EDITORIAL
The new Commission: Jobs for the boys and bigger jobs for the girls; an unwanted job for Austria
By Catherine Woollard
The big news of the rentrée in Brussels is the new Commission. EU member states (MS) put forward their nominees during the summer and this week returning Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, presented her proposal for the allocation of roles to the MS’ nominees.
There is quite a lot of disappointment. Many MS nominated candidates with strong economic backgrounds because they wanted finance portfolios and, not least, because the big task of this mandate will be to negotiate and agree on the next seven-year EU budget, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), with MS wanting to secure their piece of the € 1.5 trillion pie.
There were not enough finance jobs to go around, and von der Leyen followed through in a major way on her threat to punish those MS that did not nominate women by handing vice-president positions and the most important portfolios to female nominees (and Italy). Those (re)proposing weak candidates received suitably minor portfolios (see Hungary, Malta and Greece). Italy received the portfolio it wanted (money) and a vice-president role for a candidate with a somewhat questionable past, reflecting the need to keep Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni sweet – essential to von der Leyen keeping the EU functioning. Meloni’s tactic of ‘take the money and don’t rock the boat’ continues.
On the other hand, there were few takers for the poisoned chalice that is internal affairs, with the tricky asylum and migration dossier the main item within it. There were strong rumours over the last two weeks that Belgium was interested, while the nominee who looked best qualified for the position was withdrawn after a row with von der Leyen.
The reluctant Commissioner emerges
Following all these machinations, the unlikely new Commissioner-designate for Internal Affairs and Migration is Magnus Brunner, Austria’s finance minister, who is unlikely to be pleased with the choice. Like many issues in EU asylum and migration policy, the best that can be said is that he is not the worst candidate, with a reputation as a consensus-based and serious politician. Von der Leyen’s thinking here is presumably that she needs a safe pair of hands and a commissioner who is not further to the right than her, who would use the position to create trouble and attack the Commission from her right flank. At the same time, she has tried to appease the headbangers by giving the job to a country known as hard-line.
Of the other commissioners relevant to asylum, for external policy, the choices are very much with an eye to the East, with Kaja Kallas from Estonia as High Representative, Jozef Sileka (Czechia), a trade, energy and banking specialist, and once apparently ‘Banker of the Year’, for international partnerships, Marta Kos (Slovenia) for enlargement and even Dubravka Šuica, re-nominated by Croatia, taking the new position of Commissioner for the Mediterranean. The story here is of prioritising and investing in the EU’s response to the conflict with Russia and a renewed focus on accession, now encompassing Ukraine and Moldova, in parallel to possible peace negotiations and reconstruction in 2025 and after. There may be a renewed momentum in the EU’s response to displacement from Ukraine, where the pressure for collective action after an impressive early start, is considerable.
Commissioners with any experience or previous interest in the EU’s relations with the Middle East and North Africa or Africa, or indeed on global issues, are few and far between. In this context, resistance to the inclusion of migration control measures in external action and funding and tottering EU diplomacy is unlikely. In this context, a role could open for European Council President Antonia Costa: while Charles Michel jumping into foreign policy chairs was generally not welcomed, the EU’s diplomatic relations might benefit from an experienced and heavyweight presence.
Finally, the role of Michael McGrath in the justice dossier is also important. Like Austria, Ireland desperately wanted a finance position and proposed a candidate in McGrath with a strong economic background. Like Brunner, he may not be best pleased with the allocation, receiving the justice position which includes the tricky but not well-rewarded job of dealing with the abuse of the rule of law by the MS. That battle, based on a defence of the treaties, along with the consolidation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the legal practice of MS, are nonetheless crucial to the future of the EU.
What does it mean for EU asylum and migration policy?
The European Parliament (EP) likes to claim a couple of scalps during the hearings when it “interviews” the nominees, to show its power even though it can’t reject and isn’t required to approve individual candidates (it can only reject the whole lot). Barring an act of self-sabotage at the prospect of taking on the cursed dossier, Brunner will sail through. What then does that mean for the future of EU asylum and migration policy?
