EDITORIAL

By Catherine Woollard

This week, Ursula von der Leyen was re-elected as President of the European Commission, following a strong showing by the EPP in the European Parliament elections last month. This completes the first and most important stages in the changeover of power taking place in Brussels: the inauguration of the Parliament and the confirmation of the “Big Four”, the positions of presidents of the Commission, Council and Parliament, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs. For asylum and migration policy, there is not much good news –  but when is there ever? Key decisions largely but not solely in the hands of the EPP will now shape the next five years on asylum and migration.

What has already been determined?

While the media has presented von der Leyen’s return as a victory for the centre against the extremes, on the asylum issue, neither she nor the EPP – nor many of its component parts – are centrist. Already, the last Commission and the last Parliament demonstrated that in the post-Merkel era, the centre does not hold when it comes to refugee politics. The very hard-line content in the Pact (the reform of EU asylum law), is largely the work of the EPP, in and via the Commission, and in the Parliament, where the major change in the institution’s positioning after 2019 resulted from the radicalisation of the EPP and not from the increased presence of the extreme right.

Fifty shades of right

The new Parliament features right-wing groups of varying shades, along a spectrum starting with the EPP and ending in a very dark place. The big winner in the elections was the EPP, remaining the largest group with 188 seats, an increase of 14 (it should be noted that there are more seats overall in this mandate). The clearly extreme right groups, the Patriots and the Sovereigntists, have 109 seats, with the ECR, which by some measures is an extreme right grouping, at 84. That is a dangerous situation, but in the phrase that encapsulated the election results – it could have been worse.

The extreme right are spread across three political groups and it is not always the numbers per se that pose a problem, but rather the presence of certain individuals who know the system, and the positions they hold in the Parliament’s complex ecosystem. In this regard, the election of Fabrice Leggeri, former Executive Director of Frontex, who left amid accusations of financial malpractice and human rights violations, is someone to watch. He joined the Rassemblement National, which has just lost the election in France, meaning that he won’t go off to join the national government. Key committees should also be monitored, and notably the Budget Committee, given that one of the main jobs of this Parliament will be to negotiate the next seven-year budget and that it is chaired by the ECR (albeit by one of their more moderate members). Other extreme right figures will be loud, polluting the political debate with their toxicity, but not necessarily having an impact on policy outcomes.

The persistence of the term populist to describe these parties and politicians is misleading and obfuscating. Some of them use populist methods; some do not. All are strongly nationalist, identarian, socially conservative, and at heart anti-EU. The anti-migration stance is also a common feature, but there are nuances within these groupings. Some are virulently opposed to all migration; others accept some forms of migration, even if only out of perceived economic necessity, and with scant regard for the rights of immigrants. For instance, even a politician like Georgia Meloni appears to see the economic reality that migration is necessary. Moving further right, most of the parties within the sovereigntist block are opposed to all forms of migration, and express more openly the racism and Islamophobia that underlie the views of all extreme right parties.

While views on migration may vary slightly, all these parties are anti-refugee, and strongly hostile to Europe offering international protection through a functioning asylum system. Hungary’s Fidesz typifies this approach. Victor Orbán has found his natural home in a new extreme right group, the Patriots, after finally – rightly – being kicked out of the EPP. Domestically, some migration into Hungary is allowed but the asylum system has been totally dismantled.

For the progressive groups, the election was not good, but nor was it a disaster. The centre left S and D group lost four seats but remains the second largest with 136 MEPs. Within it, there are many strong voices on this issue, but also too many compromisers. The Greens lost significantly but the party line, heard from Greens across the continent, is that they are back to their “normal” level after atypically good results in 2019. The hard left remains small but stable.

For the Liberals, their seats have fallen to 77, a pattern which is reflected at national level, where the centre also does not hold, only one government in the EU is now led by a party in the liberal family. In the increasingly fragmented political systems in Europe, centrist liberals have been able to act as power brokers, throwing their support behind the ever-diminishing centre-right or centre-left parties. They have also served as compromise candidates in the complex coalitions needed to build a majority at national level. In the European Parliament, they will still be by the EPP when it seeks to build a majority without relying on the extreme right.

On some issues, the EPP will seek to build a coalition with the centre-left, liberals and Greens, as has just happened on the re-election of von der Leyen. On other issues, they may at least toy with building a more right-wing coalition and are certainly not averse to working with the ECR and possibly even the Patriots, despite von der Leyen criticising Orbán’s recent antics.

Thus, on asylum and migration, as for other issues, what happens in the next five years, will depend to a large extent on decisions where the EPP is central, even if other political players can have an influence. In the immediacy, there are five important questions.

1. Who will be “our” Commissioner?

The appointment of the big four positions was relatively smooth. Apart from von der Leyen herself, they are not bad news for asylum and migration policy. António Costa has a progressive approach; Roberta Metsola is at the softer and more sensible end of the EPP; Kaja Kallas is concerned above all about the threat of Russia, and management of displacement from Ukraine is a major part of the EU’s response.

