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The Takshashila PLA Insight
Issue No 112.
September 24, 2021
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Today's Issue:

- China-India Brief: New Commander for Xinjiang MD, More Military Exercises in WTC, Chinese Cyber Activities, Doklam
- Taiwan
- South China Sea
- US General called his Chinese Counterpart to Avert an Armed Conflict
- PLA Promotions
- Shenzhou 12
- MSS Chief Chen Wenqing visits Tibet
I. The Big Story: China-India Brief

India and China’s Foreign Ministers Dr S Jaishankar and Wang Yi met in Dushanbe last week, ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit. Dr Jaishankar noted that since their previous meeting on 14th July, the two sides had made some progress in the resolution of the remaining issues along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh and had completed the disengagement in the Gogra area. However, there were still some outstanding issues that needed to be resolved. He also underlined that it was necessary to ensure progress in the resolution of the remaining issues to restore peace and tranquillity along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh, noting that peace and tranquillity in the border areas have been the essential basis for progress in the bilateral relations.

The Chinese 
readout highlighted that China and India should continue to adhere to the strategic consensus of not posing threats to each other, developing opportunities for each other, and pushing bilateral relations and pragmatic cooperation into a healthy and stable development track. This is not only in the two countries' common interests but also conducive to regional and world peace and development. 

The two readouts indicate that China and India are still not on the same page with regard to disengagement and broader bilateral relations. Since the start of the stand-off in 2020, India has maintained that normal relations cannot be restored until there are tensions on the border. But the Chinese have maintained that bilateral relations could be restored, and the border issues should not be hyphenated with broader bilateral relations.

Meanwhile, the PLA Daily reports that the Western Theatre Command has 
introduced more night drills for the unit stationed near the border. This is to familiarise the soldiers with the newer equipment the PLA commissioned with the South Xinjiang Military Region earlier this year. It includes the new PHL-03 truck-mounted self-propelled rocket launchers, PCL-161 and PCL-181 self-propelled howitzers, Type-15 tanks, ZBL-09 infantry fighting vehicle, Type 08 armoured vehicle and Z-20 and Z-8G helicopters. Similar equipment was also commissioned with the Tibet Military District since 2017, and the frequency of military exercises in the region has increased. Thus, going ahead, the frequency of military exercises in the South Xinjiang Military Region would most likely increase.

Staying with Xinjiang, Lt Gen Liu Lin is now the 
Commander of the Xinjiang Military District. Earlier, as a Maj Gen, Liu Lin was the Commander of the South Xinjiang Military Region. Caixin reports that he was recently promoted as Lt Gen and will now command the Xinjiang Military District. This is after Lt Gen Hai Waijiang, the former Xinjiang Military Commander, was promoted as General and was made the Commander of the Western Theatre Command. This also means that India will have to negotiate with a new commander at Chushul-Moldo point as the South Xinjiang Military Region will get a new commander. Throughout the course of the ongoing stand-off, India interacted with Liu during the multiple rounds of the Corps Commanders-level meeting.

Moving on, the State media 
reports that the Tibet Military District tested its air defence forces last week. In a live-fire drill on a plateau at 4,700m (15,400-foot) altitude, an air defence brigade under the Tibetan Military District hit several incoming targets, according to a video released by state broadcaster CCTV. The targets intercepted included cruise missiles, stand-off air-to-ground missiles and mock fighter planes flying at ultra-low altitude. According to the video, the PLA brigade used a Chinese HQ-16B surface-to-air missile system with radar. 

The state media also reports that video and article exchange was held between Xinjiang Military Region’s border battalion and primary school students of Huazhong Road in Anqing city in Anhui province. It served three purposes: 1) Continue creating a narrative that India is the aggressor, and the PLA is defending the borders 2) Sow the feeling of nationalism through such initiatives 3) Introduce loyalty through means of education.