First, the Pact will be the main game in town. Austria tends to respect EU asylum law, and the reforms will reduce its responsibilities if implemented correctly. The Commission has pushed ahead at an extraordinarily fast pace with implementation plans, following the adoption of the Pact in anticipation of the Hungarian Presidency and the uncertainties attached to transitions in the EP and Commission. There is a momentum there that is hard to stop and the incoming Commissioner seems unlikely to want to stop it.
While commissioners are bound to act in the interests of the EU and are not representatives of their MS, etc etc, renationalisation in the form of the increasing power of the MS in EU decision-making is also manifested in the strategic choices commissioners make, especially given the strong tendency to nominate national politicians who have an interest in returning to national politics – for example, those who have held ministerial positions and may want to do so again. On asylum, Austria is a Member State significantly impacted by the lack of compliance of others. For example, the fact that Hungary doesn’t have an asylum system and that Austria has the second highest number of applications per capita are not unrelated.
From a protection perspective, a return to compliance would be positive. The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) post-Pact, is worse than before (see ECRE’s extensive analysis). Nonetheless, now is an opportunity to address the violations and implementation gaps that have been so neglected during the reforms, which themselves must be implemented in full respect of EU and international law, including the Charter.
Second, and relatedly, there is nonetheless a risk of an emphasis on certain elements of the reformed legal framework, and notably on enforcing the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation rules on responsibility (i.e. “Dublin” rather than Dublin) and the border procedure. A selective approach would be unfortunate and likely to lead to further political crises. Already, the effort to ensure implementation is a massive challenge, as years of tolerated non-compliance have taken their toll. Even-handedness is essential to maintain trust.
Third, unfortunately, not much is likely to change in terms of the worst violations at the borders and related impunity, as the objective of limiting arrivals of refugees is firmly engrained, regardless of cost and consequence. The search for accountability and justice – by ECRE, its members, and many others – will likewise continue.
More uncertain is the fate of the clamour for a different legal regime (favouring denial of access) at the borders. Certain MS are desperate to use the worst elements in the new Pact: the provisions that allow for derogation from the law, particularly in situations of so-called instrumentalisation. Indeed, a number of them seem to have preempted the application of the reforms by already putting measures in place, and a large number are intervening in cases running at the European Court of Human Rights in efforts to get favourable judgments from that court. In this respect, it does not bode well that sitting above the Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration will be the Executive Vice-President for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, Hanne Virkkunen, from Finland, a country pioneering efforts to use the instrumentalisation get-out. Similarly, the steadfast refusal to criticise or indeed meaningfully comment on the Italy-Albania deal will also likely remain – for at least as long as the state of terror in the Commission at the thought of upsetting the Italian government which has the power to pull the plug on the Pact.
Finally, the external adventures will continue. Thus, the sight of the EU’s INTERNAL AFFAIRS commissioner flying around to meet repressive leaders on migratory routes, cheque book in hand, as diplomats and development specialists facepalm in the background, will not go away. A stronger focus on the Balkans as a holding area is likely however.
Is it all unravelling anyway?
More extreme scenarios than the usual gradual creep creep of erosion of international refugee protection by Europe are possible. This week has seen the Dutch request for an opt-out from the Pact, quickly shutdown by the Commission. Hungary then made a similar request – a rather redundant proposal since it doesn’t respect EU asylum law in any case. It is seeking to negotiate with the Commission over the massive fines imposed by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) which the government refuses to pay, and which can – and should – be deducted from the billions of EU funding that Hungary continues to receive despite consistently and dangerously undermining the EU on a near daily basis.
Much more alarming are some of the proposals under discussion in Germany. While the expansion of border checks and the anti-integration measures passed are damaging enough, a serious discussion also rumbles on on invoking Article 72 of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU to claim an emergency situation and, on that basis, to derogate from EU asylum law. The proposals fervently advocated by the opposition Christian Democratic Union (CDU), include suspending the registering of new asylum applications. It is not exaggeration to say that some of the proposals that the government has been seriously considering could lead to the end of a common system, given Germany’s role in it and the chain reaction that would follow. The CJEU tightly circumscribes the use of Article 72 and an Austrian Commissioner is unlikely to be receptive towards Germany invoking it (but a CDU Commission President in the run-up to an election… ? ) Nonetheless, the government itself is in a perilous position.
