I. The Big Story: China-India Brief
It’s been 14 days since I wrote the previous issue of the newsletter on October 2, 2021. I thought that China’s National Day Golden Week would be slow on the news. However, a lot has happened on China’s southwestern and eastern borders with India and Taiwan in the past two weeks.
China and India had the 13th round of the Corps Commander-level talks this week. The talks were held at Moldo on the Chinese side of the border and discussed disengagement from Patrolling Point 15 in Hot Springs. The talks were led by the 14th Corps Commander Lt Gen P.K Menon and the South Xinjiang District’s new Commander Maj Gen Zhao Zhidan (since Lt Gen Liu Lin now heads the Xinjiang Military Command). The talks ended in a stalemate. China’s Western Theatre Command spokesperson issued a statement blaming India for “unreasonable and unrealistic demands." “The Chinese side made great efforts to promote the easing and cooling of the border situation and fully demonstrated its sincerity of maintaining overall interests of bilateral military relations. However, the Indian side still persisted in its unreasonable and unrealistic demands, which added difficulties to the negotiations. China is firm in its resolve to safeguard national sovereignty. We hope that the Indian side should avoid misjudging the situation and cherish the hard-won situation in the China-India border areas. The Indian side should abide by the relevant agreements and consensus reached between the two countries and two militaries, show sincerity and take concrete actions to jointly safeguard peace and stability in the border areas with China,” said Senior Colonel Long Shaohua, WTC spokesperson.
On the Indian side, the Ministry of External Affairs’ statement claimed, “The Indian side pointed out that the situation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) had been caused by unilateral attempts of the Chinese side to alter the status quo and in violation of the bilateral agreements. It was, therefore, necessary that the Chinese side take appropriate steps in the remaining areas so as to restore peace and tranquillity along the LAC in the Western Sector… During the meeting, the Indian side made constructive suggestions for resolving the remaining areas, but the Chinese side was not agreeable and also could not provide any forward-looking proposals. The meeting thus did not result in a resolution of the remaining areas.”
This is not the first time that the Corps Commanders meeting ended with no solution or agreement. However, it’s worrying this time because of the shrill acrimony that the two sides have openly displayed in their separate statements towards each other. The events in the past few weeks across both sides of the border could perhaps be a reason for this. For instance, close to 100 PLA soldiers had transgressed the LAC in Uttarakhand’s Barahoti sector on August 30, 2021. The minor transgression could be due to the differing perception of the LAC at Barahoti, however, these soldiers also damaged some infrastructure – especially a bridge – before returning. The incident didn’t lead to a stand-off, but some reports confirm that the PLA soldiers transgressed over 5 km of the Indian Territory by crossing the Tun Jun La Pass.
Similarly, the Indian media reports that the PLA and the Indian Army had a minor altercation last week near Tawang, eastern sector, before the 13th Corps Commanders meeting. The Indian Express reports that both countries' patrol parties came face-to-face in Arunachal Pradesh - near Yangtse in Tawang. "The Chinese came in a "sizeable" strength and came face-to-face with an Indian patrolling unit." The Tawang sector is prone to such incidents, however, the report claims that such an engagement between the two sides has happened after a long time in this area. Before this, a similar incident had taken place near Tawang in 2016. The Hindu reports that the Chinese soldiers were also detained for a few hours by the Indian Army. However, when asked to China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson in a press conference, Zhao Lijian replied, "I am not aware of relevant information."
On the same issue, I could find a few interesting articles in the Chinese media. First, a China Daily report cited a PLA source claiming that the Chinese border troops conducting “routine patrols” in the Dongzhang area had been “unreasonably blocked by the Indian side.” The report claims that the “Indian media’s recent hype about Chinese soldiers being detained for crossing the line is false and inconsistent with the facts. In this incident, the Indian side first deliberately provoked and then distorted and discredited the Chinese side, seriously violating bilateral agreements.” Second, the PLA Daily also criticised the “despicable” Indian media reports claiming that it had hyped up a routine patrol as “big news.” In a post on Weibo, it claimed that the Indian media should have more integrity, adding: “In recent years, the Indian media seems to have a particular preference for fabricating and hyping up Sino-Indian border issues, and they have played up the tense atmosphere and stimulated populist sentiments from time to time.” Finally, similar things were said by Dr Liu Zhongyi, Secretary-General of China and South Asia Cooperation Research Center, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), when he was interviewed by The Global Times. He said that India has always adopted a forward policy and a policy of cannibalisation on the Sino-Indian border. The Dongzhang Waterfall (the area of the recent minor altercation near Tawang) belongs to China. Tibetans living in the Dongzhang area regard Dongzhang Waterfall as a sacred place, and they often used to collect holy water before. In the 1990s, the Indian army gradually eroded and advanced and then reached this place. In 1999, the Dongzhang confrontation took place. Later, both China and India maintained a restrained attitude in this region. In 2001, the Indian army occupied the Dongzhang Waterfall by encroaching and advancing and destroyed the local bridge. India took advantage of the Yugoslavia embassy bombing incident and the subsequent collision incident in the South China Sea to make this advance in Dongzhang. Before 2009, the local herders could still go under the waterfall to the Dorgol Meadow. But now, India has completely prevented our people from passing, and our anti-cannibalisation struggle has continued. Our troops conduct routine patrols here, which is completely legal and reasonable.