Meanwhile, a US-based private cyber security company 
claimed this week that a major Indian media conglomerate, police department, and national identification database had been hacked, likely by a Chinese state-sponsored group. The Insikt Group, the threat research division of Massachusetts-based Recorded Future, said the hacking group, given the temporary name TAG-28, made use of Winnti malware, which it said is exclusively shared among several Chinese state-sponsored activity groups. Chinese authorities have consistently denied any form of state-sponsored hacking and said China itself is a major target of cyberattacks. The Insikt Group suggested the cyberattack could be related to those border tensions. “As of early August 2021, Recorded Future data shows a 261% increase in the number of suspected state-sponsored Chinese cyber operations targeting Indian organizations and companies already in 2021 compared to 2020,” highlighted the report. They also observed that around 500 megabytes of data are being extracted from the network of the media conglomerate.

Do check Nathan Ruser and Baani Grewal’s latest document on the current developments between China and India at Doklam. The authors have built 3D satellite imagery – through the collection and analysis of new satellite imagery and using an open-source data set that they have compiled from 2019 to 2021. Their key findings are:

1) India and China have continued their infrastructure build-up along the border, including new frontline observation towers and forward bases. China has accelerated the construction following the 2017 Doklam stand-off, and the road continued through late 2020 and early 2021.

2) In Doklam, despite the disengagement agreement, China has exploited its de facto control of Bhutanese territory, allowing its military to continue building strategic road infrastructure towards India.  

3) India’s historical positions along the borderlands in the Doklam region have resulted in maintaining surveillance advantage throughout the area by using frontline positions abutting the borders.

4) Currently, at least 50 sq km of Bhutanese territory is under China’s de facto control. Don’t miss this, do check the 3D imagery in this 
document, especially of Jampheri ridge, Siliguri Corridor and the Chinese road construction.

Meanwhile, President Xi Jinping wrote a letter to unit 77656, which was named a “model plateau battalion” in 2016 for its “outstanding performance in safeguarding borders.” This unit is under Tibet Military District’s jurisdiction and deployed on the border with India. “Your mission is strenuous, and your responsibilities are heavy. I hope our comrades will carry on with the sense of mission, carry forward your fine traditions, enhance military training and be combat-ready,” 
wrote Xi.

Across the border, India is all set to conduct the eight flight-test of the 5000km ranged Agni V ICBM. This time, the missile is to be tested with MIRV capabilities. Interestingly, China this week cited the post-Pokhran blast resolution in the United Nations Security Council over India’s planned missile test. “As for whether India can develop ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, the UNSCR 1172 already has clear stipulations,” said Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian at a media briefing. The resolution, in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests, “calls upon India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponisation or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and to undertake appropriate commitments in that regard."

While 
citing the resolution regarding India’s missile programme, China has, in contrast, been aiding the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes for decades, from providing enriched uranium and even technology for nuclear-capable missiles.

Meanwhile, India’s Chief of Defence Staff, Gen Bipin Rawat, claimed that India is looking to
raise a rocket force for “different sorts of missiles.”

Finally, on the Quadrilateral Security Grouping (Quad), Prime Minister Modi is in the US for the UNGA and has 
already met the Australian PM Scott Morrison, Japan’s PM Suga Yoshihide and US Vice President Kamala Harris before the Quad Leaders’ Summit.

Do check ORF’s special report by Prof Harsh Pant and Shashank Mattoo on 
The Rise and Rise of the Quad: Setting an Agenda for India. 

Also read:
-The 43rd piece from
Xi’s Thought Q&A series on the PLA from the People’s Daily. 
- Jayadeva Ranade’s piece on the
PLA unrest.

II. Developing Stories

Taiwan and China

The US Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, USS Barry, conducted its ninth transit through the Taiwan Strait last week. “The ship’s transit through the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the US commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific,” said the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet, adding that the US military “flies, sails, and operates anywhere international law allows.”  In response, the PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command’s spokesperson said“The US has repeatedly taken provocative actions, which illustrates that the US is the biggest troublemaker for the stability of the Taiwan Strait. The theatre command remains on high alert and is determined to safeguard national sovereignty, security and regional peace and stability.” The ETC also deployed naval and air forces, including combat ships, early warning aircraft and ­bombers, to carry out joint patrols and combat drills in the waters and seas to the southwest of Taiwan. Taiwan’s defence ministry said the mainland military deployment included six J-16 and two J-11 fighters, one anti-submarine, and one reconnaissance aircraft. The Chinese fighter jets flew in an area close to the disputed Pratas Islands, governed by Taipei but claimed by Beijing, while the anti-submarine and reconnaissance aircraft flew into the Bashi Channel, which separates Taiwan from the Philippines, according to a map issued by the ministry.

