I. The Big Story: China-India Brief
It’s been over a year since the start of the ongoing stand-off between China and India. The two sides have held 11 rounds of the Corps Commander-level meetings, with the latest on April 9, 2021- which yielded no result. Until now, disengagement has been achieved on Pangong Tso north and south banks, however, the stand-off in varying degrees continues at the Gogra-Hotspot regions and the approach road to the Depsang plains.
The Depsang Plains remains to be the biggest challenge for the Indian security establishment. Sushant Singh, a former journalist and now a research fellow with the Centre for Policy Research, describes it as a strategically important area for India. “Depsang is very close to the Karakoram pass. It’s a flat area. Chinese have five roads coming to that area - where they can bring their armour, while India only has one road. It forms a kind of a wedge towards the Siachen Glacier. If the Chinese come from the east and move into Depsang, and if they overcome a single mountain range that India defends, then they could cut down the Indian supply line to the southern Siachen Glacier. This allows the Pakistanis to move in from their side and occupy the southern Siachen Glacier. This is the only place where China and Pakistan’s territorial goals can physically meet on the Indian territory. It doesn’t mean that China will go and occupy Siachen, but it could facilitate Pakistan to capture the Siachen Glacier. This is something that worries the Indian defence establishment. Depsang is also not defensible due to the terrain configuration on the Indian side… Depsang is far more important strategically than Pangong Tso, and it remains unresolved until now,” claims Singh on the Seen and Unseen weekly podcast (02.13.30) hosted by Amit Varma.
Image Source: The Wire
Recently, there have been some reports of Chinese activities on the border. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) claims that China has equipped its border facing troops with India with modified truck-mounted rockets. “The digital version of the PHL-03 long-range multiple rocket launchers were filmed mass deployed to an artillery battalion of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Xinjiang Military Command. This unit is stationed in the plateau area, at 5,200-metre (17,000-feet) altitude, where the PLA was involved in a deadly clash with Indian troops in June,” claims the report. Furthermore, the Hindustan Times reports that the PLA has begun constructing a post along the Indian border in the sensitive Kaurik sector of Himachal Pradesh’s tribal Lahaul and Spiti districts. During the routine recce recently, the Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) patrol reported seeing PLA soldiers, who had arrived in a vehicle, negotiating with the stone-crusher owner to supply construction material. The Indian state of Himachal Pradesh shares a 260-km border with China in Kinnaur and Lahaul, and Spiti districts. Five ITBP battalions guard the border with China in the state.
Do read Dr Arzan Tarapore’s Occasional Paper for the Lowy Institute. He highlights:
1) The still-unresolved Ladakh crisis has created a new strategic reality for India, marked by renewed political hostility with China and increased militarisation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
2) This new strategic reality imposes unequal costs on India and China. India is likely to defer much-needed military modernisation and maritime expansion into the Indian Ocean – which would impair its ability to compete strategically with China.
3) In contrast, China incurred only marginal material costs; it was probably more concerned with the prospect of continued deterioration in its relationship with India. Even that cost was more threatened rather than realised and largely reduced when the disengagement plan was agreed.
He also argues that the central policy challenge for India is balancing the heightened Chinese military threat on the northern border with the rapidly growing Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean. It can manage this challenge by focusing on military strategies of denial rather than punishment, focusing on imposing political rather than material costs on China, and accepting more risk at the LAC in exchange for long-term leverage in the Indian Ocean region. How India responds will shape its strategic competition with China and the interests of like-minded partners, including Australia, which depend on an increasingly capable and active India, stresses Dr Tarapore.
He recommends that India should use deterrence by denial over punishment as India’s military doctrine, ensure coercion imposes political cost than military costs and accept more risk on the LAC in exchange for long term leverage and influence in the Indian Ocean. Also, read his papers for Carnegie arguing that the Indian Army should rethink its doctrine and for the Washington Quarterly on how India could build strategic leverage in the Indian Ocean. All three are insightful reads.
Moving on, Foreign Policy had a detailed article on how China is building villages and military outposts in Bhutan. There are three aspects to this article. 1) China’s announcement of a new village called Gyalaphug in 2015, which is in Bhutan. 2) President Xi Jinping’s model Xiaokang 600 border defence villages on borders with India and Bhutan, “with every village acting as a fortress and every household as a watch post.” 3) Chinese salami-slicing strategy in the Himalayas can shi (nibbling like a silkworm).