Most scenarios that would result from a (partial) collapse of the CEAS would be highly damaging from a protection perspective. Where this is not of interest to MS, they might not the less consider the impact they would likely face through either gradual deharmonisation through liberally allowing derogations, unpunished non-compliance or more dramatic collapse. There is also a bitter irony in Germany bemoaning the system which is based on its interests by still retaining the unfair Dublin rules, and the Netherlands seeking to blow up the Pact which is built on its successful promotion of the cruel idea of mandatory border procedures.
So what it means for asylum and migration are some positive changes and some more of the same. Also, lots of uncertainty where a good dose of evidence, common sense, humanity and the rule of law would help. The objective needs to be a situation where most MS respect most of the law most of the time. This would also be the best way to contain the issue so that it is dealt with without becoming a crisis where heads of state feel obliged to intervene, a situation that always leads to more restrictions. Policy-makers – officials as well as politicians – need to get a grip and get on with the job of making asylum systems function, in a calm and steady manner, rather than pursuing variously unrealistic, cruel or nonsensical ideas which just feed the populist beast. Post-reform, the system is not better, but it was believed to be necessary to reform before it was possible to enforce. So, now, enforce.
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EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS
NORDIC REGION
- Doctors in Finland have criticised the government’s proposal to withhold healthcare from undocumented people.
- Norway is planning to introduce significant amendments to the Integration Act to speed up the integration of refugees into the workforce.
- The Swedish government is planning to offer a € 30,000 allowance to people who leave Sweden and return to their countries of origin voluntarily.
- A Chinese activist who risks detainment in China has fled to Sweden after her application for asylum in Denmark was rejected.
The Finnish government has proposed to reverse a 2023 law that gives undocumented people access to healthcare. It has justified the move on the grounds that it would be in line with ongoing plans to reduce spending and immigration. Responding to the proposal, which it claims could result in deaths, the Finnish Medical Association has urged the government to change its “problematic and damaging” plan that would prevent people from accessing non-emergency health care. Aino Tuomi-Nikula from the health NGO Physicians for Social Responsibility said: “Those who tabled this proposal pretend that we don’t have enough money for everyone and that full access to healthcare would invite more people to Finland. We know this is not true, and that it’s actually cheaper to treat conditions in advance by primary healthcare than leaving them to emergency care. This measure is a political stunt to crack down on marginalised people and bank on public fear of migrants”. Louise Bonneau from the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants said: “Healthcare is a basic human right, not a privilege reserved for some. This law, if passed, would lead to suffering and betray Finland’s commitment to equality and justice. It must be rejected”. The proposal, which has strong support from the far-right Finns Party, was due to be presented to parliament before 28 September. However, on 18 September, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health said that it would postpone the proposal until the start of 2025 as it needed “more time for preparation”.
Elsewhere, the draft budget that was presented by the Ministry of Finance Budget in August includes a number of cuts that may affect the work of refugee-focused NGOs in Finland. The Ministry of Justice is reportedly planning to cut its funding to the Finnish League for Human Rights (Ihmisoikeuksien) by more than half while ECRE organisation Finnish Refugee Advice Centre (Pakolaisneuvonta) may lose all of its government funding. Reacting to the budget proposal, the head Pia Lindfors from Pakolaisneuvonta said: “The support we received from the Ministry of Justice has been our salvation, and last year we were put on the frame for the first time. We just had time to take a breather, but now we’re going back to saving mode”.
Norway is planning to amend the Integration Act and introduce new measures to the induction programme in order to increase the number of refugees in employment. The new measures include more job-focused activities, the integration of older refugees [55-60 years old] in the induction programme and an extension of education time for refugees. “More refugees need to work. The experiences after the high number of arrivals from Ukraine show how important and effective it is to streamline integration. Now, we want to add improvements to the Integration Act so that this applies to all future refugees who come to Norway,” said Minister for Employment and Inclusion Tonje Brenna. “The most important thing we do for integration is for those who come to Norway to learn Norwegian and get a job in a serious working life. Then we must have a flexible and simple regulatory framework that helps to achieve these goals,” she added.
