The Most Interesting Story this Week: China’s Hypersonic Weapons

The Financial Times reported this week that China tested a new hypersonic weapons system in August 2021. The missile circled the globe before speeding towards the target. It missed its mark by two dozen miles, however, the test showed astounding progress China has made in developing this technology. Later, the Financial Times reported that China conducted two hypersonic tests over the summer rather than the one test reported earlier. It first tested a rocket using a “fractional orbital bombardment system” (FOBS) to launch a “hypersonic glide vehicle” capable of carrying nuclear weapons on July 27 and followed that up with a second hypersonic test on August 13, the newspaper reported later this week. 
 
Before discussing the details of what happened, its drivers and its impact, let’s first understand the science of hypersonic tech and the FOBS.
 
Several countries are developing hypersonic weapons, which fly around the speed of 4.7 to 5.2 times the sound of speed (around Mach 5/ a bit more than 6000 km/hour). There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV) and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles. The HGVs are launched from a rocket, perhaps even an existing ballistic missile booster, and then coast unpowered simply from their own momentum to glide towards their target. HCM, however, are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines or “scramjets,” as they use oxygen from the air and produce thrust during their flight, just as other aircraft do. Ballistic missiles are faster than hypersonic missiles, however, unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles do not follow a fixed trajectory. It can manoeuvre and en route to its destination. The speed, manoeuvrability and low altitude flight make it extremely challenging for detection. Most of the current effort in the world, including the recent Chinese test, is directed toward the far easier boost-glide vehicles.

I will encourage you to read this long, complicated but fantastic piece by Dr Ivan Oelrich to understand more about this.  
 
A FOB is not a new development, as the Soviets deployed similar systems during the Cold War period. It was developed and deployed as a response to what President Lyndon B. Johnson called “Chinese oriented Anti-Ballistic Missile Development.” Dr Jeffrey Lewis explains an orbital bombardment system as a big rocket placing a nuclear warhead in orbit. Attached to that warhead is a small rocket motor. A country could fire that little motor to slow the warhead in space and bring it back down wherever they wanted. The Outer Space Treaty prohibits putting nuclear weapons in orbit, so the Soviets named it the “fractional orbital bombardment system” because it didn’t make a full orbit.

The latest reports indicate that China had followed the Soviet Union’s lead in developing FOBS to complete the orbit of the globe before its hypersonic glide payload descended to the earth. In July, the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology announced the 77th launch of its Long March 2C rockets; in late August, it announced the 79th launch. There is no information on the 78th launch, which could be the FOBS test involving HGV.

Chinese Drivers for this Test

During a plenary meeting with the delegations on the Chinese President People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) in March 2021, President Xi Jinping directed the military to “accelerate the construction of advanced strategic deterrent” capabilities. (要坚持以战领建，加强战建统筹，抓紧推进战略性、引领性、基础性重大工程，加快打造高水平战略威慑和联合作战体系.) “We must persist in leading construction by war, strengthen the overall planning of war construction, step up efforts to advance strategic, leading, and major fundamental projects, and accelerate the creation of a high-level strategic deterrence and joint combat system,” said Xi.

This was perhaps one of the strongest and most explicit public instructions on the topic to come from China’s highest-ranking leader in recent times. The speed in the development of the latest missile silos and the recent FOBS test could be due to Xi’s March 2021 instruction. I am not saying that China started developing silos or FOBS technology after Xi’s speech, but it can be argued that the increased US-China tensions in the past few years and Xi’s recent speech acted as catalysts.

China worries that the US could seek to attack China’s nuclear force preemptively and then use the missile defence to intercept China’s retaliation. The US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Furthermore, the members of the Congress and Pentagon have been increasingly investing in the prompt global strike capabilities since 2003. Chinese analysts have expressed their concerns about the US’ CPGS and BMD programmes. It must be highlighted that China has been capable of attacking the US since the 1980s. The US’ operational homeland missile defence system—the Ground-based Midcourse Defence system—is designed to intercept only North Korea’s ICBMs. However, China’s deep suspicions of US nuclear policy, fueled by fears over the implications of BMD and CPGS, feed into growing doubts about US strategic intentions.

The latest system enables China to evade US’ early warning radars – an important component of BMDs - which are looking towards the North Pole. The FOBS could fly over the South Pole and hit the continental US from where there are no radars. Furthermore, the low altitude of its orbit would mean that ground-based radars would only be able to detect its approach later in the flight, reducing warning times — and the window for defensive countermeasures by at least 10 minutes. Finally, a manoeuvrable HGV payload could take an unpredictable final approach to its target, complicating attempts to estimate the weapon’s path and launch interceptors to neutralise the threat. 
 
This doesn’t mean that China would attack the US, as it still subscribes to the nuclear No-first Use policy – at least in theory. But as Prof M Taylor Fravel and Dr Fiona Cunningham have highlighted in their multiple writings, China’s modest expansion of its nuclear arsenal and increased sophistication of its forces with limited ambiguity allow the use of threat of nuclear retaliation to deter a conventional attack on its nuclear arsenal.
 
