-Beijing trolls: Foreign Policy
-New missile silo fields: Arms Control Association
-Nuclear arms control more urgent than ever
China’s New Maritime Law
China passed a maritime law demanding that foreign vessels entering its “territorial waters” should report to China under maritime regulations. China’s Maritime Safety Administration said that under regulations taking effect from September 1, vessels of foreign nationality entering China’s territorial seas must report ship and cargo information to China’s maritime administrations. The reporting requirements apply to submersibles, nuclear vessels, ships carrying radioactive materials, ships carrying bulk oil, chemicals, liquefied gas and other toxic and harmful substances and other vessels that were considered a threat to the country’s maritime traffic safety, the administration said in a notice last week.
Sounds reasonable in isolation, but not when one considers Beijing’s interpretation of the “territorial waters.” Beijing asserts its sovereignty over vast swathes of the South China Sea, under its widely contested and far-reaching nine-dash line, as well as disputed islands in the East China Sea. Would this mean that China would also try to enforce the new law in the disputed seas? A similar law passed earlier this year empowered the coast guards to board and also open fire on a foreign vessel. Both these laws are deliberately kept ambiguous.
Aristyo Rizka Darmawan highlights that under China’s Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992, article 2 stipulates that:
“The [People’s Republic of China]’s territorial sea refers to the waters adjacent to its territorial land. And the PRC’s territorial land includes the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to the People’s Republic of China. The PRC's internal waters refer to the waters along the baseline of the territorial sea facing the land.”
These laws, along with June 2020’s revisions to the People’s Armed Police Law, January’s revisions to the National Defence Law and the implementation of the Hainan Free Trade Port Law in June this year, highlight a broader trend of increasing coordination between the maritime policy and military enforcement apparatus. This looks like a stepped-up effort to assert sovereign claims on disputed areas.
Taiwan and China
The latest 2021 Chicago Council Survey shows that a majority of Americans support US policies towards Taiwan. Majorities favour US recognition of Taiwan as an independent country, support its inclusion in international organisations, and support the signing of a US-Taiwan free trade agreement. A slimmer majority (52%) support the US signing a formal alliance with Taiwan, and a plurality (46%) favouring explicitly committing to defend Taiwan if China invades. When asked about a range of potential scenarios, over half of Americans (52%) favoured using US troops to defend if China invaded the island.
It is the highest level ever recorded in the Council’s surveys dating back to 1982 when the question was first asked. Republicans (60%) are more likely to support sending US troops to Taiwan’s defence than Democrats (50%) or Independents (49%), highlights the survey.
Meanwhile, a US warship and the US coastguard cutter sailed through the Taiwan Strait last week. The Kidd, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, accompanied by the Coast Guard cutter Munro, transited “through international waters in accordance with international law,” the US Navy said in a statement. China’s Ministry of Defense, of course, protested against the passage and expressed concerns over the US actions in the region.
Taiwan, meanwhile, plans to hold large-scale air raid drills –simulating missile and warplane attacks by Beijing – alongside its annual live-fire military exercises in September. The annual air raid drill dubbed the “Wan An exercise” will be carried out on September 15 across Taiwan, including its frontline islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu. This will be timed to coincide with the military’s massive annual live-fire Han Kuang exercises to test the combat readiness of the island’s forces. This year’s war games will run for five days from September 13. Taiwan also plans to launch a new defence agency in 2022 to boost the combat readiness of the reserve forces. It will send officers of the reserve forces to the United States for training and exchange visits to improve the mobilisation and build-up.
Taiwan also will start the construction of its first domestic submarine this November. Additionally, under its Sea Sword programme, it will upgrade its six Kang Ding-class frigates to improve their air and missile defence capabilities by installing new missile systems. All this information was revealed when President Tsai Ing-wen’s cabinet proposed military spending of T$471.7 billion (US$16.89 billion) for 2022.