The next step is the appointment of the college of commissioners, including the selection of the JHA Commissioner, which has to be handled extremely carefully. The portfolio is not one of the most sought after but it needs to go to a serious, heavyweight candidate who is not going to take the job just to score political points. Regardless of political affiliation, a background in law and a strong commitment to the EU seem important, given the conflicts that may arise between the Commission and the Member States over implementation of the Pact. Given the conflicts that will certainly arise between the Member States, a Commissioner from a “neutral” country, not at the heart of these battles, could act as an honest broker. Toughness and willingness to stand up against the extreme right will also be required, not least in the chairing of the JHA Council.

This relates to the other areas for decisions.

2. Implementing or legislating?

After eight years, the EU asylum reform has been concluded. The Commission has been working flat out on plans for implementation. The question is will the next Commission focus on the implementation or bow to the pressure from extremist forces to introduce more legislation? While ECRE did not support the Pact, the conclusion of the reforms means that at least the question of compliance, long neglected, is central and longstanding implementation gaps can be addressed. In this context, opening up the legal framework again would be a disaster – in the current political environment, every reform reduces protection standards, but it renders the system ever more complex and detracts from the real business of simply making asylum systems function. For as long as refugees arrive in Europe – which will be forever – there will be pressure from states to change laws so that they do not have to provide international protection. This just has to be resisted – it has already gone too far.

3. Will rule of law prevail – consistently?

Another, again related, question is whether the EPP is committed to the rule of law without exception. While the Group’s Chair, Manfred Weber, and its manifesto for the elections underlined the importance of rule of law, there are reasons for concern. States tend to make exceptions for asylum policy, in the sense that it is considers acceptable to ignore EU law in this area, that the judgments of both European courts are often disregarded, and a flagrant lack of compliance is tolerated in a way that would be unacceptable in other areas. The Commission has been too deferential to the Member States in general and certainly in asylum matters. There is near impunity for states’ unlawful actions, while at the same time, NGOs, lawyers, emergency responders, journalists, and others, find their work restricted and even criminalised. The extreme right seeks and benefits from the absence of rule of law – but the centre right could do better at defending it.

4. How are crises prioritised?

The global political situation is unstable and beset with crises (although perhaps it was always the case for incoming Commissioners – since 2008 the crisis narrative is ubiquitous, and the 1990s were hardly stable in Europe). Chief among the challenges facing the incoming institutions will be the ongoing war with Russia, in which the EU is a conflict party; the imminent second term of the Trump criminal syndicate; the slow-burning crisis of climate change continue; the AI revolution which looks more of a threat than an opportunity; and so on.

Despite these manifest challenges, the extreme right will constantly try to stimulate new European migration crises for its own purposes, and those of its paymasters, including the one in the east. The leadership of the EU has to avoid falling into this trap and prioritise the real crises, which are also the concerns of the vast majority of European citizens. There is too much pandering to the vocal minority which obsesses over migration. The self-defeating strategy of agreeing that there is a “migration crisis” and trying to manage it by preventing all people from arriving in Europe just doesn’t work. The Ukraine displacement response provides a different model, one of crisis avoidance, with plenty of lessons that should be applied more generally.

5. Will they leave foreign policy alone?

It can be expected that the EPP/VDL-led Commission will continue the strategy of “externalisation”, meaning seeking to outsource responsibility for refugee protection to countries outside Europe. Multiple tools are used to do this, from the reform of asylum law to denial of access at the borders. One particularly counter-productive element is the use of EU external policies to support, pressure, bribe or threaten countries to prevent people from reaching Europe. The latest efforts include a new generation of migration deals and the attempt to apply a distorted version of the “route-based approach”.

Building up international protection systems in other countries is crucial, as is providing adequate funding to the world’s major refugee hosting countries, only two of which are in Europe. However, that is not the point of these “externalising” measures: with Europe’s consent and funding, the countries on the other side of the deals often engage in violations and push people further back, rather than developing protection systems. Similarly, the original concept of the route-based approach, meaning that humanitarian assistance should provided all along a route, because the static model of delivery doesn’t respond to the needs of displaced people, is long since lost. The new Eurocentric version is based on the idea that so long as support of some kind (ill-defined) can be found somewhere along a “route” then Europe’s denial of protection is justified.  Allocating resources based on the route rather than need is a further distortion of the humanitarian system.

All of these gimmicky efforts undermine the real potential for EU external policies to tackle the causes of displacement and also to building international protection where needed – the latter of which will never work unless Europe itself has a functioning international protection system. It also undermines the as yet unrealised potential for the EU to have a serious foreign policy, at a time when that would be quite helpful (see “global crises” above).

Thus, as always, there are events, and crises, and developments way beyond the control of Europe’s political leaders. But there are also decisions that can be taken, responsibilities assumed, and harm to be avoided – in order to have a positive influence in the fraught area of asylum and migration policy.