Thus these two incidents in Barahoti and Tawang highlight that everything is not fine between China and India across the LAC. It also indicates that the two sides would have to face another harsh winter of forward deployment and heightened tensions along the LAC.
Meanwhile, amid the continuing tensions, China’s MFA issued a statement asking India “to stop taking actions that would complicate and expand the border issues.” This was in response to India’s Vice-President Venkaiah Naidu’s Arunachal Pradesh’s tour last weekend. India responded to this, “Arunachal Pradesh is an integral and inalienable part of India. Indian leaders routinely travel to the state of Arunachal Pradesh as they do to any other state of India. Objecting to the visit of Indian leaders to a state of India does not stand to reason and understanding of Indian people.”
On the Chinese side, as the two sides failed to break the deadlock at the Corps Commanders meeting, the Xinjiang Military District conducted a tank drill near the Indian border. Reportedly, the latest T-15 tanks were also used in the drill. The T-15s were commissioned with the South Xinjiang Military District earlier this year. Since the report claims the T-15s were near the border with India, I presume that this drill was under the South Xinjiang Military District’s command. Two weeks back, XMD also carried out overnight live-fire drills with self-propelled guns and rockets near the Karakoram ranges.
On the Indian side, Defence Minister Rajanath Singh presided over the final breakthrough blast of the Se La Tunnel in Arunachal Pradesh. The tunnel is located near the border with China. It goes through the Se La pass and is expected to cut the distance to the border by 10 km. The tunnel would also cut the travel time between the Indian Army’s 4 Corps HQ at Tezpur, Assam and Tawang by at least an hour. Also, the Centre is examining the proposal to recruit an additional 10,000 Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) troops to be deployed along the LAC. The recruits would guard 47 border outposts, sanctioned by the Union Cabinet in 2020.
Multiple Talks on the Indian Side
In the last two weeks, the top brass of the Indian foreign and security affairs establishment has made multiple public appearances to issue statements or discuss the ongoing border dispute with China. Let’s start with the Chief of the Army Staff, Gen M.M Naravane. In an India Today conclave, Gen Naravane said, “If they (China) are there to stay, we are too there to stay.” A week before, in an annual session of the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry, he noted that there was an outstanding border issue with China. “We are well prepared to meet any misadventure that may occur as we have demonstrated in the past. Such incidents will continue to occur until a long-term solution is reached- that is, to have a boundary agreement. That should be the thrust of our efforts so that we have lasting peace along our northern borders,” said Gen Naravane.
Similarly, India’s new Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal V.R Chaudhari, said, “We’re fully prepared to deal with any situation (with China). We need to keep in mind that while they have built airfields and hardened their shelters, they have the huge penalty of high altitude. That will be a weak area for them.” He also highlighted that the Indian Air Force can’t reach the required sanctioned 42 squadron strength in the next 10-15 years, and the force will remain at 35 squadron strength – given the current phase-out and inductions.
Even India’s Foreign Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar, spoke at the India Today Conclave. “There is still no credible explanation as to why they (Chinese) chose to bring that size of forces to that sector of our border. If attempts are being made to unilaterally change the LAC status quo, and large forces are brought to the border in contravention of written agreements, the relationship will obviously be impacted… We have had progress (disengagement) in a few areas. But the larger problem remains which is a very sizeable Chinese force close to, if not at, the LAC,” said Dr Jaishankar.
Staying with military issues, the Quadrilateral countries were engaged in the second edition of the 25th Malabar naval exercises this week in the Bay of Bengal. The first edition was held in August this year near Guam. The Indian Navy has deployed two frontline warships, a P8I long-range maritime patrol aircraft and a Submarine for the exercise.
