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Early economic theory traditionally treated the household as a single unit. In these unitary models of the household all members have the same utility function and so have the same preferences. There is no bargaining process and hence there is no correlation between household expenditures, financial outcomes and who makes the household decisions. In the non-unitary models of the household, it is assumed that each household member has a different utility function and therefore has different preferences. A bargaining process takes place within the household and decisions are made according to each member’s bargaining power. The outcome of these bargaining processes varies depending on who makes the decision.
This edition of the newsletter compiles readings on gender asymmetries in intra-household decision making, and how this affects outcomes for women.
Additionally, the newsletter contains information on jobs shared by Women in Econ & Policy members over WhatsApp. This edition also contains work by fellow members. We hope to continue highlighting work by the fantastic women in our community - make sure to check it out, and share your work with us for future editions.
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Gender Asymmetries in Intra-household decision making
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Spousal Control and Intra-household Decision Making: An Experimental Study in the Philippines: Nava Ashraf elicits causal effects of spousal observability and communication on financial choices of married individuals in the Philippines. When choices are private, men put money into their personal accounts. When choices are observable, men commit money to consumption for their own benefit. When required to communicate, men put money into their wives' account. These strong treatment effects on men, but not women, appear related more to control than to gender: men whose wives control household savings respond more strongly to the treatment and women whose husbands control savings exhibit the same response.
Read the paper here.
Intra-Household Bargaining and Decision-Making, Social Norms and Women’s Empowerment: Evidence from a Global Investment in Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: A learning brief by the International Council for Research on Women compiling findings from multiple studies funded by the Women and Girls at the Center for Development (WGCD) initiative through the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The studies focus on evaluating gendered aspects of intrahousehold bargaining and decision-making or chart empowerment outcomes using changes in decision making.
Read the brief here
Are Movers More Egalitarian than Stayers? An Intergenerational Perspective on Intra-Household Financial Decision-Making : This study seeks to investigate the role of international migration in shaping the financial decision-making behaviors of married couples through a comparison of three generations of Turkish migrants to Europe (i.e., movers) with their counterparts who remained in Turkey (i.e., stayers). The data are drawn from a subset of personal data from the 2000 Families Survey, involving 4,215 interviews performed randomly with married individuals nested within 1,713 families.
Read the paper here.
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All featured photos are from unsplash.com
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Measuring decision-making power in the household
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Is it time to rethink how we measure women’s household decision-making power in impact evaluations? : This blog post by Rachel Glennester and Claire Walsh looks at how some of the most common survey questions for measuring women’s participation in household decision-making are not specific or time-bound, and how evaluations need to change how they measure household decision-making power of women.
Context and measurement: An analysis of the relationship between intrahousehold decision making and autonomy: The authors explore several measurement concepts around standard decision-making indicators using case studies from two distinct locales: Bangladesh and Ghana. In particular, they utilize a measure of relative autonomy-a construction used primarily in psychology that measures the extent to which actions are intrinsically or extrinsically motivated --to calibrate decision-making. They are interested in knowing whether men and women who report sole decision-making in a particular domain, experience stronger or weaker feelings of autonomous motivation, compared to those who report joint decision-making.
Read the paper here.
Recommendations for Measuring Intra-Household Power and Decision Making : Prepared by the UNECE Task Force on Measuring Intra-household Power and Decision-making, this reference is a guide for countries looking to embark on research on the gendered aspect of intra-household decision making.
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Bargaining power and outcomes for women
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His, Hers, or Ours: Impacts of a Training and Asset Transfer Programme on Intra-Household Decision-Making in Zambia: This paper studies the effects of a multifaceted asset transfer programme on the decision-making dynamics of smallholder households. Constructing separate indexes of participation in household decision-making for adult females and males using difference-in-differences to assess the impact of livestock transfer and training to evaluate whether these interventions increase the share of decisions in which individuals participate.
Read the paper here.
Why Are Older Women Missing in India? The Age Profile of Bargaining Power and Poverty: Almost half of missing women in India are of post-reproductive ages. The author shows that intra-household gender inequality and gender asymmetry in poverty can account for a substantial fraction of these missing women. Using a natural experiment, she links women's intra-household bargaining power to their mortality risk and finds that bargaining power declines with age, and that women's relative poverty rates closely match their higher than expected mortality rates by age.
Read the paper here.
Bargaining Breakdown: Intra-Household Decision-Making and Female Labor Supply: The authors outline a model of household decision-making where households choose whether or not to bargain.
Bargaining is costly, and information about the household’s choice set may be asymmetric. In this model, spouses may withhold information to manipulate the choice set and may avoid bargaining to prevent certain outcomes from being realized. They test the model in the context of female labor supply in India. Spousal preferences are misaligned: wives are significantly more supportive of women’s employment than their husbands.
Read the paper here.
Intrahousehold Bargaining, Female Autonomy, and Labor Supply: Theory and Evidence from India: The authors propose an alternative noncooperative household model of labour supply in which a woman’s unearned income improves her autonomy within the household, which raises her gains from working and can increase her labor supply.
They find empirical support for this model, using women’s exposure to the Hindu Succession Act in India as a source of exogenous variation in their unearned income. They show that policies that empower women can have an additional impact on the labor market, which can further reinforce autonomy increases.
Read the paper here.
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