The PLA also
sent 24 aircraft to Taiwan’s ADIZ this week. This included 18 fighter jets, two bombers, two anti-submarine aircraft, a transport and an electronic warfare aircraft. This is the 20th time the PLA planes have entered Taiwan’s ADIZ this month. Do check this amazing data compiled by Gerald C. Brown on the Taiwanese ADIZ violation by the PLA aircraft. Note that this is minus the September 2021 data.

Earlier this month, Beijing protested against the possibility of the US 
considering a request from Taipei to change the name of its mission in the US capital from Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to Taiwan Representative Office. A decision has not been made, but this is along with the similar request by Taiwan last week when it submitted an application to join the CPTPP under the name “the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei)” – a title it used in the World Trade Organisation.

Meanwhile, Taiwan is 
planning to spend NT$240 billion over the next five years on domestically produced arms like Wan Chien cruise missiles, Tien Kung anti-ballistic missiles, short-range Tien Chien and medium-range Hsiung Feng missiles. The money will also cover navy and coastguard vessels equipped with anti-ship and anti-aircraft weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles. The special budget supplements the NT$471.7 billion defence budget for next year and will need to be approved by the legislature, where the government has a large majority.

Finally, read Dr Oriana Skylar Mastro’s recent 
submission for the New York Times on the meaning of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan for Taiwan. She argues that the withdrawal shows President Biden is truly refocusing his national security priorities — he even listed the need to “focus on shoring up America’s core strengths to meet the strategic competition with China” as one of the reasons for the drawdown. She also highlights that the US departure from Afghanistan creates security concerns in China’s own backyard that could distract it from its competition with the United States. Additionally, she highlights that the US stayed much longer in Afghanistan than most expected. This upsets China’s calculus about what the United States would do in a Taiwan crisis since conventional wisdom in Beijing had been that the painful legacy of Somalia would deter Washington from ever coming to Taipei’s aid.


South China Sea

As Duan Dang highlights in the latest issue of his South China Sea Brief, the Natuna Sea has been the central focus of tensions between China, Indonesia and the US in the past three months. He highlights that the Chinese Survey ship, Haiyang Dizhi 10, escorted by Chinese coastguard vessels, has been operating in the Natuna Sea for several weeks. Reportedly, it’s also supported by the PLA’s Type 054 Frigate. Meanwhile, the US Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group was spotted in the region on September 9. The strike group was shadowed by a Chinese Type 052/052D destroyer. Duan further writes that on September 10, China, in response, brought reinforcements by deploying five more coastguard vessels to the seven that were already operating in the area. Even the Shandong Aircraft Carrier group also sailed for the south. It appeared that China was preparing for a stand-off in case of interference by the US carrier strike group to the operation of Haiyang Dizhi 10. The situation was tense; the USS Carl Vinson carrier turned on its AIS signal and broadcasted its position in the Natuna Sea - 50 nautical miles from Haiyang Dizhi 10, he writes (more details in his newsletter). 

Now, the US carrier has left the region, and the five coastguard vessels have also returned to Hainan. Meanwhile, during these activities, Indonesia 
deployed a patrol vessel, a naval vessel to shadow the survey ship and four more warships in the area. Do follow his newsletter, it’s extremely insightful.