In Sweden, the government is planning to increase the allowance for people who wish to return to their country of origin voluntarily. The current remigration allowance is € 873 but only one person used it in 2023. The government is reportedly planning to increase this amount to € 30,000 from 2026. “More people who haven’t really been able to find their place here in Sweden will choose to return instead of living here and, year after year, living on benefits, living in exclusion,” said Sweden Democrats (SD) Spokesperson Ludvig Aspling. “We believe that there are many people who would actually prefer to return home, but they may need a little help along the way,” he added. The proposal to increase the remigration allowance appears to be creating division between the three parties that make up the coalition government. “We should not contribute to the implementation of ill-considered proposals that are actually based on the SD’s harsh rhetoric,” said Finnish Liberal member of the European Parliament Karin Karlsbro. Her Liberal party colleague, Youth Association chair Anton Holmlund, added: “It [the allowance] sends pretty bad signals to everyone who wants to stay and wants to integrate. Here, the government says that you should not stay here. Ideally, we want to pay you to leave. This is a completely wrong signal and will not help integration in Sweden”.
A Chinese activist is at risk of deportation after Denmark rejected her asylum application. Liu Dongling, who leads an online campaign called ‘Ban the Great Firewall’ against China’s internet censorship regime, applied for asylum in June 2022. In June 2024, Danish immigration authorities informed Liu that her asylum application had been rejected and that she would be deported to China within seven days. Fearing she would be falsely detained in China, Liu fled to Sweden. A number of human rights organisations, including the Madrid-based Safeguard Defenders, are trying to persuade the Danish immigration authorities to reconsider their decision. “We have prepared all the paperwork to support the reassessment of her case,” said the organisation’s director, Peter Dahlin.
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NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
HUNGARY
- European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen has allocated the health and animal welfare portfolio to Hungary’s Commissioner-designate Oliver Várhelyi in a move that the Hungarian opposition has described as ‘humiliating’ and a sign of Hungary’s increasing marginalisation within the EU.
- The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has ruled against the Hungarian state in another transit zone case.
- The EU has triggered a special procedure to recoup the unpaid €200 million fine that the European Court of Justice of the EU imposed on Hungary over its ‘unprecedented and exceptionally serious breach’ of EU asylum law.
- A senior minister has reported that Hungary is ‘ready to file a lawsuit against the Commission’ to reimburse the costs it has incurred in ‘protecting the EU’s borders’.
- The EC has declared that it is ‘standing ready to use all our powers under the treaty’ to thwart the Hungarian government’s threat to bus people seeking asylum in Hungary to Brussels.
- Minister for European Union Affairs Bóka János has announced that Hungary will join the Netherlands in requesting an opt-out from EU asylum and migration rules.
On 17 September, European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen allocated the health and animal welfare portfolio to Hungary’s Commissioner-designate Oliver Várhelyi. The Hungarian opposition has described the move as “humiliating” and a sign of an increasingly marginalised Hungary in the EU. Várhelyi is currently Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood so the new role is widely seen as a demotion. “This is where [Hungarian Prime Minister] Orbán and his party have led Hungary. Zero influence. A laughing stock,” opposition member of the European Parliament Csaba Molnár posted on Facebook. “The Hungarian commissioner will be given the post that is the least important. Such a post did not even exist before, it is being created specifically for the purpose of humiliating the Orbán family,” he added.
Also on 17 September, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled against Hungary in another transit zone case. A mother and her four children who were seeking asylum in the country were unlawfully detained in inhuman conditions for 17 months. ECRE member organisation the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC) represented the applicants before the ECtHR, the fourteenth time that the organisation has been successful in ECtHR cases of unlawful and inhuman transit zone detention of families with children seeking asylum in Hungary. “Of course, we are happy about the new judgment, but we also see that even today, Hungary often fails to guarantee adequate treatment to refugee and asylum-seeking children,” said HHC lawyer Barbara Pohárnok who represented the family.