This development, along with China’s conventional and nuclear forces modernisation, in general, is a worrying factor for the US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. As Prof Caitlin Talmadge highlights, under a deep nuclear stalemate, the conventional balance of power and balance of resolve will determine outcomes, and those probably favour China in a future conflict.

Now, it's extremely important that the world views recent Chinese developments as engaging in both quantitative and qualitative modernisation of its nuclear arsenal. Quantitative: Increasing the number of warheads and missile silos; Qualitative: Diversification of the delivery platforms.

Reactions to China’s Tests

The US State Department spokesperson Ned Price said that the administration of President Joe Biden was very concerned about the latest development in China’s nuclear arms capability and “novel delivery systems.” President Biden also said that he was concerned about the test when reports enquired.

The US Navy and Army also reportedly tested hypersonic weapon component prototypes on Wednesday this week, the Pentagon said, calling the three tests successful. Sandia National Laboratories ran the tests from NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia, which will help “inform the development of the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) and the Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) offensive hypersonic strike,” a statement said. It comes days after the Financial Times reported China’s tests. White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki said on Wednesday the administration had raised concerns to China about hypersonic missile technology through “diplomatic channels” but told reporters they welcome “stiff competition” so long as it doesn’t veer into conflict.

The head of US Strategic Command, Adm. Charles Richard, said, “It almost seems like we can’t go through a month without some new revelation coming about China. I am not surprised at reports like this. I won’t be surprised when another report comes next month.”

Meanwhile, China has denied the reports about the recent tests. “This was not a missile, this was a spacecraft… This is of great significance for reducing the cost of spacecraft use,” said MFA spokesperson Zhao Lijian.

While commenting on this issue, Prof Shi Yinhong, Renmin University, said that China needed to be capable of overcoming the US missile defence systems deployed in the region. “The minimal deterrence needed 30 years ago is different from what is needed today. China has to respond to the deployment of US missile defence systems to maintain its minimal deterrence. The nuclear stockpile in China is still significantly lower than that in the US.” Similarly, Prof Wu Riqiang, Renmin University, said that the US should not be “surprised to see China and Russia taking measures against its missile defence system. The US said repeatedly that it would not accept any limit on its missile defence system. Naturally, China is worried about the future deployment of such a system and needs to make preparations ahead.”

On arms control, Prof Wu Riqiang said one key obstacle to holding nuclear arms control talks between China and the US was that the US had not acknowledged mutual vulnerability with China. The concept of mutual vulnerability was seen as preventing the US and the former Soviet Union from engaging in a nuclear war during the Cold War period, achieved by each admitting it was vulnerable to the other’s nuclear forces. “If the US is really concerned with China’s nuclear development, then why did the US not admit vulnerability to China? Only by admitting vulnerability can nuclear arms control negotiations be made possible.”

Broader Chinese Hypersonic Capabilities besides the Recent Tests

China has demonstrated its growing interest in Russian advanced hypersonic technology. A January 2017 CRS report highlights that over half of the open-source Chinese papers on hypersonic technologies include references to Russian weapons programmes. The recent CRS report highlights that China could increasingly consider hypersonic weapons within the regional context.

Programmes: 

1. DF-17, an MRBM (also designed to launch HGVs)
2. DF-41,  an ICBM (which could be modified to carry a conventional or nuclear HGV)
3. DF-ZF HGV (also referred to as WU-14) tested at least nine times since 2014. 
4. Stary Sky 2 (Xing Kong 2), a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype “successfully tested” in August 2014.
5. China has reportedly tested three hypersonic vehicle models (D18-1S, D18-2S and D-18-3S). 
6. Researchers from the China Academy of Sciences have recently developed a new wind tunnel capable of simulating flights up at 10 km per second, 30 times the speed of sound. Reportedly, the new tech will put China 20-30 years ahead of the West.  

With all these developments, looks like we are up for interesting times going ahead. By early July 2021, the Biden administration had formally begun working on the Nuclear Posture Review. It will be reportedly released with the National Defence Strategy early next year. Before that, the Pentagon’s China Military Power Report 2021 is due. Furthermore, it's more than two years since China’s previous defence white paper was released in 2019. With all these latest developments, it will be interesting to read what these documents have to offer about the recent events and the changes that have happened in the last two years period.
   
Read More

- CRS: Hypersonic Weapons: Background for Congress
- CRS: Ballistic Missile Defence Primer
- Narrowing the US-China Gap on Missile Defence: Dr Tong Zhao
- Assessing the Influence of Hypersonic Weapons on Deterrence: Dr Paige P Cone
- Hypersonic Weapon and Strategic Stability
- Hypersonic Weapons and Escalation Control in East Asia: Strategic Studies Quarterly
- Assuring Assured Retaliation: Dr Fiona S. Cunningham and Prof M Taylor Fravel
- China’s Nuclear Ambiguity: Kartik Bommakanti and Suyash Desai

Podcasts

- Balance of Power: China’s Surprise Missile Test: Dr Oriana Skylar Mastro
- Nuclear Pieces on Asia Chessboard: Prof Caitlin Talmadge

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