This brings me to Dr Munmun Majumdar’s 
article in the India Quarterly journal on Natunas, the next flashpoint in the South China Sea. She highlights that the latest encroachment by China into the Indonesian Natuna EEZ witnessed a departure of China’s justification for such action when it argued that it has sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and also sovereign rights over relevant waters near the Nansha Islands. In this article, she examines Indonesia’s response vis-à-vis China and argues that with the rise of nationalism over ownership of the Natunas, it is likely to progress into an area of potential conflict between Indonesia and China. She writes that while Indonesia is reticent about acknowledging becoming a party to the dispute in the SCS, it does not shy away from rejecting attempts made by China to dominate the sea. In the face of unfolding geopolitical realities, it is certain that it is not tenable for Indonesia to continue to remain neutral. So far, Jakarta has reacted to China’s maritime encroachments with diplomatic protests backed up by occasional shows of force. But the recent incident demonstrated that there is a likelihood of tensions to increase in the near future. Although an outright naval confrontation between Indonesia and China is unlikely, in the face of growing domestic opposition to China’s actions in the Natuna area, whether Indonesia can continue to manage the collision of interests between Indonesia and China with caution and dexterity is becoming increasingly uncertain.

Elsewhere, there are also reports about at least ten Indonesian government ministries and the intelligence agency being compromised by a suspected Chinese cyberattack. The intrusion is linked to Mustang Panda, a Chinese threat actor known for its cyber espionage 
campaigns in Southeast Asia. 

Finally, Beijing 
slammed Germany and also rejected the port call request for the German Frigate Bayern to Shanghai. The 4,000-tonne frigate Bayern set off from Wilhelmshaven last month for a six-month mission to the Indo-Pacific, including the disputed South China Sea, to strengthen Germany’s presence in the region. Before Bayern’s departure last month, German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said its goal was to show allies in the region that “we are standing up for our values and interest together.”


US General Called his Chinese Counterpart to Avert an Armed Conflict

Veteran journalist Bob Woodward and Robert Costa’s upcoming book, Peril, makes an explosive revelation. They write that in the Trump administration’s final months, the country’s (US) top military officer, Gen Mark A. Milley, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was so fearful that the President’s actions might spark a war with China that he moved urgently to avert armed conflict and called his Chinese counterpart twice.

The latest Washington Post report reveals that Gen Milley assured Gen. Li Zuocheng, his Chinese counterpart, that the US would not strike in a pair of secret phone calls. The first call took place on October 30, 2020, four days before the election that unseated President Donald Trump. The final call took place on January 8, 2021, two days after the Capitol siege carried out by his supporters in a quest to cancel the vote. Gen Milley’s review of intelligence prompted the first call, suggesting the Chinese believed the US was preparing to attack. Woodward and Costa write that that belief was based on tensions over military exercises in the South China Sea and deepened by Trump’s belligerent rhetoric toward China. “General Li, I want to assure you that the American government is stable and everything is going to be okay,” Milley told him. “We are not going to attack or conduct any kinetic operations against you,” added Milley.

In the second call, placed to address Chinese fears about the events of Jan. 6, Li wasn’t as easily assuaged, even after Milley promised him, “We are 100 per cent steady. Everything’s fine. But democracy can be sloppy sometimes.”

Gen Milley also called the US Indo-Pacific Command Chief and senior officers to review the procedures for launching nuclear weapons, saying the president alone could give the order — but, crucially, that he, Milley, also had to be involved. Looking each in the eye, Milley asked the officers to affirm that they had understood, the authors write, in what he considered an “oath.” The book’s revelations quickly made Milley a target for many in the US.


China’s Nuclear Doctrine

China should review its nuclear first-use policy, Sha Zukang, Chinese ambassador for disarmament affairs to the UN in Geneva in the 1990s, said last week. He made the remarks at a conference in Beijing, marking 20 years since the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association was founded. 
 
According to a transcript of his speech released on Wednesday, Sha said China had taken the “moral high ground” with its pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances when it first gained nuclear capabilities in 1964. But he said it was now time for Beijing to “fine-tune” that policy as a way to counter the increasing US military presence in the region, noting that the US regarded China as a major rival or even an adversary. “The strategic pressure on China is intensifying as [the US] has built new military alliances and as it increases its military presence in our neighbourhood.” China should maintain its “no first use” pledge for most nuclear and non-nuclear states, Sha said. But the unconditional policy “may not apply to the US unless China and the US negotiate a mutual understanding on no first use of nuclear weapons, or unless the US ceases to take any negative measures that undermine the effectiveness of China’s strategic forces.” In his speech to more than 200 Chinese arms control experts attending the September 15 conference, Sha said Beijing should establish its own rules on missile exports instead of joining the US-initiated Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). He said the US had used the multilateral export control regime to justify its growing military presence in the region.