“Gyalaphug is now one of three new villages (two already occupied, one under construction), 66 miles of new roads, a small hydropower station, two Communist Party administrative centres, a communications base, a disaster relief warehouse, five military or police outposts, and what are believed to be a major signals tower, a satellite receiving station, a military base, and up to six security sites and outposts that China has constructed in what it says are parts of Lhodrak in the TAR but which in fact are in the far north of Bhutan,” claims the article.
India’s 5G Trials
Last week, India’s Department of Telecommunications permitted service providers to conduct 5G technology trials. It gave a list of service providers, which have tie-ups with original equipment manufacturers and service providers. As expected, Chinese tech giants were missing from the list. China’s Embassy in India has reacted to this. “We noted the relevant notification and express concern and regret that Chinese telecommunications companies have not been permitted to conduct 5G trials with Indian Telecom Service Providers in India. Relevant Chinese companies have been operating in India for years, providing mass job opportunities and making a contribution to India’s infrastructure construction in telecommunications. To exclude Chinese telecommunications companies from the trials will not only harm their legitimate rights and interests but also hinder the improvement of the Indian business environment, which is not conducive to the innovation and development of related Indian industries.”
Of course, there were some op-eds in the Global Times claiming New Delhi’s political calculations are hurting India’s economy, India’s trade barriers are hurting its citizens, etc.
I found Prof Harsh Pant and Aarshi Tirkey's journal article The 5G Question and India's Conundrum extremely insightful. Do take a read, it's behind the paywall.
Meanwhile, SCMP reports that India is calling on China to stop surging prices and increase cargo flights to get urgently needed supplies to the pandemic-ravaged country. Indian companies have sourced oxygen concentrators and other medical supplies from their Chinese counterparts but have been hit with prices at more than double the usual rate, while cargo flights between the two countries have yet to return to previous levels. India’s envoy in Hong Kong, Priyanka Chauhan, said price instability and transport disruptions had affected moves to ramp up production in India to deal with its recent surge in coronavirus cases, and the Chinese government could step in. “What I would like to say is that our expectation at this point is that the supply chain should remain open and product prices should remain stable. Even if there is a little bit of supply-demand pressure, there has to be some stability and predictability to product prices. And there has to be a sense of governmental level support and efforts,” she was quoted in SCMP.
But despite the border problems and India’s economic decoupling, the two countries traded more in 2020-21. India imported goods worth $65.21 billion from China in 2020-21, according to provisional estimates published by the ministry of commerce and industry. While it exported goods worth $21.19 billion. Since India’s import bill for 2020-21 fell 17.1 per cent to $393.60 billion, and exports declined by 7.2 per cent to $290.81 billion, China’s share in India’s import bill rose to 16.6 per cent from 13.7 per cent, and export bill grew to 7.3 per cent from 5.3 per cent.
Bangladesh in Quad?
China pre-emptively warned Bangladesh against joining the Quadrilateral Security grouping (Quad). China’s envoy to Bangladesh said, “Obviously it will not be a good idea for Bangladesh to participate in this small club of four because it will substantially damage our bilateral relationship.” Bangladesh’s Foreign Ministry reacted sharply to this. “As a sovereign country, Bangladesh will determine the course of its foreign policy in the interest of its people” and “urged foreign envoys in Dhaka to maintain decency and decorum while speaking in public,” reacted A.K. Abdul Momen, Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister.
China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson also responded to this. Spokesperson Hua Chunying told reporters in Beijing that she “had not seen any reports from our (Chinese) Embassy in Bangladesh” on the issue. “So about the protest from the Bangladesh Foreign Minister, I’m not sure what exactly the protest is and what the accurate words are…About the Chinese Ambassador’s remarks on the Quad, we have made our position clear on this issue. We believe it is an exclusive clique against China and trying to rally countries around China to work against China. So I believe you understand our position very clearly.”
The US State Department also reacted, “We’ve taken note of that statement from the PRC ambassador to Bangladesh. We respect Bangladesh’s sovereignty, & we respect Bangladesh’s right to make foreign policy decisions for itself.”
Dr Liu Zhongyi of SIIS, China, argued in the Global Times that Bangladesh is China’s important partner as it has signed up for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Bangladesh strikes a good balance between major powers as it actively cooperates with China on economics. At the same time, Dhaka hopes such cooperation will thus bring more countries to invest in Bangladesh. If the country falls into the geopolitical trap of the Quad, its economic prospects will accordingly be at risk. If the Quad really wants to bring Bangladesh in, then Dhaka has to weigh the damage the joining would cause to its economic development and national security.