Finally, I am sharing an interesting piece that I read last week. It is by Dr Zhiqun Zhu on the paradoxes in the Taiwan Strait. He argues that there are many problems in the trilateral Taipei-Beijing-Washington relationship:
- From Taiwan’s side, it’s seeking to boost its international status, shunning Beijing and rejecting “one China” by imposing a precondition for cross-Strait talks.
- From the US side, it’s attempting to maintain the status quo, which in turn upsets the cross-Strait order, and following its “one China” policy - indirectly helping create “one China one Taiwan.”
- From the Chinese side, treating Taiwan like Hong Kong and Macau widens, not narrows, the cross-Strait gap and punishing Taiwan independence strengthens the push for separation. Read the full piece.
The South China Sea
The PLA has reportedly held over 100 military drills in the South China Sea in the past three months. Last week, the Maritime Safety Administration announced three separate navigation restriction zones in the South China Sea, the northern Yellow Sea and the Bohai Strait for live-fire military exercises. This is not the first time the PLA has organised military exercises across multiple seas. The Global Times report highlights that the PLA held 48 military exercises in the Bohai Sea and the Yellow Sea, 39 exercises on the islands near Taiwan, 26 in the South China Sea and at least seven in the East China Sea in the last four months.
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III. Research Papers
Beyond Mahan: The evolution of China’s policy discussion on sea power development
Edward Sing Yue Chan published a paper in Asian Security on the evolution of Chinese academic and policy perspectives on sea power development. He divides the discourse into four schools of thought: Mahanianism, Harmonious School, Administrative School and Balancing School. He argues that Mahanianism is the oldest school and has been very popular since the 1980s. Liu Huaqing, also known as “Chinese Mahan”, introduced a “near-seas active defence strategy” based on the Mahanian ideology. The PLA Navy is the major pillar for implementing this strategy, and it’s based on the Navy’s ability to control the seas and project power.
The author argues that the Harmonious School evolved from Mahanian thought. This school argues that China’s maritime security should not be limited to the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ); it should also include the right to travel in open seas and exploit maritime resources. It also argues that China’s overseas interests need to be addressed by nonmilitary measures, such as diplomatic power, economic power, and law enforcement power. Finally, the Harmonious School scholars claim that the Navy should focus more on protecting economic interests overseas because it is the only military force that can travel beyond territorial seas during peacetime.
The author argues the Administrative School scholars believe that only a solid administrative body can protect and expand China’s sea power effectively and sufficiently. The Administrative School suggests several policies to strengthen China’s maritime governance. It recommends that the government legislates a Chinese maritime law based on international laws. This law allows domestic law enforcement agencies to have clear guidelines for executing their power. It would also increase China’s legitimacy and jurisdiction over its territorial waters and EEZ, including disputed territory.
Finally, the Balancing School focuses on diplomatic activities and identifies building sea power as a geopolitical strategy to balance the power in East Asia. It advocates that the state could pursue military and diplomatic powers as a “two trail” strategy to protect and expand China’s sea power sufficiently and peacefully, especially in East Asia.
PLA’s Three Warfares
This paper is written by a retired US Army officer. Edwin S. Cochran examines the conduct of Chinese influence operations, a broad range of non-kinetic, communications-related, and informational activities that aim to affect a target audience’s cognitive, psychological, motivational, ideational, ideological, and moral characteristics. He argues that China conducts influence operations on a global scale as part of a grand strategy that seeks China’s “rejuvenation” as a great power, and the PLA is a key executor in this. PLA influence operations are encapsulated in the “Three Warfares” concept of media (or public opinion) warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. He highlights that the contemporary version of Chinese influence operations emerged in 2003 when the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission approved the “Three Warfares” concept in the revised “Chinese People’s Liberation Army Political Work Regulations.” The purpose of the “Three Warfares” is to establish “discursive power” (huayu quan) over an adversary – the power to control perceptions and shape narratives that serve Chinese interests while undermining those of an opponent.
After explaining each concept, he also highlights which military, state and party units are responsible for these warfares. For example, he underlines that the 311 Base, headquartered in Fuzhou, Fujian province, is the only PLA organisation publically known to focus on psychological warfare. The base has at least six subordinate regiments responsible for targeting public opinion on Taiwan through network operations, television, audiovisual productions, and radio broadcasting. Read More.