Meanwhile, do check this 
commentary from the Hill. Former NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller argues that the US focus should be not on nuclear weapons but on the new and emerging technologies rapidly maturing into military assets. Innovations in artificial intelligence, big data analysis, quantum computing, and quantum sensing and biotechnology are born in future defence capacity. The US needs to do everything it can to disrupt the Chinese rush to technological superiority. Instead of losing focus over 100 ICBM silos, which were recently found, that have nothing to do with the future capabilities, we (The US) must push the frontiers of science and innovation and prevent Chinese dominance. The US has the talent and the institutions to do so — as long as we spend our resources wisely.

Also, check the panel discussion on 
China’s new nuclear silo fields on the Bulletin – participants: Matt Korda, Dr Tong Zhao and Dr Duyeon Kim.

III. Research Papers

China’s New Direction: Challenges and Opportunities

The Task Force on US-China Policy is a group of China specialists from around the US, convened by Asia Society’s Center on US-China Relations, the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy’s 21st Century China Center. In the Task Force's latest report titled “China’s New Direction: Challenges and Opportunities for US Policy,” leading US experts on China weighed in on major changes in China and gave recommendations for US policy going forward under President Biden.
 
The report discusses eight topics: Politics, military, foreign policy, technology, society, human rights, climate change and economy. I will only highlight key insights from the military and foreign policy sections. But do read the full report, it’s extremely insightful.
 
The military section is authored by Prof Thomas Christensen, Dr Zack Cooper, Karl Eikenberry, Prof M. Taylor Fravel and Bonnie Glaser. They highlight that China’s long-range strike weapons, including anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, integrated air defence systems, electronic, cyber and space warfare capabilities and China’s grey zone activities, are the four areas of most concern for the US.

They recommend: 1) The US should rely on more agile US capabilities in East Asia 2) The US should develop a larger inventory of longer-range strike weapons beyond the reach of China’s IAD weapons. 3) It must disperse forward-deployed material and ensure cyber security for the logistics line 4) It should help to improve the capabilities of partners in the South China Sea region 5) It should conduct strategic dialogues on crisis management with Beijing. 6) The US must help strengthen Taiwan’s defensive capabilities against China’s invasion and coercion.

The diplomacy section in this report is also authored by Prof M Taylor Fravel, Bonnie Glaser and Dr Evan Mederios. They argue that both historical and contemporary factors drive China’s foreign policy. They highlight that China now has more diverse material capabilities than ever before, enabling its more activist international posture.

China’s economic instrument of statecraft, according to authors, include positive inducements like aids, loans, direct investment, market access and trade and investment agreements, and negative inducements include economic coercion such as tariff or threat of loss of access to China’s large market, export restrictions, consumer boycotts, etc.

The diplomacy section of this report also discusses China’s approaches to its key relationships and vulnerabilities in China’s diplomatic posture.

The authors recommend: 1) The more US revitalises itself politically, economically, and militarily, the more influence it can exercise in global affairs, thus providing credible options to countries seeking to resist Chinese coercion 2) The US should continue to rebuild its relationships with allies and partners, as well as its role in multilateral organisations, which are an indispensable instrument of US statecraft 3) The US should reinvest in the infrastructure of American diplomacy 4) At the same time, the US should not avoid or eschew diplomatic cooperation with China or in multilateral efforts that include China, especially in areas where interests align, such as climate change, public health and nonproliferation 5) Finally, the US policy responses should focus on areas where Chinese diplomacy poses the sharpest challenges to US interests worldwide, such as economic diplomacy, global governance, and information.