Finally, do read the recent ORF Issue Brief by Khalid Shah making a case for India’s proactive position in consonance with democratic values against the CCP’s Xinjiang policies. He highlights that China has repeatedly needled India on the Kashmir issue, Masood Azhar’s blacklisting issue and blocking Pakistan’s FATF blacklisting.
“Democratic norms and principles are integral to India’s growing prowess in the neighbourhood and the rest of the world. Maintaining silence on the issue of the Uyghurs is akin to granting Beijing a carte blanche on its poor human rights record. Instead of appeasing China on the issue, New Delhi can bolster its image as a champion of democratic values in the world and a vocal arbiter in the region for human rights. More so, India will send a strong message to Pakistan and its population by raising its voice on the Uyghur genocide and the hypocrisy of the Muslim world. Furthermore, analysts note that India’s hesitation in raising the issue stems from China’s sensitivity to what Beijing considers an “internal matter.” China has repeatedly sought to play both active and passive roles on issues that India considers to be an “internal matter,” he writes.
Read More
- Why is China making a permanent enemy of India? Dr Brahma Chellaney
- Remove a sanctions cloud from US-India relations Kenneth I. Juster
|
|
|
II. Developing Stories
The South China Sea
The Philippines plans to convert a South China Sea island into a military hub amid rising tensions with China. The Philippine military will ask President Rodrigo Duterte to fund a logistics hub on Thitu Island, its chief General Cirilito Sobejana said, as the nation seeks to sustain patrols in the South China Sea. It’s also planning to place high-resolution, night-capable cameras to monitor activities around islands claimed by the Philippines, he said. “Our objective is to drive away Chinese maritime militia and other Chinese vessels from our exclusive economic zone,” Sobejana told CNN Philippines this week. The armed forces chief also said that marines and sailors had been deployed to nine stations in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea.
Responding to this, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that the two countries enjoy a friendship spanning thousands of years, whereas the South China Sea issue arose only several decades ago. “Our two countries have reached a common consensus to have dialogue and consultation, and certain individuals should refrain from stirring up trouble on this issue.”
Meanwhile, the Philippines has filed another diplomatic protest against China, as 287 Chinese vessels are reportedly still swarming in the West Philippine Sea. The Philippines has also rejected an annual summer fishing ban imposed by China in the disputed South China Sea and encouraged its fishermen to keep fishing in the country’s territorial waters. The fishing moratorium imposed by China since 1999 runs from May 1 to Aug. 16 and covers areas of the South China Sea as well as other waters off China.
Additionally, Japan has begun providing the Philippine military with life-saving equipment adopted by the Self-Defence Forces, making it the first time Tokyo has offered SDF equipment to a foreign armed force using its official development assistance (ODA). The supply of the equipment, also available for civilian use, is intended to strengthen defence ties with the Philippines as the two countries are faced with China’s assertive claims in the East and South China seas.
Do read Dr Oriana Skyler Mastro’s policy paper on the Chinese Intentions in the South China Sea. She presents an analytical framework for understanding intentions based on two components - distinguishing between intentions about the process and those about the outcome and incorporating information from discourse, behaviour, and capabilities. By applying the framework, she argues that China wants to establish de facto control over the South China Sea, meaning sovereignty over the disputed islands and dictate the rules of behaviour in the surrounding waters. These intentions are detrimental to US and allied interests.
She gives eight recommendations that the US can take to prevent Beijing from incrementally advancing its control over the South China Sea. 1) the US should expand and increase its tempo of military ops in the region 2) It should prioritise coalition building to ensure free and open SCS 3) It should specify that US alliance commitments extend to protecting EEZs 4) US could warn Beijing that it may reconsider its neutral position on the sovereignty of the SCS disputed islands to support claimants with less expansive and restrictive EEZ claims unless China moderates its EEZ claims and agrees to international law positions on maritime rights 5) Respond immediately to each aggressive acts of China 6) Chinese assets committing the act of aggression shouldn’t determine the US response 7) To reconstitute its deterrent, the United States should seek military access to new partner facilities in the SCS 8) The US should spearhead and prioritise a diplomatic solution to the South China Sea disputes, with or without China. Read the full paper.