  

EU EASTERN BORDERS: Estonian Border Guards to Support Latvian Colleagues on Latvia-Russia Border ― Finland Enacts Controversial New ‘Pushback Law’ ― Hungary Faces Renewed Criticism from Both EC and FRA ― Lithuanian Border Guards to Support Latvian Colleagues on Latvia-Russia Border ― Poland Allows Border Guards to Use Firearms Against People Trying to Cross Poland-Russia Border

• Officers from Estonia’s Police and Border Guard Board (PPA) will be sent to the Latvia-Belarus border to help their Latvian counterparts to prevent irregular crossings.
• On 22 July, Finland’s new law aimed at preventing people seeking asylum from entering the country via its border with Russia came into effect.
• The European Commission (EC) and the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) have published reports that are highly critical of the state of the rule of law in Hungary and the country’s failure to investigate human rights violations against people trying to enter its territory irregularly.
• Lithuania is planning to send a team of border guards to Latvia to support the latter’s border management efforts on its border with Russia.
• Poland’s parliament has approved a measure to allow border guards to fire live ammunition at people who try to cross the Poland-Belarus border irregularly under certain conditions.

Officers from Estonia’s Police and Border Guard Board (PPA) will be sent to the Latvia-Belarus border to help their Latvian counterparts to prevent irregular crossings. According to Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR), following a request from Estonia in late July, an 11-person PPA team will travel to Latvia for two weeks in early August. It is the ninth time that Estonia has sent a PPA team to Latvia to assist with border management since 2021.

The PPA is also strengthening the infrastructure on several crossings along the Estonia-Russia border. ERR has reported that new and stronger traffic barriers will be installed on the Luhamaa, Koidula and Narva border crossings in the coming years. The head of the Narva border crossing, Marek Liiva explained the rationale behind the planned changes to the barriers: “These should then also, perhaps in the future, help to better deter a so-called hybrid attack. If there is a threat of mass immigration or a desire to push these individuals across the border, as there were groups of them here at the end of last year, these will also help to better deter such activity against us or in our direction”.

On 22 July, Finland’s new law aimed at preventing people seeking asylum from entering the country via its border with Russia came into effect. The controversial legislation (officially titled ‘Act on Temporary Measures to Combat Instrumentalized Migration’ but often referred to as Finland’s “pushback law”) was adopted by the Finnish parliament on 12 July and will initially be valid for a period of 12 months. It will allow Finnish border guards to turn away people who want to claim asylum at the Finland-Russia border and to “remove” any people who have already entered Finnish territory. Finnish President Alexander Stubb has claimed that the law has broad support from other European heads of state and government. “Many remarked that the instrument looks good – especially the leaders of Baltic countries. And it may be that they’ll start copying it,” he said after the meeting of the European Political Community on 18 July. The director of ECRE member organisation the Finnish Refugee Advice Centre, Pia Lindfors, issued a scathing assessment of the potential impact of the new legislation. “The rule of law in Finland has been shaken,” she told POLITICO. Her criticism was echoed by the director of Amnesty International Finland, Frank Johansson. “This law makes it possible to do pushbacks, which are always illegal,” he said, adding: “It goes much further than crisis regulation in the new EU migration pact; and it gives a green light to violence on the borders”. Martti Koskenniemi, a law professor from the University of Helsinki, described the Finnish Parliament’s decision to adopt the new law as a “legal mistake”. “It’s a black spot in Finnish constitutional history. And I have no doubt that it will be corrected – sooner or later,” he told Euronews.

The European Commission (EC) has issued a damning verdict on the state of the rule of law in Hungary. Following the publication of the 2024 Rule of Law Report on 24 July, Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders told reporters that Hungary presented “a real systemic issue for the Commission about the rule of law”. In its new report, the EC noted that no progress had been made on any of the recommendations that it made to Hungary in 2023, including on ‘fostering a safe and enabling civic space and remove obstacles affecting civil society organisations’. In this context, it highlighted Hungary’s failure to repeal legislation ‘in particular the immigration tax’ – ‘a special 25% immigration tax applicable to financial support received by organisations carrying out ‘activities facilitating immigration’’ – that limited those organisations’ capacity to operate.

The EC’s strong criticism of the state of the rule of law in Hungary was followed up on 30 July by accusations that it was failing to investigate human rights violations against people trying to cross its borders irregularly. A new report by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) singled out Hungary, together with Croatia and Greece, as countries which ‘did not effectively investigate incidents of ill treatment and loss of life during border management’. The FRA also noted that, despite ‘credible allegations’ of mistreatment, the three countries made insufficient efforts to locate and hear victims and witnesses, hindered lawyers in their work and did not have access to key evidence (e.g. footage from border surveillance).

The publication of the EC and FRA reports came a week after a number of EU member states (MS) had boycotted an informal meeting of justice and home affairs ministers that the Hungarian government was hosting in Budapest in the context of its presidency of the Council of the EU. Prior to the 22 July meeting, Lithuanian Deputy Minister for the Interior Arnoldas Abramavičius told journalists: “I think this is a reaction towards Hungary’s external activity maybe sometimes not adjusted to the European framework”, adding: “Some countries sent lower level politicians, some countries sent ministers level. I don’t say it is a boycott but kind of an opinion expressed by the member states”. EUobserver described the MS’ decision to “snub” the meeting on migration and security as a “symbolic response to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s visit to Moscow”.

