The 9th China-Central & Eastern Europe “17+1” virtual summit has come to an end. Despite that this year the conference was chaired by Xi Jinping, the summit experienced the lowest representation with 6 out of the 17 countries electing to send ministers instead of their head of state or government. Notably, those countries were all EU member states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia). Despite China’s charm offensive suffering a diplomatic setback, this does not bring an end to the era of active Chinese engagement in the region. Instead, it shifts the center of gravity towards the countries from the Western Balkans. This comes as no surprise as those countries have enjoyed the most capital and BRI projects from Beijing so far. Further case in point, Xi has declared the commitment to launch a "customs clearance coordination and consultation point" which would cover Hungary, Serbia, North Macedonia and Greece [China’s Eastern Europe strategy gets the cold shoulder].
While the 17+1 cooperation is a separate initiative from the BRI, projects and narratives behind the two often intertwine. Judging the development of 17+1 and consequently the BRI from a generalized state of sentiments is an incorrect approach. The outcome of the Chinese-led initiatives is vastly dependent on the activities of local actors [Global Perspectives on China's Belt and Road Initiative]. Judging from the budding relations with Serbia and Hungary chiefly, China’s role in Eastern and Central Europe is still one of an active and potent foreign actor.
Mirela Petkova
|
|