PLA RF Missile Test
On August 13, 2021, the PLA RF conducted a live-fire missile launch, most likely from its 1st test and training district in Jilantai. The missiles impacted at least two targets on the apron of the runway at the PLA RF’s Ruqiang target impact area, 1400 km from Jilantai. Some reports highlight that these were the DF-15 SRBMs which the PLA RF personnel launched from its first conventional missile unit, 613 Brigade. But the DF-15’s range is only 800 km.
This leaves several possibilities:
1) The PLA RF 613 Brigade is equipped with DF-21 MRBM.
2) The PLA RF 613 Brigade is equipped with the DF-17 hypersonic or CJ-100 supersonic cruise missiles; both have unknown ranges. (Also, no report showed the trajectory of the missile to identify the type of missile.)
3) There is a new unobserved missile that China has fired in the recent test.
4) The DF-15’s range has improved.
Jianfeng 2021
In March 2021, PLA RF missile commanders competed in a new six-day competition assessment called Jianfeng 2021 at Rocket Force Command College, Wuhan. This competition is organised by the Director of the Training Bureau of Rocket Forces Staff Headquarters. The competition is linked to the Rocket Force’s operational chain of command, making critical decisions on the real-time battlefield. This competition's focus was on solving problems, improving war strategy and strategic thinking capabilities, and deepening operational design and tactical innovation. Experts from various theatres and China’s NDU were brought to challenge the commanders.
Josh Baughman highlights that the details of Jianfeng 2021 were purposely kept vague, including what scenarios were tested, what regions were emphasised and who were the potential adversaries. But he highlights that further indications of joint operations were critical to JF 2021. Chinese People’s Liberation Army Joint Operations Outline (Provisional)” (中国人民解放军联合作战纲要 - 试行）was referenced in the competition and used to help in scoring. Finally, the author highlights the PLA Daily’s release in June titled “Rocket Force ‘Jianfeng 2021’ Missile Brigade Competition Assessment" emphasised on "One Brigade, One Exam, Directly Pointing to the Battlefield.” He argues that jointness (联合性）was explicitly emphasised in the report. The article states, “The test method was changed to joint planning” and highlighted the necessity of jointness in modern warfare.
Read More
- Human’s First, Weapon’s Second: Marcus Clay
- Russian Participation in the PRC’s Strategic Exercises (for the first time)
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IV News Updates
Pentagon and PLA Talk
The Pentagon and the PLA initiated their first direct contact line last week since Biden took office. The video call focused on “maintaining open channels of communication between the two militaries.” “There should be a sense of urgency about this,” said retired Adm. Scott Swift, former commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Past experiences like the Tiananmen Square incident and Chinese fighter jet and US reconnaissance jet collision in 2001 have underscored the fragility of these links. But it’s a step in the right direction to managing risks between the two armed forces.
PLA Rotation in Hong Kong and Macau
The PLA completed its 24th rotation of troops in Hong Kong and its 22nd rotation of troops in Macau in August this year. I think this is an annual rotation that happens in August every year.
China Air Show
The 13th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition, usually known as China Air Show, will be held from September 28 to October 3 in Zhuhai, southern China’s Guangdong province. Newer fighter jets and a number of PLA AF’s active main combat equipment will be displayed via flight show and in the exhibition. The PLA AF’s Bayi Aerobatics Team and the Red Eagle Aerobatic Team will also perform at the air show.
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V. Additional Readings
-Matt Pottinger’s article in Foreign Affairs on Chinese Grand Strategy
-China and America: A New Game in a New Era: NDU Publication
-China Leadership Monitor’s Latest Issue
-PLA Sr Col Zhou Bo’s op-ed on Afghanistan
-India’s New Consulate and Subnational Diplomacy in South Asia: SAV
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| This newsletter is written by Suyash Desai, a research associate, China Studies Programme, at the Takshashila Institution. He has previously completed his M Phil from CIPOD, JNU. |
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