The Lithuanian government has announced that it will receive EU funding for strengthening infrastructure on its border with Russia. Speaking to Žinių Radijas radio on 25 July, Minister of the Interior Agnė Bilotaitė said: “We will receive funding from Europe. There’s now 150 million euros earmarked specifically for strengthening the infrastructure of the eastern borders”. “We don’t see any migrant flows there, but we clearly understand that we need to strengthen the border,” she added.

Lithuania is also planning to send a team of border guards to Latvia to support the latter’s border management efforts. “Latvia has asked for 10-15 officers. And this is the number we are considering,” said Lina Laurinaitytė from the Lithuanian State Border Guard Service (VSAT) on 28 July. Elsewhere, Laurinaitytė’s VSAT colleague, Giedrius Mišutis, reported a rise in “secondary migration” through Latvia. “People who illegally entered Latvia from Belarus or asylum-seekers accommodated in foreigner registration centres are trying to reach the Lithuanian-Polish border through the Latvian-Lithuanian internal border and travel to the West,” he told the Baltic News Service.

Poland’s parliament has approved a measure to allow border guards to fire live ammunition “preventively” or in “self-defence” at people who try to cross the Poland-Belarus border irregularly. The controversial measure, which was approved by the Senate on 26 July, ‘excludes criminal liability for the use of arms or direct force in violation of the rules’ by officers if there is a threat to their safety or to the country. Commenting on the adoption of the new law, Bartek Rumienczyk from the Grupa Granica platform said: “This law will only make an already very difficult situation at the Belarusian border worse”. “Because of the buffer zone, it is already impossible for us to document what is happening in the region, including the violence carried out by the border guards,” he added, concluding: “This will further complicate our work and make the area more dangerous for people seeking asylum”. Amnesty International’s deputy regional director for Europe, Dinushika Dissanayake, was equally scathing in her criticism of the new law. Speaking before it had been adopted by the Polish parliament, she said: “These proposals set a dangerous precedent for the regulation of the use and potential abuse of firearms in Poland and should be rejected. Under international law and standards, the use of force against individuals must be strictly necessary and proportionate to the threat posed; the use of firearms is prohibited except in situations where there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury. Any attempt by the Polish authorities to undermine these principles would be unlawful”. Marcin Wolny from ECRE member organisation the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights expressed disappointment in the government’s failure to adopt a more progressive approach to managing irregular crossings at the Poland-Belarus border. “I believe the government (…) stepped into the shoes of its predecessors because it was convenient,” he said. In a letter to the marshal (presiding officer) of the Senate, Małgorzata Kidawa-Błońska, on 17 July, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Michael O’Flaherty wrote that the proposal may provide “a disincentive for state agents deployed in the border areas, or in other situations within its scope, to act in respect of the rules on the proportionality in the use of force and firearms” and that it could “foster a lack of accountability and suggest a lack of commitment to human rights obligations”.

In addition to urging the Senate to refrain from adopting firearms law “in its current form”, Commissioner O’Flaherty also wrote to Prime Minister Donald Tusk to express his concerns about “the continuing practice of summary returns of persons across the border to Belarus, without an individual assessment, putting them at risk of refoulement and other human rights violations” and the “impact of the buffer zone on the provision of humanitarian and legal assistance to people stranded in the border area, on human rights monitoring, and on the right to information”. In his letter to Prime Minister Tusk, O’Flaherty recognised the “challenges posed by the instrumentalisation of irregular migration” but clarified that “the problems which states may encounter in managing migratory flows or in the reception of asylum seekers cannot justify having recourse to practices that are not compatible with the ECHR”.

Related articles

• EU EASTERN BORDERS: Significant Increase in Arrivals via EU Eastern Borders Despite Overall Decrease in EU ― Finland Adopts Controversial ‘Pushback’ Law ― Asylum Seekers File Lawsuit Against Lithuania for Unlawful Detention ― NGO Calls for Urgent Action to Help People Trapped in ‘Death Zone’ Along Poland-Belarus Border ― Poland Asks France and Germany for Support to Secure Belarus Border (July 2024)
• EU EASTERN BORDERS: Finland’s Controversial Migration Law Moves Closer to Adoption Amid Civil Society and United Nations Concerns ― Hungary Receives € 200 Million Fine from EU Court over Migration Policy Then Vows to Prioritise ‘Stemming Illegal Migration’ in Upcoming EU Presidency ― Poland Reintroduces ‘Exclusion’ Zone’ next to Border with Belarus and Considers Closing Remaining Crossings (June 2024)

  

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NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

GREECE: NGOs Renew Criticism of Conditions in Greek Centres ― FRA Accuses Greece of Failing to Investigate ‘Ill-Treatment’ of People Trying to Cross Greece-Türkiye Border ― NGOs Object to ‘Overly Positive’ EC Rule of Law Report on Greece ― Child Arrivals in Greece Quadruple in 2024 ― Hellenic Coast Guard Rejects Turkish Accusations of Pushbacks ― Court Convicts Vigilantes for Illegally Detaining Migrants