PLA Promotions

Kenneth Allen, Dennis Blasko and John Cobbert published a brief on the recent PLA reshuffle that led to the promotion of five Lt Gens to Generals' rank, making them in charge of two theatre commands, two services and the National Defense University. Refer to PLA Insight’s issue number 111. They highlight that all five theatre commands in China now have army generals as Commanders. The resurgence of an all-Army contingent of theatre commanders may be a temporary anomaly as the PLA intends to increase its joint capabilities. Non-Army officers serve on all the joint staffs (CMC and Theatre), and some non-Army officers also are being assigned to the PLA’s local headquarters system of provincial Military District, Military Subdistrict/Garrison, and People’s Armed Forces Departments throughout China (responsible for defence mobilisation, conscription, emergency response, and military-civil integration activities). Based on the PLA’s declared objectives, the authors argue that more non-Army officers could be promoted to leadership positions in the CMC and Theatre Commands to increase jointness and provide examples of how junior Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force officers can aspire.

They also argue that the reshuffle may reflect the announced goal of changing the PLA’s hierarchical structure from a grade-based to a rank-based system.  The authors estimate that of the approximately 37 PLA full generals and admirals on active-duty (across the PLA), at least nine will reach 65 by 2022 and are likely to retire before the 20th Party Congress in October 2022. 

Finally, political loyalty to Xi Jinping plays an important role in high-level PLA promotions as well as all other policy issues in China, the authors note. All senior PLA officers are senior Party members and are either full or alternate members of the Central Committee and, therefore, by definition, “Xi’s men” — if not, they don’t become senior PLA officers.

The Takshashila Institution has been engaged in sustained research on India’s space policies and their strategic implications. Earlier this year, my colleagues developed A Space Doctrine for India which proposes a series of principles and approaches that they believe ought to define India’s approach to security in outer space. Most recently, they have put together a discussion document that makes explicit key propositions that undergird India's space doctrine. That document, Space as a Geopolitical Environment, also serves as a brief and ready reference for issues relating to geopolitics in space. I would encourage you to please take a read. 
IV. News Update

- This week, a Chinese spacecraft carrying three astronauts landed in the Gobi Desert in Inner Mongolia, bringing Shenzhou 12’s mission to an end. Shenzhou 12, launched on June 16, carried the core module of China’s Earth-orbiting space station. It crewed three astronauts to work at an under-construction space station for three months, the longest stay in low earth orbit by any Chinese national. Meanwhile, China also launched a cargo spaceship on Monday to deliver supplies to its Tiangong space station and prepare for a second crewed mission planned for next month.

- Last week, President Xi Jinping inspected a military base in northwest China’s Shaanxi province. While inspecting this base, Xi emphasised focusing on preparing for war, accelerating innovation and development, and comprehensively improving the ability to perform the stated missions and tasks.

- MSS head Chen Wenqing visited China last week. “The purpose of this investigation and research trip to Tibet is to further study and implement the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech on Tibet’s inspection and the spirit of the Seventh Central Conference on Tibet Work and the Central Conference on Ethnic Work. Guided by the overall national security concept, the Party will thoroughly implement the Party’s strategy of managing Tibet in the new era, carry out the study and education of party history and the education and rectification of political and legal teams in a down-to-earth manner, and contribute to the efforts of the state security organs to write a new chapter in the long-term stability and high-quality development of the snowy plateau,” the report notes.

- Japan began a large-scale military exercise last week with at least 100,000 personnel, 20,000 vehicles and 120 aircraft. “This exercise is a large-scale exercise for the entire Ground Self-Defense Force for the first time in 30 years since 1993, focusing on the operational preparatory stage, improving operational effectiveness and deterrence/coping ability,” the statement said.

- China is considering buying three dozen Russian naval attack helicopters. The PLA is studying the possibility of buying Russian Ka-52Ks helicopters for its Type 075 landing dock.
V. More Readings

- Full text of Xi Jinping’s 76th UNGA Speech
- China issues guidelines on developing civilised cyberspace
- AUKUS in perspective by Dr Bates Gill
- Australia badly needs nuclear submarines by Prof Andrew Erickson
- Arctic choke point and China
This newsletter is written by Suyash Desai, a research associate, China Studies Programme, at the Takshashila Institution. He has previously completed his M Phil from CIPOD, JNU. 
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