Elsewhere, despite border issues, China-India trade hits the $90 billion mark. It’s a 30 per cent jump from the pre-pandemic level. Data from China’s General Administration of Customs (GAC) showed two-way trade jumped 49% in the first nine months to $90.37 billion. India’s imports from China surged 51.7% to $68.4 billion, while India’s exports rose 42.5% to $21.9 billion. India’s biggest exports to China are iron ore, cotton, and other raw material-based commodities. India imports mechanical and electrical machinery in large quantities, while imports of medical supplies have soared in the past two years.
Meanwhile, in a step towards resolving their boundary disputes, Bhutan and China signed an MoU on a three-step roadmap to help speed up talks at a meeting of Foreign Ministers of both countries held via videoconference. The roadmap “for Expediting the Bhutan-China Boundary Negotiations”, is expected to start after it has been delayed for five years, first due to the 2017 Doklam standoff and then by the pandemic. New Delhi reacted to this, “We have noted the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Bhutan and China today.”
I am sharing two journal articles that I read this week on China-India issues.
First, Dr Masahiro Kurita’s article in Asian Security on China’s Kashmir Policy since the mid-2010s: He argues that China’s policy towards the Kashmir dispute has been changing slowly since the last decade. Earlier, Beijing distanced itself from the territorial dispute and acted as a mere development partner in the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. In the past, it had maintained its neutrality and publically stated that India and Pakistan should bilaterally resolve the dispute. Although, as a third party, it irritated India occasionally, it largely remained neutral. This helped India and China stabilise the Sino-Indian relations from the 1990s to mid-2010. However, in the past decade, Beijing has signalled its willingness to take a mediator’s role, conducted activities entailing the employment of the PLA in the area, and even nudged Islamabad to take steps to integrate Gilgit-Baltistan – a step that would affect the geographical scope of the Kashmir sovereignty question. Furthermore, after India’s undoing of Article 370, there was a definite pro-Pakistan colour to Beijing’s Kashmir policy. China also resorted to mentioning UNSC resolutions to settle the Kashmir dispute after India from the policy China has adopted in the past 20 years.
Second, Lei Thi Hang Nga and Nguyen Le Thy Thuong’s article on India-China Competition in South Asia under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Administration in the Journal of Indian and Asian Studies. The authors use neo-realism and balance of threat theories to analyse India-China competition in South Asia in three areas: Diplomacy, economy and security. They argue that the most fundamental motivation of China and India in this competition is to achieve power and security and not economic objectives. While China’s strategic calculation leans towards its ambitions to gain greater power in the geopolitical order, India’s strategic calculation leans towards ensuring its security. They argue that China intends to emulate and then overtake India in the very region of India’s traditional influence, while India’s strategy is to maintain and strengthen its number one position in the region. They highlight that although China’s influence in the region seems to have overwhelmed India, India’s internal forces also hinder China’s penetrating steps into the South Asian region.
Additional Readings on China-India Issue
- Harvard International Law Journal: Interstitial Space and the High Himalayan Dispute between China and India
- Carnegie Paper: Amb Vijay Gokhale: India’s Fog of Misunderstanding Surrounding Nepal-China Relations
- War on the Rocks: India and China’s Missile Silos
- WTC Commander dies of Cancer
- India backs WHO Move for a New Expert Group to Probe COVID Origins
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I review Prof Harsh Pant's book, Politics and Geopolitics: Decoding India's Neighbourhood Challenge, for Business Standard.
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II. Developing Stories
Taiwan-China Relations
China’s warplanes made a record number of incursions in Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the first week of October 2021. On October 1, a total of 38 PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ. On October 2, 39 PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ. On October 4, the PLA sent a record 56 aircraft in two sets to Taiwan’s ADIZ. A total number of 149 Chinese military aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ from October 1, 2021, to October 4, 2021. Since September 2020, the PLA has conducted 845 sorties with its fighter jets, bombers and surveillance aircraft in Taiwan’s ADIZ. After the October 4 incident, Taiwan’s Defence Minister, Chui Kuo-cheng, claimed that the China-Taiwan relations are at the lowest in the past 40 years, and Beijing would be fully capable of starting a war by 2025.
Meanwhile, President Xi Jinping said that China would pursue reunification with Taiwan by peaceful means. Speaking in the Great Hall of the People to commemorate the 110th anniversary of the revolution that ended the country’s last imperial dynasty, Xi said the biggest obstacle to the reunification of China was the “Taiwan independence” force. “Those who forget their heritage, betray their motherland and seek to split the country will come to no good,” said Xi. His speech came a day ahead of the official anniversary of the Wuchang Uprising on October 10, which is celebrated as National Day in Taiwan. He struck a relatively softer tone than in July, his last major speech mentioning Taiwan, in which he vowed to “smash” any attempts at formal independence. In 2019, he had also directly threatened to use force to bring the island under Beijing’s control. While reading this, I remembered a sentence from Dr Oriana Skylar Mastro’s recent article for Foreign Affairs. She writes, “Chinese leaders will continue to pay lip service to peaceful unification until the day the war breaks out, but their actions increasingly suggest that they have something else in mind.”