• Amnesty International and Mobile Info Team and Refugee Legal Support have published damning reports on ‘closed controlled access centres’ (CCACs) in Greece.
• A new report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) into alleged ill-treatment at the EU’s borders has singled out Greece as one of the EU’s worst offenders.
• Seven NGOs have issued a joint statement in which they claim that the European Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report was ‘overly positive’ about the state of the rule of law in Greece.
• Analysis undertaken by Save the Children has revealed that the number of child arrivals in Greece has quadrupled in 2024.
• The Hellenic Coast Guard has rejected accusations by the Turkish coastguard and defence ministry that it carried out numerous pushbacks in July.
• A Greek court has convicted three vigilantes for illegally detaining 13 people they falsely accused of starting a deadly fire in the Evros region in 2023.

Several NGOs have published damning reports on ‘closed controlled access centres’ (CCACs) in Greece. Their reports echo the findings of an earlier report by the Council of Europe in which it urged Greece to treat refugees and migrants with dignity and humanity, and to stop pushbacks and the mistreatment of people in detention. On 30 July, Amnesty International published a report that described the EU-funded accommodation centre on the island of Samos as a ‘dystopian nightmare’. The EU has been providing support to Greece to establish and operate CCACs since 2020. The first CCAC was opened on Samos in September 2021 with the objective of providing better conditions than older reception facilities. However, Amnesty International has reported that the camp suffers from overcrowding and inadequate living conditions, insufficient water, severe lack of medical supplies, lack of support for vulnerable people, harsh restrictions on unaccompanied minors and systematic restrictions amounting to arbitrary detention. “This is all happening in an EU-funded site that is supposed to be compliant with European standards,” said the organisation’s senior director for regional human rights impact, Deprose Muchena. “Instead, we found a dystopian nightmare: a highly securitised camp lacking in the most basic infrastructure,” he added. The NGO warned that such centres “must not become the blueprint for the EU Migration Pact”. On 26 July, the NGOs Mobile Info Team and Refugee Legal Support published a joint report based on interviews with 30 residents from nine different camps in Greece. Their research, which was focused on the “inhumane” CCACs on the Aegean islands, also revealed “a troubling picture of neglect and mismanagement” on the mainland. “We are extremely concerned at the lack of dignity and adequate living standards afforded to people who come to Greece seeking international protection,” they concluded.

On 30 July, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) issued a report in which it decried the lack of investigation into alleged ill-treatment at the EU’s borders. The FRA found that Greece, Croatia and Hungary in particular “did not effectively investigate incidents of ill treatment and loss of life during border management”. It cited several incidents in which people were subjected to mistreatment without consequences for the perpetrators – including one in Greece in 2022, in which two Palestinians were purportedly beaten, sexually assaulted, and abandoned on a life raft at sea – noting that “the low number of investigations of such cases, despite the high number of credible allegations, casts a negative light on border management authorities’ operation”. It added that fear and intimidation also prevented victims from reporting mistreatment. “There are too many allegations of human rights violations at the EU’s borders (…) Europe has a duty to treat everyone at the borders fairly, respectfully, and in full compliance with human rights law,” said FRA director Sirpa Rautio.

On 1 August, seven NGOs issued a joint statement in which they claim that the European Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report was misleading about the state of the rule of law in Greece. “The overly positive account in the report starkly contrasts an alarming reality experienced by journalists, activists, and civil society organizations on the ground, and a growing international concern over the deterioration of the rule of law in the country,” they wrote. The group added that “civil society organisations and human rights defenders, particularly those working on migration issues, also face significant obstacles, and even criminal charges, for their work in Greece”.

On 17 July, Save the Children reported that the number of child arrivals in Greece had quadrupled in 2024. According to the NGO, over 6,400 children entered Greece in 2024, four times more than in the previous year. Fileri Kyriaki from ECRE member organisation the Greek Council for Refugees said that children often experience agony and fear, knowing that they could die on their journey. “There are no safe and legal channels to migration. The children have to risk their lives,” she explained. The analysis conducted by the two NGOs revealed that, in 2023, most unaccompanied children seeking safety in Greece had had their asylum claims rejected, thus leaving them without legal papers and vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. “Children arriving alone in Greece are facing dire conditions that demand urgent attention, and the new EU Pact could make a bad situation even worse for them,” said Save the Children Europe director and EU representative, Willy Bergogné. “Every child deserves safety and dignity upon arrival. Yet, these children arriving in Greece are not being treated as children. It’s imperative that Greek authorities and the EU step up to provide robust guardianship, essential proper protection systems, and improved living standards. The Mediterranean also cannot continue to be a graveyard for children. Safe and accessible routes into Europe must be established to ensure their safe passage,” he concluded.

The Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG) has rejected accusations made by the Turkish coastguard and ministry of defence that it conducted illegal pushbacks. The Turkish coastguard has claimed that it rescued victims of Greek pushbacks in at least four separate incidents in late July. Türkiye has repeatedly accused Greece of mistreating people on the move and relations between the two countries are tense. On 22 July, the Turkish defence ministry X posted drone footage which appeared to show a Hellenic Coast Guard vessel pushing a migrant boat back into Turkish waters. Commenting on the incident, a senior HCG official said: “This is in no way a pushback. It is detection and prevention of illegal entry into Greek territorial waters”.