On 18 September, the EU triggered a special procedure to recoup the €200 million fine (subject to an additional €1 million for every day of non-compliance) that the Court of Justice of the EU imposed on Hungary in June 2024 over its “unprecedented and exceptionally serious breach” of EU asylum law. Hungary has publicly refused to pay the fine and has subsequently missed two payment deadlines: the first in late August a second on 17 September. As a result, the EC has activated an “offsetting procedure”. “So, what we are going to do now is to deduct the €200 million from upcoming payments from the EU budget towards Hungary,” stated EC Spokesperson Balazs Ujvari. A day after the EU triggered the offsetting procedure, Hungarian Minister of State for International Communication and Relations Zoltán Kovács X posted that Hungary had “begun negotiations to address the EU court’s migration ruling, aiming to resolve the situation without paying the fines”. Citing Minister for European Union Affairs Bóka János, Kovács wrote that “Hungary’s goal is to stop the daily € 1 million fine while resolving the issue” and that the two sides had “agreed on the channels for ongoing discussions and set a clear timetable for further negotiations”.
Elsewhere, the Hungarian government has stated it is “ready to file a lawsuit against the Commission” to reimburse the costs of “protecting” the EU’s borders. On 12 September, Minister in charge of the Prime Minister’s Office Gergely Gulyás argued that Hungary should get a partial reimbursement from the EU as it had “spent €2 billion on [border control] without any relevant financial assistance” while other countries had “received financial aid for the protection of the Schengen border”. The announcement about a possible lawsuit comes a week after Hungary accused the EU of refusing to provide it with financial assistance to support its migration management efforts. Responding to the accusation, an EU spokesperson noted that Hungary had received “nearly double” the amount of funding in the 2021-2027 EU long-term budget compared to the previous period, and that “Hungary, moreover, received emergency assistance from the home affairs fund to provide support to people fleeing the Russian war in Ukraine through direct management”.
Finally, on 10 September, the EC announced that it was “standing ready to use all our powers under the treaty to ensure that the EU law is respected” in order to thwart the Hungarian government’s threat to bus people who were seeking asylum in Hungary to Brussels. On 30 August, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán threatened to send people “with a one-way ticket” to Brussels and Deputy Minister of the Interior Bence Rétvári even went as far as holding a press conference to show off the buses that would be used to implement the measure. “If Brussels wants illegal migrants, Brussels can have them,” Rétvári said. Several Belgian officials, including Minister for Foreign Affairs Hadja Lahbib, State Secretary for Asylum and Migration Nicole de Moor and Mayor of Brussels Philippe Clos have all condemned Hungary’s plan, calling it a provocation that “contradicts European obligations” and that “undermines solidarity and co-operation within the Union”.
On 19 September, Minister for European Union Affairs Bóka János X posted that the Hungarian government would “join the Netherlands in asking for an opt-out from EU asylum and migration rules if a Treaty amendment allows it”.
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NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
UK
- Twenty people have died in two separate incidents in the Channel in September.
- France’s interior minister has called for a for a migration treaty between the UK and the EU, while the UK has announced additional funding for border security.
- Prime Minister Keir Starmer has praised Italy’s efforts to reduce irregular migration and shown ‘great interest’ in the Italy-Albania Protocol following discussions with his Italian counterpart.
- More than 30 NGOs have written a joint letter to Secretary of State for the Home Department Yvette Cooper to denounce a recent proposal to pay them to help settle people who have been deported from the UK.
- The chair of the public inquiry into abuse at an immigration removal centre in 2017 has criticised the government for failing to agree all but one of its 33 recommendations.
- The Home Office has announced that it has scrapped plans to house people seeking asylum at a former military base in Lincolnshire.
Another eight people have died whilst trying to cross the Channel from France to the UK in a small boat. The latest deaths occurred in the early hours of 15 September off the coast of Ambleteuse in northern France. According to French authorities, the boat was carrying 59 people from Afghanistan, Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan when it ran aground and was “clearly torn on the rocks”. 51 people, including a 10-moth-old baby were rescued. Commenting on the latest tragedy, the head of ECRE member organisation the Refugee Council, Enver Solomon, urged the UK government not to rely on enforcement to reduce the number of small boat crossings. “Enforcement alone is not the solution. People are being forced into the arms of smugglers because they are desperate, fleeing violence and persecution in countries like Afghanistan, Syria and Sudan in search of safety,” he said, adding: “Smugglers will respond to tougher policing by making these refugees take bigger risks, with more perilous crossing points and more crowded boats”.