Elsewhere, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s National Day address reiterated her stand on cross-strait relations. “Our position on cross-strait relations remains the same: neither our goodwill nor our commitments will change. We call for maintaining the status quo, and we will do our utmost to prevent the status quo from being unilaterally altered. We will continue to bolster our national defense and demonstrate our determination to defend ourselves in order to ensure that nobody can force Taiwan to take the path China has laid out for us. This is because the path that China has laid out offers neither a free and democratic way of life for Taiwan nor sovereignty for our 23 million people,” said Tsai.
Meanwhile, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reports that China is upgrading its military bases facing Taiwan. The upgraded infrastructure at three air bases in Fujian province will give the PLA AF long-term logistical air combat support. These three bases are Longtian Airbase, Huian Airbase and Zhangzhou Airbase.
The PLA also reportedly carried out beach landing and assault drills in the Fujian province this week. It also recently deployed its latest J-16 D electronic warfare aircraft, which made its first public appearance in the 2021 Zhuhai Air show with its Eastern Theatre Command.
This week, Taiwanese Defence Minister Chiu said that Taiwan won’t start a war with China but will defend itself “full-on.” “What is clearest is that the Republic of China absolutely will not start or set off a war, but if there are movements, we will meet the enemy full-on,” Chiu told a parliament committee meeting.
Finally, amid increasing tensions between China and the US, Harvard University relocates its intensive summer Chinese language programme from Beijing to Taipei. The Harvard Beijing Academy will leave the Beijing Language and Culture University where it has been since 2005, Harvard Crimson student newspaper wrote. The academy will form a new partnership with National Taiwan University next summer.
Additional Readings on Taiwan
- The Wall Street Journal: US Troops have been Deployed in Taiwan for at least a Year
- WSJ Opinion: Will America Come to Taiwan’s Defence?
- Foreign Affairs: How to Prevent Accidental War over Taiwan?
The South China Sea
Last week, Malaysia summoned the Chinese ambassador over South China Sea vessels. This is the second time this year that Malaysia has summoned the Chinese ambassador. In a four-paragraph statement released last Monday, the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that Chinese ambassador Ouyang Yujing was summoned “to convey Malaysia’s position and protest against the presence and activities of Chinese vessels, including a survey vessel, in Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone off the coasts of Sabah and Sarawak.”
Meanwhile, expressing concern over a US nuclear submarine sustaining damage in the South China Sea, the PRC, this week, demanded Washington reveal the details and the location of the incident and blamed the US’ assertion for conducting air and naval sorties in the name of “freedom of navigation” as its cause. A US nuclear-powered submarine struck an object underwater in the South China Sea last week. A number of sailors on board the USS Connecticut were injured in the accident. None of the injuries was life-threatening, highlighted a statement from the US Pacific Fleet. “China is severely concerned about this accident. The US, as the side involved in this incident, should inform the relevant details, including the location, purpose of this navigation, details of the accident and what did the submarine run into and whether any nuclear leakage has taken place and whether the local maritime environment was harmed,” said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian.
Finally, Chinese scientists claim that they have tested a monitoring device in the South China Sea that can improve detection of underwater currents believed to be a big danger to submarines. In a paper in the domestic peer-reviewed journal Earth Science Frontiers, the researchers said the 1.4-tonne sensor could operate on the seafloor for weeks and surface in response to a signal from a mother ship.
Shenzhou 13 Space Mission
China launched its Shenzhou 13 space mission today. A younger team of three astronauts for its Shenzhou 13 space mission took off from its northwest Gobi desert and docked with the Tianhe core module of the Tiangong Space Station early morning today at 6.56 am. The mission, which is planned to last for six months, will be piloted by Zhai Zhigang, 55, Wang Yaping, 41, and Ye Guangfu, 41, who were the backup crew of the recently completed Shenzhou 12 mission. Wang is the first female Chinese astronaut to work in the Chinese space station's new Tianhe core module. This is the second space flight for Wang, who was a crew member of the Shenzhou 10 mission in 2013. Liu Yang, 43, who joined the Shenzhou 9 mission in June 2012, was the first Chinese woman in space. In the next six months, the crew will verify how sustainable the space station's technology is for long stays, conduct more spacewalks – the previous crew completed two – and further test the space station's robotic arm and their spacesuits, and carry out scientific experiments, according to CMSA.