On 11 July, a Greek court convicted three vigilantes for illegally detaining 13 people they had falsely accused of starting a deadly fire in the Evros region in August 2023. The case was initially treated as a racially motivated attack. However, in its ruling, the court stated that the motives of the three men could not be deemed as racist. The victims’ lawyers expressed their disappointment with the ruling and claimed that it “undermined” attacks on migrants. Commenting on the court’s decision to downgrade the charges against the vigilantes from ‘kidnapping’ to ‘illegal detention’, one of them, John Patzanakidis, said: “it’s obviously a negative development”. “The number of racist crimes recorded in Greece is just the tip of the iceberg. Only a few of them reach the court and in even fewer, the court recognises a racist motive,” he added.

Related articles

• MEDITERRANEAN: New Joint Report Highlights Extreme Violence on Land Routes Towards Africa’s Mediterranean Coast ― NGO Appeals to Cypriot Courts on Behalf of People Trapped in Buffer Zone ― Greek Court Acknowledges Racist Motives in 2018 Anti-Migrant Attacks on Lesvos ― CoE Urges Greece to Treat Migrants and Refugees with ‘Dignity and Humanity’ ― Investigation Reveals Frontex Failure to Report Migrant Abuses (July 2024)
• MEDITERRANEAN: UN Offers Condolences for Victims of Migrant Shipwrecks in Ionian Sea ― Cyprus Rejects “Buffer Zone Migrants” Amid Rising Tensions Between Republic and UN ― Hellenic Coast Guard Accused of Throwing Migrants Overboard to Their Deaths ― Italian Cabinet Upholds NGO Request to Stop Sending Patrol Boats to Tunisia ― Frontex Internal Review System Actively Undermined (June 2024)

  

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NEWS FROM THE ECRE OFFICE

AIDA Country Report on Romania – 2023 Update

The updated AIDA Country Report on Romania provides a detailed overview of legislative and practice-related developments in asylum procedures, reception conditions, detention of asylum seekers and content of international protection in 2023. It also includes an annex which provides an overview of temporary protection (TP).

In 2023, 10,178 applications for international protection were made in Romania. The most represented countries of origin were Bangladesh, Syria and Pakistan. At the same time, 1,016 people (mostly from Syria and Somalia) were granted international protection. The recognition rate was 16.7% (down from 25.7% in 2022) and there were wide discrepancies between nationalities: 0% recognition rate for Bangladeshis, 2.5% for Pakistanis and 62.5% for Syrians.

Access to the territory and the asylum procedure remained a challenge in 2023 with continued reports of pushbacks, ill-treatment, including physical violence, at the border and the use of readmission agreements, although the latter was to a lesser degree compared to 2022. In March 2023, Romania started the implementation of a six-month EU-funded pilot project focused on border management with Serbia and accelerated procedures. A Romanian official stated that the project enabled Romanian authorities to identify groups of migrants who approached the Serbia-Romania border and thus to notify Serbian authorities “long before they reach the border”. The European Commission considered the pilot to be a success. The asylum law was amended in the context of the pilot project. As a result, the right of asylum seekers’ to remain in Romania was limited until the end of the asylum procedure, officials from the EU Agency for Asylum were allowed to register, interview and analyse asylum applications, and the issuance of return decisions together with the negative decision on international protection was foreseen.

The reception of asylum applicants and the inclusion of new beneficiaries of international protection (BIPs) was severely hindered by the end of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund national programme in October 2023 as it forced a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that had been providing legal, medical and financial assistance to suspend their projects. (NB/ Funding was eventually resumed in June 2024).

In August 2023, a joint ministerial order further specified the appointment, role, tasks, training and professional experience of legal representatives for unaccompanied minors (UAMs). As a result, some UAMs have faced particular difficulties in exercising their right to family reunification as the legal representative is responsible for initiating the necessary steps to identify the child’s family and assessing whether or not reunification is possible.

Regarding BIPs, many barriers to meaningful inclusion remained in 2023. People who were able to find employment were generally paid minimum wage and were unable to afford a decent living. This was especially the case for families with children. The most commonly reported barriers to employment continued to be insufficient knowledge of Romanian and non-recognition of prior qualifications. In addition, lack of proper knowledge, language barriers, arbitrary refusals of care by doctors, general issues in the Romanian healthcare system, including long delays for specialists, and the cost of medical services severely hindered BIPs’ effective access to healthcare.

In 2023, 51,984 Ukrainians received TP status in Romania. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), in December 2023 there were 83,675 refugees from Ukraine in Romania. As of 1 May 2023, a number of elements of the support programme that granted financial assistance to TP beneficiaries for housing and food/subsistence were amended. The legal framework was also amended shortly afterwards. As result, TP beneficiaries were required to register with the employment agency to continue receiving financial assistance.

The full report is available here and the annex on temporary protection is available here.