The eight deaths near Ambleteuse came less than two weeks after 12 people died after the bottom of their boat “ripped open” off the Cap Gris-Nez a few kilometres along the coast. According to French authorities, the dead included six children and a pregnant woman. It is understood that most of the victims were from Eritrea. Commenting on the tragedy, which occurred on 3 September, Minister for Border Security and Asylum Angela Eagle claimed that there were already some safe routes available to people who wanted to claim asylum in the UK. “Unfortunately, there are also (…) more people who want to come, than there are safe or legal routes that we could ever set up,” she said, adding: “So the way of stopping this is actually to deal with the people-smuggling gangs and the exploitation of vulnerable people that they are facilitating”. Amnesty International UK said: “No amount of ‘smash the gangs’ policing and government rhetoric is going to stop these disasters from unfolding time and again if the needs of people exploited by these gangs remain unaddressed”. The head of the refugee rights NGO Safe Passage International, Dr Wanda Wyporska said: “We must not accept this government’s refusal to prioritise opening new safe routes”, while the head of refugee NGO Care4Calais, Steve Smith, said: “Every political leader, on both sides of our Channel, needs to be asked: ‘How many lives will be lost before they end these avoidable tragedies?’. Amélie Moyart from the humanitarian NGO Utopia 56 highlighted the risk of an enforcement-focused approach. “There’s still a lot of demand but there’s less boats, which means there are more people in each one, and it’s more difficult to put a boat in the sea,” she said, adding: “All the enforcement the French and English are putting in place, it’s not a solution, it’s just making people take more and more risk and making the crossing more dangerous”.
The day after the Cap Gris-New incident, French Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin called for a migration treaty between the UK and the EU. The EU should seek to “re-establish a traditional migration partnership with our British friends and neighbours,” he said, adding that the € 541 million that the UK had paid France for increased border security represented only “a third of what we are spending”. He also suggested that the UK was an attractive destination for people on the move because “often, you can work without having papers” and “as there is no common immigration policy with the EU (…), people try a lot to go to Great Britain because they know that they are probably not deportable from British territory”. On 17 September, UK Secretary of State for the Home Department Yvette Cooper announced that the government would allocate £ 75 million to improve the capabilities of the UK Border Security Command.
On 16 September, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer had a meeting with his Italian counterpart, Giorgia Meloni, to discuss various migration-related issues. At a press conference after their meeting, Starmer praised the Italian prime minister, saying: “You have made significant progress by working hand-in-hand with countries along the migration routes to address the root causes of migration and dismantle criminal networks”. Meloni told journalists that Starmer had shown “great interest” in the Italy-Albania Protocol that was signed in November 2023. Starmer also praised Italy’s role in the migration deals that the EU has signed with Libya and Tunisia. “Preventing people leaving their country in the first place is far better than trying to deal with those that have arrived in any of our countries (…),” he said, adding that the deals “appear to have had quite a profound effect”. Several members of the UK parliament, including members of Starmer’s own Labour party questioned the wisdom of the leader of a centre-left UK government taking migration advice from a far-right Italian politician. Kim Johnson MP described it as “disturbing” while Nadia Whittome MP suggested that the government should be “building an asylum and immigration system with compassion at its heart”. Responding to the criticism, Starmer claimed that learning lessons from “allies” demonstrated the new UK government’s “return to British pragmatism”. “We are pragmatists, first and foremost. When we see a challenge, we discuss with our friends and allies the different approaches that are being taken, look at what works,” he said.