You could also read other Essays on the Rise of China and its Implications: Chinese Silk Road Infrastructure, Chinese Antarctic Strategy, China’s Surveillance Technology, Nuclear Belt and Road, etc.
Debris of Chinese Rocket
Debris from a large Chinese rocket landed in the Indian Ocean near the Maldives early Sunday morning, China’s space administration announced. It said most of the debris had burned up on re-entry. It was not immediately clear whether any of what remained had landed on any of the Maldives’s 1,192 islands. The NASA administrator, Bill Nelson, issued an unusual rebuke after China’s announcement, accusing the country of “failing to meet responsible standards regarding their space debris.” The rocket, a Long March 5B, launched the main module of China’s next space station, Tiangong, on April 29. Usually, the large booster stages of rockets immediately drop back to Earth after they are jettisoned, but the 23-ton core stage of the Long March 5B accompanied the space station segment all the way to orbit.
But this is not the first time that China’s space program has been responsible for such events. In 2018, China’s space laboratory, Tiangong-1, also had an uncontrolled descent into the earth’s atmosphere after China’s space agency lost control over the spacecraft. Another example of China breaking norms and engaging in irresponsible behaviour in space is its ASAT test. China’s first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007, at an altitude of 850 kilometres, resulted in creating around 3,000 pieces of space debris. More significantly, it broke the unwritten moratorium that was in place for two decades. Beijing also started developing various counter space capabilities with the goal of competing with the US. Nevertheless, each of China’s actions has led to a spiral effect, with others seeking to match China’s actions. For example, China’s repeated ASAT tests have led to the US’ own ASAT test (Operation Burnt Frost in 2008) and India’s ASAT test (Mission Shakti in 2019).
With China planning an ambitious space programme that includes its own space station, it is likely that there will be more such risky incidents in the future as well.
Other activities that China has planned in the near future:
- Chinese Mars Mission: A landing vehicle on descent through the thin Martian atmosphere.
- Three more crafts to the moon by 2027 featuring additional rovers, a flying probe and even a proposed experiment in 3-D printing in space. The missions are mean to lay the foundation for a lunar base and visits by astronauts by 2030.
- Russian-Chinese lunar space station.
- Chinese space station of which the first module was sent to space, and the main rocket booster tumbled back to earth in what is called an uncontrolled reentry.
- Second Mars lander by 2028.
Taiwan and China
The PLA recently held a joint cross-sea landing drill with multiple service branches and practiced coordinated operations among several amphibious landing units. A brigade under the 72nd Group Army attached to the PLA Eastern Theatre Command recently conducted these joint exercises with the Navy, China Central Television (CCTV) reported. The Global Times writes that by revealing the entire process of the exercise in detail, the PLA demonstrated its amphibious landing capabilities to the Taiwan secessionists and foreign forces who believe in the PLA's lack of this ability. It comes as tensions are rising in the region, with both the United States and PLA navies sending aircraft carrier strike groups to the South China Sea.
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen announced a new department for cybersecurity. It has also tightened the maritime border controls after a Chinese man crossed Taiwan Strait in a small rubber craft and reached Taichung. Furthermore, Taiwan’s Air Force recently signed a deal worth NT$291 million with the US to continue the maintenance of armaments relating to its F-16 fighter jets. The deal will see US personnel provide maintenance to missiles that can be loaded onto Taiwan’s F-16 fighter jets, which US-based Lockheed Martin Co. manufactured It comes in the wake of the Chinese Air Force conducting increasingly frequent sorties near the island. The Taiwanese Navy has also ordered a new mid-to-long-range radar system from the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology. The new system will replace existing ageing radar stations positioned on Taiwan’s main island and outlying islands such as Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. “Not only will the new equipment help the Navy to obtain more precise information about the movements of Chinese ships, but it can also assist with the guiding of Hsiung Feng supersonic missiles in the case of a counteroffensive against attacking vessels,” claims the report.
Finally, Japan, Taiwan, and the US are reportedly preparing to hold a strategic dialogue later this month to address the growing Chinese threat in the region. The trilateral meeting will take place virtually and centre on Taiwan’s attempt to participate in the upcoming World Health Assembly. Furthermore, Japan and the US also reportedly plan to call on Taiwan, a leading manufacturer of semiconductors, to provide them with key electronic components amid concern that rising tensions between Washington and Beijing could disrupt supply chains.
Also, read Lieutenant General Chip Gregson (ret.), Russell Hsiao, and Ambassador Stephen M. Young (ret.)’s research report for the Global Taiwan Institute on Strengthening Taiwan’s Deterrence and Resilience.