For more information about the AIDA database or to read other AIDA reports, please visit the AIDA website.

  

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AIDA Country Report on Türkiye – 2023 Update

The updated AIDA Country Report on Türkiye provides a detailed overview of legislative and practice-related developments in asylum procedures, reception conditions, detention of asylum seekers and content of international protection in 2023.

In 2023, 19,017 applications for international protection were made in Türkiye (43% decrease compared to 2022). The main countries of origin of applicants were Afghanistan (13,068), Iraq (2,776) and Iran (1,416).

There was a substantial shift towards integrated border management to address irregular arrivals in 2023. The construction of border control facilities, including 1,234 km of patrol roads, on 80% of the borders with Iran and Syria was completed. According to Turkish authorities, the facilities prevented 203,437 irregular arrivals during the first 11 months of 2023. Unfortunately, the increase in the number of controls at border crossings also resulted in a corresponding increase in the number of attempted crossings via more dangerous routes. Pushbacks continued in 2023 and the victims were mainly single men from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In some cases, it was reported that individuals were held for months before being subjected to pushbacks. In addition, there were worrying reports of migrants being caught and beaten by organised groups on the Iranian side of the border.

The registration of applications remained one of the most significant barriers to people seeking international protection in Türkiye in 2023, and it was reportedly “almost impossible” for vulnerable applicants in a number of areas. The difficulties were notably created by the closure of new registrations in 1,169 neighbourhoods in 63 provinces in which the foreign population exceeded 20% of the Turkish population. In addition to the registration problems, address verification procedures continued for both international and temporary protection (TP) holders. These issues led to an increasing number of people becoming undocumented.

Regarding detention, the number of transfers between detention centres increased in 2023. The practice of sudden transfers without previous communications was particularly problematic and affected people’s right to access a legal remedy as lawyers were unable to locate their clients due to the authorities failing to share information on their whereabouts.

In 2023, the main concerns related to migration and asylum were the effects of the devastating earthquakes that increased the need for humanitarian aid in an area in which almost 1.7 million Syrian of TP beneficiaries were hosted. According to official estimates, approximately 50,000 people, including 7,000 Syrians who were TP holders, lost their lives, more than half a million buildings, including houses, workplaces, schools, hospitals, and government offices, were damaged, and significant financial losses were incurred. One year after the earthquakes, the effects are still being felt as some families are still unable to access basic needs, including water and shelter. As a result, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) expedited resettlement processing of the most vulnerable refugees, particularly unaccompanied children and women at risk in earthquake-affected locations. More than 16,800 resettlement submissions were made in 2023, 94% of which were from the earthquake region.

Anti-migrant sentiments increased noticeably in the country in 2023, largely due to the crisis caused by the earthquakes. The 2023 general election campaign was centred on topics such as voluntary return, “unwanted immigrants” and border protection, and this created increased challenges for migrant and refugee communities.

The full report is available here.

For more information about the AIDA database or to read other AIDA reports, please visit the AIDA website.

  

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RECENT REPORTS

ECRE

August

• AIDA Country Report on Türkiye – 2023 Update

July

• AIDA Country Report on Croatia – 2023 Update
• AIDA Country Report on Hungary – 2023 Update
• AIDA Country Report on Italy – 2023 Update
• AIDA Country Report on Portugal – 2023 Update
• AIDA Country Report on Romania – 2023 Update
• AIDA Country Report on Switzerland – 2023 Update
• ECRE and Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, Beyond walls and fences: EU funding used for a complex and digitalised border surveillance system

 

ECRE Member Organisations

 July

• Accem, Informe Personas Refugiadas 2024
• Amnesty International, Samos: “We feel in prison on the island”: Unlawful detention and sub-standard conditions in an EU-funded refugee centre
• Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI) et al., Joint Policy Paper: The EU Screening Regulation
• Fenix – Humanitarian Legal Aid, The Pact’s Practice – At The Border
• Fenix – Humanitarian Legal Aid, The Pact’s Practice – Introduction to a Fenix Series
• Greek Council for Refugees, Climate Refugees: Addressing climate-induced massive migration before it happens
• Greek Council for Refugees, Δημοσιοποίηση της Ετήσιας Έκθεσης 2023 του Μηχανισμού Καταγραφής Περιστατικών Άτυπων Αναγκαστικών Επιτροφών
• Greek Council for Refugees, Σχόλιο επί των Προτάσεων του Γενικού Εισαγγελέα επί της υπόθεσης C-134/23
• International Rescue Committee, Core Reception Principles: Welcoming People Seeking Safety, Supporting Host Communities, and Advancing Fair, Effective Asylum Systems
• Jesuit Refugee Service Europe, Detained and Unprotected: Access to Justice and Legal Aid in Immigration Detention Across Europe
• Norwegian Refugee Council, Briefing Note: Refugees trapped in Europe’s “death zone”
• Ocalenie Foundation et al., No Safe Passage. Migrants’ deaths at the European Union-Belarusian border
• PRO ASYL, An der Realität vorbei: Das Urteil des OVG Münster zu Syrien