More than 30 NGOs have written to Secretary of State for the Home Department Yvette Cooper to denounce the Home Office’s proposal to pay them to help settle people who have been deported from the UK. The joint letter was sent in protest over the launch of a call for tenders for a £ 15 million government contract to pay “non-statutory sector organisations that are charities and non-profit making organisations” to help people from, Albania, Bangladesh, Ghana, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Nigeria, Pakistan, Vietnam and Zimbabwe with “temporary accommodation, food and cash assistance” when they arrive back in their countries of origin. “We stand united against this attempt to make us complicit in the department’s harmful and divisive anti-migrant agenda,” the NGOs wrote. According to one of the signatory organisations, the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), the call for tenders represented an attempt by the government to “bribe” NGOs. “In this context, offering charities millions to become part of the system putting our clients at risk is cynical and deeply unethical,” said Mary Atkinson from JCWI.
Elsewhere, the chair of the public inquiry into abuse that took place in 2017 at the Brook House Immigration Removal Centre (IRC) near London Gatwick Airport has reported that the government had only agreed to one of its 33 recommendations. On 18 September, Kate Eves said the previous government’s response had been “inadequate and disappointing” and that the current government was “failing to listen” to the inquiry’s proposals for urgent changes relating to staff training, the use of force in IRCs and time limits on detention. One year after the report was published, the only recommendation that has been agreed to by the government relates to ensuring that all IRC staff are aware of a “ban on handcuffing people behind their backs when sitting down”.
And finally, the Home Office has announced that it has scrapped plans to house people seeking asylum at a former military base in Lincolnshire. According to a written statement to the House of Commons by Minister for Border Security and Asylum Angela Eagle on 5 September, the plans to convert RAF Scampton had been abandoned because it “clearly fails to deliver value for money for the taxpayer”. An estimated £ 60 million had already been spent on the scheme which was due to have cost a total of £ 122 million between its scheduled opening in autumn 2024 and the end of its use in 2027. The decision comes less than two months after the Home Office also announced that the contract for the Bibby Stockholm barge would not be renewed when it expires in January 2025. The barge, which is moored off Portland on the south coast of England, has been used as asylum accommodation for men since August 2023.
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NEWS FROM THE ECRE OFFICE
ECRE has published a comments paper on the recast Directive Laying Down Standards for the Reception of Applicants for International Protection, commonly known as the ‘Reception Conditions Directive’ (RCD). The RCD was adopted in May 2024 as one of the central pillars of the reformed Common European Asylum System (CEAS).
This comments paper is the latest in a series of ECRE’s analyses of the legislation that collectively forms the Pact on Migration and Asylum. It follows comments papers on the Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management, the Regulation on Addressing Situations of Crisis and Force Majeure in the Field of Migration and Asylum, and the Regulation establishing a Common Procedure for International Protection in the EU. It should be read together with ECRE’s comments paper on the European Commission proposal to recast the 2013 RCD and its analysis of the May 2018 interinstitutional political agreement on it and several other legislative proposals.
In ECRE’s view, the new RCD brings about positive and negative changes when analysed from the perspective of fundamental rights. As was the case with the other pieces of legislation that were agreed in 2018, the new RCD is more balanced than the proposal that was launched in 2020. Positive changes include clearer definitions of material reception conditions and strengthened requirements on the standards applicable to all forms of accommodation. In addition, provisions on contingency planning are intended to prevent “crises” and challenges in reception systems. In terms of socio-economic rights, the new RCD provides that access to the labour market must be granted at an earlier stage (six months maximum).
Nonetheless, other changes included in the new RCD allow for the withdrawal and reduction of reception conditions in a wider range of circumstances (including absconding) and, notably, removal of entitlement to reception conditions is required when the applicant is not in the EU member state (MS) responsible, a measure which forms part of the punitive approach that runs throughout the CEAS reforms. Even when reduction and withdrawal are applied, minimum standards must still be ensured.
ECRE’s analysis of the changes that have been introduced by the new RCD are strongly informed by the many assessments of the implementation of the 2013 RCD which indicate areas where improvements are necessary. While transposing the new elements of the 2024 recast and planning how to manage these changes, ECRE believes that EU MS must also tackle the longstanding and well-documented implementation gaps, not least because many have been neglected or deprioritised during the reform process whereas the legal obligations concerned remain central elements of the recast RCD.
The comments paper is available here.
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