While scanning through the PLA Daily, I found some remarks by Xi on national security issues. It includes remarks made during the collective study of the 18th Politburo meet, National Security Work Symposium, 14th Anniversary of Reforms and Opening up, talks with Prime Minister Oil of Nepal, etc. Do take a look.
|
|
|
III. Research Paper
The China Quarterly Journal published an article on how Chinese citizens respond to Chinese military spending. The article is based on the survey conducted by Han Xiao, Michael Sadler and Kai Quek – all three from the University of Hong Kong. They fielded a national online survey to investigate the nature of public support for military spending in China. They found that Chinese citizens support military spending in the abstract, but their support diminishes when considered alongside other domestic spending priorities. They also found that public support for military spending coexists surprisingly with anti-war sentiments and a significant strain of isolationism. “In addition, while the conventional wisdom suggests that nationalism moves a state towards bellicosity and war, we find that Chinese citizens with a stronger sense of national pride report stronger anti-war sentiments than other citizens,” they write.
The national survey was fielded in May 2016 that covered all provinces and capital municipalities in mainland China. The authors contracted a survey partner to recruit a sample of 1,485 Chinese citizens to match the 2010 National Census adult population on gender, race, income and geography.
Here are Chinese citizens top public policy priority according to the survey:
(H/t @adam_ni)
|
|
|
IV. News Update
China-Indonesia Joint Drill near Jakarta
A far-sea training task force composed of guided-missile frigates Liuzhou and Suqian from the Navy under the Chinese PLA Southern Theatre Command held a joint maritime training exercise with the Indonesian Navy in the waters near Jakarta this week. The Indonesian Navy’s guided-missile frigate Usman Harun and missile craft Halasan participated in the drill. Participating warships from both sides took turns to act as the commanding ship in the drill. The drill included ship-to-ship communication, joint search and rescue missions, and ship formation movements.
Shandong Aircraft Carrier Group concludes SCS Exercise
The Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong and its naval support group have concluded an exercise in the South China Sea, the Chinese defence ministry said last week. Gao Xiucheng, a spokesman for the Chinese navy, said the exercises were “legitimate and can enhance Chinese capabilities to protect national sovereignty, security, and development interests,” adding they could also help protect regional peace and stability. The Shandong is China’s second aircraft carrier and the first one to be domestically produced. The exercise was Shandong’s first drill in the disputed South China Sea this year. The exercise came weeks after the US and the Philippines voiced concerns about the presence of more than 200 Chinese fishing vessels near a disputed reef in the South China Sea.
Honeywell fined US$13 Million for Sharing Military Tech with China
US defence contractor Honeywell has been fined US$13 million for harming national security after sharing technical information about American fighter jets and other military aircraft with China and other countries. The US State Department said that it had reached a settlement with the company on 34 charges relating to 71 drawings it shared with Beijing, Taiwan, Canada and Ireland between 2011 and 2015. The documents included the specifications of parts for the F-35 joint strike fighter, B-1B Lancer long-range strategic bomber and F-22 fighter aircraft, as well as gas turbine engines and other military electronics.
Xi Ramps up Purge of Military Industrial Chiefs
President Xi Jinping has been targeting former and sitting executives in the country's military-industrial complex, including those involved in the country's nuclear program and the development of aircraft carriers, under his anti-corruption campaign. Last month, top anti-graft bodies for both the party and the state announced investigations into Yin Jiaxu, one-time chairman of China North Industries Group, and Liu Houcheng, an executive at China National Nuclear Corp. Both are suspected of engaging in "severe disciplinary and legal violations," the commonly used terminology denoting corruption. Since taking the helm in 2012, Xi has vowed to crack down on both "tigers" and "flies," referring to senior and low-level officials who engage in corruption. Anti-graft authorities have not disclosed in detail the reason behind the investigations into Yin and Liu.
Finally, like ASPI’s China defence universities tracker, Tsinghua’s AMiner has created a US defence universities tracker. And, it’s identical to ASPI’s tracker!
|
|
|
V. Read More
- Qiushi’s latest issue
- Chinese Military-Civil Fusion and Section 1260H: Lawfare
|
|
|
This newsletter is written by Suyash Desai, a research analyst, China Studies Programme, at the Takshashila Institution. He has previously completed his M Phil from CIPOD, JNU. |
|
|
|
|
|