Others 

August

• Human Rights Watch et al., Greece: EU Ignores Deteriorating Rule of Law

July

• Council of Europe, Greater use of firearms at the border with Belarus: PACE Rapporteur expresses deep human rights concerns at Polish draft law
• Council of Europe, PACE warns against erosion of the right of asylum
• EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Guidance on investigating alleged ill-treatment at borders
• European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Search and rescue operations and fundamental rights – June 2024 update
• International Organization for Migration, Hungary – Social Inclusion of Refugees from Ukraine (January – March 2024)
• International Organization for Migration, Libya – Maritime Update Libyan Coast (23-29 June 2024)
• International Organization for Migration, Migration Governance Insights on Regular Pathways: Delivering on the Promise of Migration
• Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, Work It Out: Advancing migrant workers’ rights
• Klikaktiv – Center for Development of Social Policies, Out of Sight: Pushing Beyond the Limits of Humanity
• Migration Policy Institute, Engaging Employers in Growing Refugee Labor Pathways
• Migration Policy Institute, Managing International Protection Needs at Borders
• Migration Policy Institute, The Door Opens for a New Chapter in European Cooperation on Migration
• Migration Policy Institute, The End of Asylum? Evolving the Protection System to Meet 21^st Century Challenges
• Missing Migrants Project, 30,001 Missing Migrants Recorded in Mediterranean (Since 2014)
• Operational Data Portal, Refugee and Migrant Children in Europe – Accompanied, Unaccompanied and Separated - 2023
• Operational Data Portal, Western Balkans – Refugees, asylum-seekers and other people in mixed movements (as of end June 2024)
• Refugee Legal Support and Mobile Info Team, Voices from the Camps: Living Conditions and Access to Services in Refugee Camps on the Greek Mainland
• Refugee Support Aegean, Greek Asylum Case Law Report – Issue 1/2024
• Refugee Support Aegean, New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Impermissible regression of standards for asylum seekers
• Support Aegean, The Greek asylum procedure in figures in 2023
• Royal Institute for International Relations (Egmont), Three Key Concepts for a More Successful Migration Policy in Belgium
• Sea-Watch, Airborne Annual Report 2023
• Statewatch, Outsourcing borders: Monitoring EU externalisation policy – Bulletin 2
• United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration and the Mixed Migration Centre, On This Journey, No One Cares if You Live or Die: Abuse, Protection and Justice along Routes between East and West Africa and Africa’s Mediterranean Coast – Volume 2

ONGOING CAMPAIGNS

ECRE Member Organisations

• Flemish Refugee Action, Refugee Walk
• Greek Council for Refugees and WWF Greece, Climate Refugees Questionnaire
• Greek Forum of Refugees, Democracy4all
• Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Needs assessment questionnaire: Online forum for European practitioners on legal questions concerning the application of fundamental rights in migration-related cases
• Refugee Council, Fair and Humane Asylum System
• Various, #stopborderviolence on the Polish-Belarusian border

Others

• Captain Support UK, Open Letter to the Home Secretary on the Unjust Prosecution of Ibrahima Bah
• Civil Society Europe, Ensuring a vibrant civic space in the European Union
• Fabrizio Spucches and Mediterranea Saving Humans, NoWay!
• Free the El Hiblu 3 Campaign, Drop the Charges Against the El Hiblu 3!
• Free the Pylos 9 Campaign, Free the #Pylos9
• Observatoire des Camps de Réfugiés, HelloAsso!
• Our House – International Centre for Civil Initiatives, #protection4Nikita
• Statewatch, Security exceptions in migration and asylum cases
• World Justice Project, European Union Subnational Justice, Governance and Rule of Law Indicators

UPCOMING EVENTS

ECRE

• 30-31 October, Brussels, Training Seminar on EU Advocacy
• 10 September, Empowering Women's Specialist Services through the Migration Pact, ECRE and Women Against Violence Europe
• 12 September, Brussels, Mutual Learning Seminar: The future of protection in the EU: Evidence to guide the implementation of the CEAS

ECRE Member Organisations

• 19 September, Online, Presentación del “Informe de País: España” del Proyecto AIDA, Accem

Others

• 18-20 September, Giessen, Human Rights in Migration Societies: Exploring the Intersection of Human Rights and Migration in Law, Politics, and Everyday Life, Human Rights Discourse in Migration Societies (MeDiMi)
• 19-20 September, Bologna and Online, The Evolving Role of Courts in Adjudicating Barriers to Accessing Asylum, University of Bologna
• 7-9 October, Florence, Effective Migration Management: Putting Policy into Action, European University Institute
• 10-11 October, Lampedusa, Migration & Artificial Intelligence: What Future for Migration and Asylum Policy in the EU?, Academy of Law and Migration (ADiM) and Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence on Integration of Migrants in Europe (IntoME)
• 28-29 November, Gent, International Conference Culture & Mental Health: Refugees, Dr Guislain Museum
• 5 November – 10 December, Online, Democracy Academy 2024, Migration Policy Group
• Online, Training Course: Temporary Protection in the European Union, Council of Europe