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III. Research Paper
Prof M. Taylor Fravel, Dr Kathryn Lavelle and Liselotte Odgaard published an article in Asian Security on China’s engagement in the Arctic. They examine how China pursues its interest in the Arctic and, specifically, the degree to which it seeks to work through the existing regime complex versus engaging in bilateral cooperation with the Arctic states. (They explain regime complex as the way international norms, agreements, and institutions intersect and interact within a given issue area. The basic components of a regime complex are, in a given functional domain or geographic region, 1) multiple regimes or institutions, 2) a lack of hierarchy among them, and 3) interactivity among them. In sum, it refers to the set of arrangements for governing an issue area). They argue that China’s willingness to work through the regime complex or use bilateral cooperation depends on specific issues. They find that China pursues a form of “Omni-directional” engagement to advance its interests in the Arctic. In the area of navigation, China emphasises its navigational rights under UNCLOS while also complying with Canadian and Russian requirements for passage in waters under their jurisdiction. However, China has focused on bilateral cooperation, most extensively with Russia, in the area of resource extraction. This is because most of the resources in the region fall under the jurisdiction of Arctic states. Finally, in the area of scientific advancement, China’s bilateral cooperation is embedded in its multilateral engagement of the regime complex, they highlight.
The authors conclude that China chooses the avenues of cooperation - inside or outside the regime complex - that it judges best facilitates the pursuit of its interests. In other words, China works through existing regimes when they benefit China’s interests, supplemented by bilateral initiatives as appropriate. They also highlight that China has not prioritised military-strategic interests in the region yet, but its current level of cooperation would provide a basis for which to pursue these in the future if they became more salient.
Thus, China pursues its interests through a mixture of bilateral and multilateral engagements, working within the existing regime complexes, participating in developing these, and attempting to influence them from without, by developing new projects and partnerships. China’s behaviour may qualify as revisionism in the sense that it does seek to revise existing regime complexes with a view to enhancing Chinese interests, but this revisionism is not pursued as a unilateral effort. Instead, the authors argue that China couples on to the agendas of multilateral institutions and individual countries or groupings with whom it has common interests in particular issue areas. Do read the complete journal article, it is extremely interesting and insightful.
Also, read The War on the Rocks article on the PLA: Schrodinger’s military.
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IV. News Update
-The PLA AF hosted International Military Flight Training Conference 2021 on September 27. Representatives from 49 countries attended this conference. Initiated by the PLAAF in 2010, the International Military Flight Training Conference is an international platform for exchanging views and practice on flight talent cultivation and development and collaborating innovation of flight training and aviation equipment. It is held biennially and has been held six times. A PLA AF official attending this conference said that the future intelligentised air battles have put forward new requirements for the competence of pilots, and the PLA AF is engaged in forward production of new-type pilots following the guideline that talent cultivation, commanding system and armaments development should proceed in coordination.
- PLA missile scientists say the accuracy of hypersonic weapons could be improved by more than ten times if control is taken out of human hands and given to a machine. Their paper, published last week in the peer-reviewed journal Systems Engineering and Electronics, proposes using artificial intelligence to write the weapon’s software “on the fly” through a unique flight control algorithm as it travels at hypervelocity. Professor Xian Yong and Li Bangjie, from Rocket Force Engineering University’s college of war support, said more decision-making power would be handed to the smart weapon – giving its human controllers no idea how it would behave after the launch button was pressed – but overall positioning accuracy “would increase by one to two orders of magnitude”.
- China and Russia launched joint naval drills off the Russian Far East. The exercises Joint Sea 2021 kicked off with a ceremony on Thursday in Russia’s Peter the Great Gulf and will run through Sunday. Chinese state media said the drills would encompass communications, anti-mine, anti-air and anti-submarine operations, joint manoeuvring and firing on seaborne targets. While such exercises have been held before, the reports said this is the first time China has sent anti-submarine warfare planes and destroyers of more than 10,000 tons in displacement for exercises abroad.
- China’s 2021 cyber security week kicked off on Monday in Xi’an. The cyber security events will run until October 17, with online and offline activities to be held across the country. It aims to promote the publicity of laws and regulations, policies and standards, and important measures related to cyber security issues through exhibitions, seminars, online classes and public-service advertisements. China launched its first cyber security week in 2014.
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| This newsletter is written by Suyash Desai, research associate, China Studies Programme, at the Takshashila Institution. He has previously completed his M Phil from CIPOD, JNU. |
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